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Abstract
Despite the enduring interest in the written work of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) 
there appears to be shortage of studies focusing specifically on what he had to say 
about the matter of civilians or non-combatants in war. After extensive consultation 
with primary and secondary sources this dissertation will argue that Clausewitz wrote 
a lot more on this subject than is commonly acknowledged. He was aware that 
civilian suffering was not simply an accidental by-product of war but also the result of 
deliberate strategic intent to compel an enemy to do one’s will. Clausewitz did not 
endorse such methods because he had a moral and theoretical preference for decisive 
battles between conventional armed forces. He tended to dismiss violence against 
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It is first necessary to introduce the reader to the general subject of war and civilians as it 
stands in relation to the work of Carl von Clausewitz.1 This chapter will start first by defining 
the term ‘civilian’ or ‘non-combatant’ and mention recent academic works on the targeting of 
such persons during times of war. The narrative wilf then point out the challenges of applying 
the principal author and source material to this particular area. A brief bibliographic survey of 
secondary literature will show the various interpretations generated over the centuries and 
help to distil the main outstanding questions and points of controversy driving this inquiry. 
This chapter will end with a basic overview of how the rest of the dissertation will be 
structured in order to make the case stated in the abstract and thesis statement below.
Outstanding questions
Any academic inquiry into warfare should start with a reading of On War by Clausewitz. As 
we near the bicentennial anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo the contents have somehow 
remained relevant to the phenomenon in all its potential manifestations from thermonucleair 
destruction to the nebulous menace of cyber warfare.2 The enduring interest in the treatise is 
attributable to its masterful scope, timeless concepts, and the way it gives readers a 
penetrating insight into military means and political ends so that nearly any debate about war 
almost always starts from Clausewitz’s paradigm or returns to it.3 By writing on the 
existential nature of war Clausewitz touched on many concepts which transcend time and 
culture. The trinity is especially helpful because it provides a three-fold perspective for 
understanding all forms of war-making, including those against civilians and non-combatants 
who are generally understood to be unarmed persons not belonging to a military 
organisation.4
It is well-known that Clausewitz was fascinated by the role of politics and popular 
passions. He understood that the degree of civilian involvement influenced the course of 
militaiy campaigns and the character of entire wars. Yet it has been left unclear whether 
Clausewitz wrote extensively about the suffering of civilians, or largely ignores this aspect of 
war. The importance of this area of research is paramount given that the man and his written 
legacy have been subjected to many conflicting interpretations and the charge of advocating 
the mass destruction of human life. Civilians meanwhile continue to perish in high numbers in 
armed conflicts across the world. Benjamin A. Valentino’s Final Solutions defines ‘mass 
killing’ to mean the intentional deaths of 50,000-plus people over a five-year period through
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direct killing and/or the effects of starvation, exposure, exhaustion, disease, relocation or 
forced labour.5
This dissertation intends to bridge the gap between academic works on the targeting 
of civilians in general and those in the more specialised field of Clausewitz studies. The void 
has left many important questions unanswered. Did Clausewitz for example advocate the 
destruction of civilian lives and property or did he oppose such methods? Are scorched-earth 
operations an effective logistical strategy or just disgraceful vandalism in his opinion? What 
does Clausewitz tell us about how to wage a people’s war and was he aware of its 
humanitarian consequences? How does one defeat an enemy insurgency and neutralise the 
passions of an enemy people? How should a conquered nation be treated? What happens if 
cruel and irrational politicians take control of policy? The answers to such questions are either 
openly on display in Clausewitz’s work or so subtle and fleeting in inference that they must 
be extrapolated carefully. Referring to various sources written at different stages of 
developing thought in order to answer thematic questions of our time obviously brings with it 
the risk of quoting Clausewitz out of context.
Thesis
On the basis of extensive consultation of primary and secondary sources this dissertation will 
highlight the fact that Clausewitz was neither ignorant nor insensitive to the suffering of 
civilians. His work displays an awareness of the humanitarian effects of battles, sieges, 
plundering raids, burdensome contributions, scorched-earth strategies, passionate hatreds and 
punitive or exterminatory policies brought forth by political conditions. It is actually curious 
that Clausewitz did not give the matter more attention. The answer can be attributed to the 
hypothesis that Clausewitz was a conscientious professional soldier exhibiting a conservative 
attitude towards the conduct of war. Clausewitz’s professional prejudices or academic 
assumptions regarding civilians are reflected in at least three ways.
First, his repeated emphasis on decisive battle between regular armed forces (even in 
the event of a people’s war or insurgency). Second, a dismissal of violence against non­
military persons as morally wrong and military ineffective or counter-productive. Third, his 
observation that higher political goals and a greater participation of the masses in the politics 
of a state (i.e. democracy) generally leads to higher levels of violence and destruction. From a 
moral and historical perspective, Clausewitz suggests that war against civilians was a practice 
of weak societies in the past and a terrible excess of the French in the present. From a 
theoretical perspective, the targeting of civilians goes against the logic of destroying or
6
i r u r  u v t u ^ i i u r i
disarming the enemy’s combatants, thereby rendering the enemy defenceless in order to 
achieve a political purpose.
What is a ‘civilian ’?
It may not be immediately apparent how the ideas of an early nineteenth century soldier can 
be applied to a phenomenon that seems so characteristic of recent times. The legal concept of 
a civilian or non-combatant is a relatively new one and such terms do not exist in the work of 
Clausewitz. The word civilian -  derived from the Latin civil is -  was likely to mean a person 
with some expertise in civil law.6 There was no body of political science and international law 
to define, let alone enforce, the principle in Clausewitz’s day. There was nevertheless a 
cultural preference for decisive battles and a moral ambiguity (or hypocrisy) towards the 
destruction of the lives and property of those not directly involved in combat.
The principle of non-combatant immunity existed faintly in the writings of 
theologians, philosophers and publicists like Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius and Emer de 
Vattel. It was only in the modem age that a secular and legalised framework of International 
Humanitarian Law was incrementally constructed to accommodate the lex ferenda arguments 
stemming from the philosophical traditions ofjus ad bellumjus in bello and jus post bellum.7 
The Geneva Conventions, Hague Regulations and United Nations specified the rights and 
obligations of militaiy servicemen by demanding protection for those rendered incapable of 
further combat through wounds or capture. In the response to the widespread abuse of civil 
populations, prohibitions were slowly extended against inflicting direct violence or inducing 
harmful conditions for all individuals who were hors de combat.8 Valentino provides a useful 
working definition of a civilian or non-combatant:
‘A noncombatant is defined as any unarmed person who is not a member of an 
organized military group and who does not actively participate in hostilities by 
intending to cause physical harm to enemy personnel or property. It should be noted 
that simply associating with combatants, providing food or other nonlethal military 
supplies to them, or participating in nonviolent political activities in support of armed 
forces does not convert a noncombatant to a combatant. Because these activities pose 
no immediate threat of physical harm to combatants, individuals who engage in them 
deserve protection from killing -  although they may be subject to judicial 
punishments.’9
The whole concept of ‘guilt’ or ‘innocence’ is so complicated in modem conflicts that it has 
become redundant. Individuals can easily take up arms to fight then revert to bystanders by 
disgarding their weapons. Even unarmed individuals are inextricably linked to the war- 
making capacity of state and non-state actors by working in war-related industries, paying
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taxes or providing services, labour and materials, etc.10 It is just simpler to define everyone 
who is not a legal combatant as a civilian and afford them the protection specified in the 1977 
Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention.11
Unless they take a direct part in hostilities individuals and entire populations will 
retain protection from military operations or any of the following: ‘acts or threats of violence’ 
with the primary purpose to spread terror; ‘indiscriminate attacks’ causing damage or loss of 
life incidental to the concrete military advantage anticipated from attacking a military target; 
the use of human shields; attacks and/or reprisals against civilian objects, cultural objects or 
places of worship, objects indispensable for survival, the natural environment or 
works/installations containing dangerous forces.12 In short, it is considered a grave breach of 
International Humanitarian Law to launch attacks on objects, facilities, localities, and persons 
outside of combat.13
The ’western way o f war ’
War remains an inescapable phenomenon of our modem world and it is civilians who 
typically bear the brunt of casualties; a fact verified by recent armed conflicts in parts of 
Africa, the Middle and Far East.14 It is easy for the general public in the more peaceful parts 
of the western world to overlook or downplay war against civilians as incomprehensible 
barbarity. Mainstream military historiography has not helped disabuse this natural notion by 
following in the tradition of Sir Edward Creasy15 and Hans Delbriick16 with narratives on 
decisive battles.17 Anglo-American scholars such as Victor Davis Hanson18 have propagated 
the alluring notion that western societies have a cultural disposition towards conventional 
battles, due in part to Clausewitz, and are now unable or unwilling to adapt, militarily or 
culturally, to the costly and ‘dirty’ business of fighting insurgency warfare.19
The argument for a ‘western way of war’ is select in its presentation of history and 
rather self-congratulatory in tone. Prior to the nineteenth century battle was more often than 
not a difficult, dangerous and unnecessary undertaking, particularly against superior armies
Off 01 00 OTbelonging to the Muslim world. John A. Lynn, John France, and Beatrice Heuser, have 
all challenged Hanson’s thesis partly on the grounds that western armies tended to avoid 
battle and found alternative means to impose their will upon their enemies such as devastating 
the lands and property of those who would be recognised today as civilians. The reasoning for 
such attacks is a controversial and contentious area of study because it dredges up animosities 
from the past and brings the actions or atrocities of the perpetrators into ethical question.24
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The targeting o f civilians: current debates
It is debatable as to what exactly in human nature or culture lessens the stigma of homicidal 
killing to the point where it becomes acceptable to the perpetrators. Individuals and societies 
at war usually want to preserve their own sense of humanity. They will try to assuage their 
consciences with a multitude of excuses commonly based around race, religion, nationalism, 
the appropriation of wealth or resources, or a sense of dealing out justice for some crime like 
armed rebellion. The most common grounds for understanding the causes of genocide or mass 
killing therefore include: the psychological/sociological conditions working on ‘ordinary’ 
individuals; the domestic conditions or regime-type of the state; or the specific strategies and 
policies of those in power.25
According to Valentino et al the political reasoning for acts of genocide could be seen 
as a way of eliminating internal enemies.26 Targeting foreign civilians in times of war on the 
other hand could be a way to coerce the enemy and undermine his means of resistance.27 
Based on the study of interstate wars, counter-insurgencies and civil conflicts between 1816 
and 2003 Alexander B. Downes has advanced some strong hypotheses on the reasoning 
behind the targeting of civilians. First, the desperation to win in desperate times and save lives 
in the long-run. Second, to deny enemy combatants the food, shelter, intelligence and 
manpower they derive from civilian sources. This can be attempted by using reprisal killings 
or strategies of interdiction (scorched-earth and population resettlement). Third, the desire to 
achieve lasting control over a conquered territory by killing or expelling a potentially 
dissident population.28
In certain circumstances like a ‘supreme emergency’ political leaders, professional 
soldiers and the common people will be tempted to disregard the principle of non-combatant 
immunity and use more extreme and indiscriminate means of violence than previous political 
conditions would allow.29 Whatever the causes or reasoning it is evident that the terrorisation 
and killing of civilians dates back to beginning of civilisation.30 From the Spartan raids into 
Attica during the Peloponnesian War to the suicide bombings of the present day there is of 
course intense debate over the morality and effectiveness of such attacks. A strong argument 
has been made that far from discrediting the enemy policy-makers, weakening their forces 
capacity to fight, or demoralising their popular support, attacks on civilians actually have the 
opposite effect.31 But if war on civilians is so useless it begs the question why so many 
combatants have so often resorted to it as a military method in the past.32
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It is important to remember that not all historic societies were as versatile as the 
cohesive nation-states of the twentieth century. The latter usually had enough organisation 
and capital to provide medical aid, rations and other and assistance to their beleaguered 
populations. Human beings lived for centuries in tenuous ecological equilibrium with the land 
where the priority was to get enough food to survive. Crop failures, natural disasters, disease, 
or the appearance of bandits and raiders could all damage the land and deplete valuable 
surpluses or scarce commodities.33 Agricultural devastation or laying the enemy’s lands under 
contribution were standard, if not the preferred, methods of attack in Europe until the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Given that Clausewitz witnessed the humanitarian 
effects of agricultural devastation it brings into question why he did not give this strategy as 
much attention as Vegetius who inspired medieval warriors with the maxim: ‘Famine makes 
greater havoc in an army than the enemy, and is more terrible than the sword.’34
The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
The lifetime of Clausewitz represents an important historical period because it witnessed a 
major shift away from siege and properietorial warfare to decisive battles between mass 
armed forces. According to David A. Bell the wars of this time paradoxically blurred and 
hardened the normative distinctions between soldiers and what we would today call 
civilians.35 The victimisation of the latter in this period is easy to overlook because traditional 
military historiography, including Clausewitz’s contribution, has been captivated by its epic 
battles. The general emphasis on destroying the enemy’s armed forces through the 
‘Napoleonic-Clausewitzian paradigm’ meant that these wars appear relatively restrained by 
the standards of other centuries.36
The Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars were essentially humanitarian disasters which 
degraded and destroyed the lives of millions. There are no concrete figures for military dead 
yet it is estimated that the death toll of European combatants came to 5,000,000.37 It is 
impossible to tell how many civilians were killed, maimed, displaced or suffered from the 
effects of having their food and shelter confiscated or destroyed. The effects of the campaigns 
in the Iberian Peninsula and Russia were certainly very devastating.38 Even the British Isles, 
which escaped relatively unscathed, paid an enormous cost for maintaining its armed forces, 
subsidising allies and waging intermittent economic warfare against France over two 
decades.39
This period witnessed a significant amount of civil disruption and popularised 
violence as the warring armies trampled their way back and forth across Europe. Hugh Smith
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explains that the French invaders sometimes ‘met armed resistance from local populations 
driven in part by national enthusiasm but also parochialism, threats to religion and popular 
culture, and the impositions and brutality of die occupiers.’40 The distinctions between 
soldiers and civilians blurred with horrendous results in the Vendee, Tyrol, Italy and Spain. 
Finally there were nationalist rebellious in Belgium, Poland, the Balkans and Greece all 
seeking freedom from foreign rule 41 It is important to describe this historical context and 
question to what extent it influenced the thought of Clausewitz.
Bringing Clausewitz into the debate
Despite the seemingly all-encompassing title and wide acclaim On War is not an ideal starting 
point for an engaging discussion on war and civilians. The main problems basically relate to 
the man, what remains of his written work and the various (mis)interpretations it has 
generated. The truth is that Clausewitz was not a consistent or coherent man and neither was 
his intellectual output.42 It is scattered in various historical volumes and periodical literature, 
often fragmented in content, variable in approach, difficult to date, and largely untranslated 
into English43 The influence of On War over the centuries is just as difficult to assess and is 
perhaps best explained in Heuser’s Reading Clausewitz.44
Put simply for the purpose a literature review, Clausewitz’s treatise was seen 
primarily as a manual for the conduct of mass armies into battle with few questioning its 
application to guerrilla warfare. Clausewitz was used by militant German nationalists to 
support ‘total war’ and blamed retrospectively by the British for the resulting atrocities. As 
Clausewitz’s reputation was rehabilitated in the West after 1945, Anglo-American readers 
became attracted to the message of political control within the context of the Cold War. After 
the fall of the Berlin Wall Clausewitz again came under criticism for being unable to explain 
‘low intensity’ violence waged by non-state actors.
Recent criticisms have stimulated academic debate and more a balanced or 
ambiguous academic view of Clausewitz is emerging for the twenty-first century. While there 
is an element of truth to all the interpretations above Clausewitz cannot be simply labelled 
and pigeon-holed into a category of political philosophy. As this dissertation will show, 
Clausewitz’s elusive thoughts on the matter of civilians are actually a lot more mixed than the 
thesis statement asserts. It is necessary however to take a firm stance against the various 
misinterpretations, which are forgivable given the complex nature of the man and his work.
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Clausewitz’s motivations and writing process
The main problems can be traced back to the original motivations and writing process of the 
author whose focus was largely on the importance of conventional battle and the role of 
policy or politics (Politik).45 In 1818 Major-General Clausewitz was relegated to 
administrative duties at the Allegemeine Kriegsschule in Berlin where he had enough spare 
time to reflect on recent events and write copiously on military affairs.46 Clausewitz felt that 
his years of experience and studious contemplation on warfare had left him with valuable 
ideas and insights, which he hoped others would find interesting to read more than once 47 
According to Azar Gat nobody formulated the Napoleonic experience in such extreme terms 
as Clausewitz, not even his fellow Prussian reformers, who had all been deeply shaken and 
enraged by defeat and subjugation of the kingdom.48
Clausewitz was irritated by the works of contemporaries like Dietrich Adam Heinrich 
von Bulow49 and Archduke Charles of Austria.50 In Clausewitz’s opinion they had reduced 
the understanding and practice war to abstract theorems and scientific principles. Military 
theory should instead be a heuristic aid to judgement; a way to gain an illuminating insight 
into a mass of phenomena if one lacked the coup d'oeil that comes with innate genius.51 
Theory had to be formed on the basis of historical examples and real-life experience. The 
problem was that it was all so subjective and untrustworthy. Clausewitz was dismissive of 
military history prior to the seventeenth century, thus curtailing any investigation into what he 
understood about civilian suffering in the past.52 The fact that Clausewitz does mention wars, 
campaigns and individual commanders dating from the time of Alexander the Great requires 
students to have a detailed knowledge of military history in order to know what he refers to 
and, just as importantly, what he does not.
The Napoleonic Wars of course formed the bulk of Clausewitz’s studies. He believed 
that these had truly revealed the basic elements of war, its violent essence, and Bonaparte 
most embodied its aggressive and destructive spirit. Clausewitz witnessed first-hand the 
‘catastrophe of 1806’ and the way the leaders had dissipated the energies of their antiquated 
armies on panaceas and a ‘flimsy web of scientific but extremely feeble strategic schemes’ 
simply not good enough to catch Bonaparte. The ‘wild boar’ was eventually caged by the 
combined coalition forces at Leipzig in 1813.53 Clausewitz felt that too many people had 
dismissed the French battles as crude brawls representing decay in the science or art of war. 
By undoing the reforms that helped the Austro-Prussian powers to achieve victory they were
12
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slipping back into the same kind of complacency which had caught them off-guard in the first 
place.54
In seeking to write a book of some theoretical value for soldiers and statesmen 
Clausewitz explored the existential nature of war and the importance of policy or political 
conditions, specifically the aims adopted and degree of popular participation. In a note dated 
10th July 1827 Clausewitz stated a need to redraft the first six books of On War and emphasise 
two things throughout: first, that there at least two types of war (to completely overthrow 
one’s opponent or merely achieve some modest territorial conquests on the frontiers); second, 
that war is nothing but a setting forth of politics with other means.55 Various other letters and 
historical studies written around this time also put greater stress on the political conditions 
permeating military actions, thereby making war an instrument of policy.56
Clausewitz henceforth undertook corrections to On War as well as writing up bulky 
histories on the most recent campaigns.57 Whether or not he found the time between 1827 and 
1830 to revise and polish up more than the first chapter of book one is unknown. What we 
have is invaluable even if some chapters lack the superior style, language and three-fold 
conception of the very first.58 Clausewitz was at least satisfied with certain concepts and 
believed that a whole range of propositions could be checked against real-life without too 
much difficulty. The author’s expressed wish was that the reader would give On War careful 
attention and test its conclusions against the actual history of war.59
Posthumous publication and dialectics o f the text
The writing process was interrupted by a European crisis in 1830 and Clausewitz died 
prematurely in November 1831. Marie von Clausewitz faithfully picked up the pieces and 
endeavoured to fulfil her late husband’s wish to have the unfinished work published. She was 
helped in this effort by family and friends like Friedrich Wilhelm von BrUhl, Franz August 
O’Etzel and Count Carl von der Groben. The extent of their influence on the manuscripts is 
difficult to detect but just as Marie asked readers to be lenient with her husband’s work the 
same courtesy should be extended to its editors.60
The treatise On War composed just three of ten volumes making up the Hinterlassene 
Werke or Posthumous Work. The other seven contain a lengthy collection of historical 
materials covering the revolutionary campaigns in Italy and Switzerland between 1796-1799 
(volumes four, five and six), the later Napoleonic campaigns in Russia and France (seven and
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eight), as well as various other campaigns by generals of the past, notably Gustavus Adolphus 
and Frederick the Great (nine and ten).61
Despite the challenges of dating and translating these sizable historical volumes Jan 
Willem Honig has highlighted their importance as they contain theoretical insights.62 In 
regard to the specific matter of civilians these volumes are indeed significant. The first page 
of On War in volume one for example starts with dismissive remarks about publicists 
applying ethics to the act of violence in war while the last page of volume ten ends with a 
moral denunciation of the methods of cruelty employed against the civil uprising in the 
Vendee.63
There were many more essays, draft papers, instructional syllabi to militaiy students 
as well as numerous letters to family and friends. These materials were intended for smaller 
readership and went unpublished until they were retrieved by archivists and historians like 
Hans Delbriick and Karl Schwartz. Private letters by Clausewitz to his wife are especially 
important because they reveal his humanitarian sentiment as well as his candid political 
opinion on issues such as the Polish Uprising of 1830.64
The initial publication of the Posthumous Work was not a great commercial success. 
The historical volumes attracted only modest attention in England,65 and On War went into 
French translation without much acclaim.66 It was not Clausewitz who was most widely read 
in this period but Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini whose Art o f War was seen to have more 
practical application than the ‘scholarly labyrinth’ constructed by Clausewitz.67 The relative 
obscurity of On War in the English-speaking world can initially be attributed to the 
difficulties of the language and the philosophical nature of its content68
Clausewitz was a certainly a brilliant, if very self-deprecating, thinker who adopted a 
dialectic approach of having two or more clashing concepts. The opening chapter for example 
sets out a thesis (war is an act of violence), contrasts it with a antithesis (war is a continuation 
of politics or policy by other means), and the incorporates and supersedes them both with a 
synthesis (the trinity).69 The dialectics and ambiguities in the original text, as well as the 
subtle changes in later translations, help to explain why there are so many conflicting 
interpretations of Clausewitz from a devil’s advocate of all-out war to a sober supporter of 
political control.70
Clausewitz and the cult o f the offensive battle
14
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After years of obscurity Clausewitz’s name was propelled to international and almost 
mystical fame when Prussia’s commander-in-chief Helmuth Graf von Moltke gave On War 
partial credit for his victories over Austria and France.71 The defensive principles of Archduke 
Charles (d. 1847), which Clausewitz had so often criticised, were exposed as inadequate in 
1866. Rather than tapping into the passions of his subjects Emperor Franz Joseph sued for 
peace (much like the Habsburgs of Clausewitz’s day) on the basis that his armies had been 
defeated in battle mid the victors were in a position to continue requisitioning occupied lands 
to the point of despoliation.72 The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was less tractable when the 
invasion provoked the formation of a new revolutionaiy republic, a protracted siege at Paris 
and francs-tireurs in the country at large.73 The experience disturbed Moltke enough to warn 
the Reichstag in Clausewitzian language that the age of cabinet wars was over and wars of the 
future would be affairs for the whole nation.74
The insights of Clausewitz became more accessible to English language readers at 
this time with a translation of On War by Colonel James John Graham in 1873.75 Lieutenant- 
Colonel George. F. R. Henderson lectured on the text for the British Army,76 while in the 
naval sphere Alfred Mahan and Julian Corbett propounded the logic that one attain command 
of the sea by destroying the enemy’s battle fleet and delegate attacks on the civilian 
commerce as secondary missions, unless of course they better serve the political purpose of 
war.77 A whole range of military responses for small wars was outlined by ‘the Clausewitz of 
colonial warfare’ Charles Callwell who placed a similar emphasis on battles and the capture 
of capitals, but much more on agricultural devastation and cattle-raiding.78 Sir Charles Dilke 
referred to Clausewitz when arguing that the scorched earth and concentration camps adopted 
against the Boers would never work due to national character of the enemy and terrain of 
South Africa.79
There were numerous other instances whereby guerrilla activity resulted in civilian 
suffering, most notably during the Russian suppression of holy warriors in the Caucasus,80 the 
Spanish counter-insurgency in Cuba,81 and the wars of the Americans.82 No one seemed to 
question the relevance of On War maybe because it described how to wage a people’s war in 
defence. For the attacker Clausewitz had suggested insurgents could be beaten whenever they 
lacked support from a regular army. The failure revolutionary movements in France,
Germany and Switzerland convinced Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, both readers of On 
War, that internal disturbances could not withstand state troopers.83 The Boer War merely 
vindicated Britain’s need to prepare for a major clash on the continent,84 and decisive battle
15
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was the chief feature that the French took from what they saw as a very confusing and 
metaphysical text.85
By the time of the fifth German edition in 1905 On War had a commendatory 
introduction by no less a person than Chief of General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen.86 
At least three memoranda written by Clausewitz for a possible war against France were 
released prior to outbreak of the First World War.87 The German military establishment 
cherry-picked operational maxims and managed to subvert Clausewitz’s key message on the 
role of policy. It was widely believed that civilian politicians should stay out of military 
affairs once a war was underway; a fallacy reinforced by a flawed edition of On War.88 This 
interpretation was consistent with the militaristic or social Darwinist views prevailing at the 
time. Humanitarian laws, customs and usages of war (Kriegsmanier) were to be brushed aside 
by military necessity in order to achieve complete victory; a concept increasingly equated 
with the physical annihilation of the enemy nation.89 More attentive readers like Max Jahns, 
Hans DelbrUck and Rudolf von Caemmerer benefitted from a greater understanding of the 
context and subtleties of Clausewitz’s writing.90
On War and International Humanitarian Law
During the nineteenth century civilian intellectuals like Leon Tolstoy had been critical of the 
cruel government policies and plundering behaviour of soldiers in foreign countries like 
China.91 Clausewitz was portrayed in Tolstoy’s War and Peace as a rather aloof and heartless 
theoretician who tells a colleague that in war ‘the only aim is to weaken the enemy, so one 
cannot of course, take into account the losses of private persons.’92 While the protection of 
civilians was not a high priority western states did make a concerted attempt to define 
combatants and regulate their conduct. Dr Francis Lieber was a fellow Prussian veteran of the 
Waterloo campaign and read Clausewitz’s statements on ‘absolute’ war. Lieber codified a 
philosophy of humanitarian restraint into U.S. army regulations despite the legal challenges of 
seccessionism and guerrillas during the American Civil War 93 From 1864 onwards the 
International Red Cross and Geneva Conventions strove to construct working articles for 
ambulances, medical personnel and soldiers rendered incapable of serving in a fighting 
capacity by wounds or capture.94
The 1907 Hague Convention IV incorporated these conventions and prohibited the 
bombardment of undefended property and ill-treatment of inhabitants under occupation so 
long as they did not engage themselves in spying and active resistance. Professional opinion 
generally took the view that the participation of guerrillas and people-in-arms was of low
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military value and morally undesirable. An annex to the convention legalised such combatants; 
on the condition that they belonged to the army’s militia or volunteer corps with a specific 
commander, displayed identifiable insignia, carried their arms openly, and conducted their 
operations in accordance with laws and customs of war. Clausewitz and August Graf 
Neidhardt von Gneisenau had already mentioned some of this criteria in their plans for a 
national uprising and the Prussian government had tried to make similar distinctions during 
the ‘War of National Liberation’ in 1813.95
At sea the Paris Declaration of 1856 abolished non-state privateering96 and the Hague 
placed limits on the naval bombardment of coastal settlements.97 The 1909 Declaration of 
London drew distinctions between types of contraband and gave safe passage to vessels not 
carrying war materials to ports free from blockade.98 Britain refused to ratify these restrictions 
and all the signatories at Hague gave only a vague agreement to observe the usages 
established by the laws of humanity and dictates of public conscience.99 Militarists like 
Friedrich von Bemhardi endorsed Clausewitz’s cynical words on humanitarian law and 
believed that only a great victorious battle could win war on the cheap and avoid years of 
horrifying attrition between nations as foreseen by the likes of Ivan Bloch.100 By 1918 Sir 
Graham Bower lamented how the breakdown of civilisation predicted by Clausewitz and 
Bemhardi had reduced the Hague agreements to mere scraps of paper.101
Clausewitz and the total wars
Like the Great Paraguayan War of 1865-70, the Great War of 1914-18 revealed a fundamental 
problem in Clausewitz’s recipe for success, which was briefly touched upon by Major Stuart 
Murray. Namely, how to neutralise the enemy’s public opinion beyond the obvious way of 
bloody battle.102 If both sides kept reconstituting their armed forces the destruction of human 
and material resources would go on indefinitely until either the popular passions wilted away 
or the policy-makers agreed on peace.103 The British and German navies were both moved by 
expediency and the allure of statistics to attack all enemy and neutral shipping destined for the 
other’s blockaded population.104 The war was not won however until the German army was 
broken in battle and its home front collapsed into revolution.105
Clausewitz’s reputation was tarnished by the WWI experience. James W. Gamer 
blamed Clausewitz for the way the Germans ruthlessly exploited occupied areas in France, 
Belgium and Russia and terrorised civilians at the slightest sign of partisan resistance.106 
Governor General of Canada John Buchan on the other hand believed that Clausewitz had 
intended wars to be won quickly thereby saving lives in the long-run and warned his
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countrymen that it was inexpedient ‘to do anything to outrage the moral sense of other 
peoples.’107 If nothing else, the Great War validated Clausewitz’s prediction that the higher 
the political aim and the greater the participation of the masses, the more policy would 
converge with destructive military aims.108 Clausewitz’s message on the power of defence 
also earned greater respect in both military and civilian circles after the traumatic experience 
of the trenches.109
As industrialised mass killing exceeded beyond the battlefield the relevance as well 
as the morality of On War was brought into question. During the years of economic 
depression and intellectual disillusionment that followed there was a call by veterans, literary 
figures and politicians to abolish war as a means for solving political disputes.110 The League 
of Nations pledged itself to reduce the incidence of international aggression while various 
international conferences held at Washington, Geneva and the Hague sought armament 
control and bans on the use of new incendiary, chemical and biological weapons. These could 
now be delivered by aerial means against civil populations for the purpose of economic 
disruption and moral terrorisation. This threatened to render the Napoleonic-Clausewitzian 
battle approach obsolete.111
A more indirect approach to paralyse the enemy’s armed power was more preferable 
for T. E. Lawrence,112 J. F. C Fuller113 and Basil Liddell Hart who denounced Clausewitz as a 
Mahdi of mass and mutual massacre.114 Spenser Wilkinson defended Clausewitz against such 
aspersions by reminding readers that military events could not be understood without 
reference to politics and most of the alternatives proposed by critics were already 
encompassed by On War.115 Elbridge Colby was however correct to identify two of its 
alternative strategies with harmful implications for civilians: levying contributions from 
occupied lands and causing damage in a general way.116 The belief that Clausewitz was to 
partly to blame for inspiring an inhumane war philosophy therefore persisted.117
Germany continued to be the most fruitful and perilous ground for Clausewitz 
studies. Biographical works by Karl Linnebach,118 Hans Rothfels,119 Eberhard Kessel,120 and 
Walter Malmsten Schering121 benefitted from access to Clausewitz’s complete papers before 
they were lost during the Second World War.122 Those army officers who took the time to 
read On War, notably Wilhelm Groener and Hans von Seeckt, continued to use the treatise for 
operational insights on offensive war.123 Joachim von Stiilpnagel on the other hand reported to 
the Reichswehr in 1924 on the weakened state of the regular army and should Germany be 
invaded the country would have to fall back on Clausewitz’s desperate vision of people’s war; 
a self-destructive option rejected back in 1918.124
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For Bemhardi and Erich von Ludendorff Clausewitz had not gone far enough in his 
espousal of nation-state effort. The next ‘total war’ would require the complete subordination 
of civilian policy to a strong militaristic government until the country had achieved the 
political goal of national survival.125 Like many of the French and German nationalists of the 
early nineteenth century Clausewitz had a romanticised image of national purification through 
the shared hardship of war.126 His more inflammatory declarations were easy to use as Nazi 
propaganda to support a life-or-death struggle to the finish.127 Karl Goerdeler, Gerhard Ritter 
and Ludwig Beck questioned whether it was morally or politically necessary to take 
Clausewitz’s concept of absolute war and overthrow beyond the destruction of enemy armies 
to literally exterminate entire peoples.128
Outside Germany there was a cautious interest in Clausewitz as historians tried to 
place the man and his ideas within their proper context.129 Stalinist Russia was suspicious of 
German literature despite the fascination in On War shown by Vladimir Lenin130 and Major- 
General E. A. Razin.131 Rothfels provided an illuminating chapter about Clausewitz for The 
Makers o f Modern Strategy132 and at least three key texts were translated for study in the U.S 
military.133 British opinion continued to be hostile: Arthur Bryant concluded his Years of 
Endurance with a comment on Clausewitz’s lack of respect for human decencies,134 while 
John H. Morgan blamed On War for indoctrinating the Germans into a militarist philosophy 
leading to bloodshed and the enslavement of subject populations.135
The Anglo-American armies were hardly blameless and they too found it necessary to 
rain down indiscriminate artillery and aerial firepower to aid the advance of their ground 
troops.136 The allied naval blockades and bomber offensives inflicted the most contentious 
damage upon the Axis populations.137 Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby later tried to justify 
these attacks by repeating Clausewitz’s apparent lack of faith in international law and the 
argument of military necessity.138 The bombings bring into question whether Clausewitz 
advocated the targeting civilians as a short-cut to success, or to what extent one may project 
military force into the opposing to state in order to bring about in-cohesion and war­
weariness. On the basis of the WWII experience Edward M. Collins and Carl Schmitt referred 
to Clausewitz to argue that democracies were just as capable as autocracies of unleashing 
massive amounts of violence when they develop passionate enmity and set their political 
goals as high as unconditional surrender.139
Cold War Clausewitz
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After 1945 the rights and responsibilities of combatants (including those in resistance 
movements struggling against foreign occupation) were expanded by the International 
Military Tribunals,140 Geneva Convention III141 and 1949 Civilian Convention.142 In the years 
following the Universal Declaration of Human Rights143 and Convention against Genocide144 
the U.N. and E.C./E.U. produced various other international covenants on economic, social 
and political rights.145 These normative changes somehow affected French policy in North 
Africa because the razzia raids and torture of non-combatants employed around the time of 
Clausewitz’s death were no longer acceptable to international and domestic opinion as 
legitimate methods of pacification by the time of the Algerian War for Independence (1954- 
62).14<s Documents like the 1970 Declaration remained ambiguous on the circumstances and 
extent to which a people could resist colonial regimes in order to secure their self- 
determination.147
The West was receptive to idea of protecting civilian populations from foreign 
occupation but resisted restrictions on air power since it would deprive them of a key military 
advantage.148 The advent of aerial bombing, nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles 
had seemingly devalued conventional armed forces and invalidated the central tenant in On 
War to destroy the enemy’s armies in ground battle.149 Anglo-American strategists and 
political scientists like Bernard Brodie and Hermann Kahn instead approved a policy of 
containment and deterrence with a range of ‘limited’ or ‘counterforce’ responses short of 
mutually assured destruction. The message on costs-benefits calculus in On War added 
credibility to these scientific theories but neo-Clausewitzians feared that a multitude of factors 
such as uncertainty, friction, human error and the escalatoiy logic of using utmost force 
would result in any nuclear confrontation spiralling out of control.150
The Cold War and a desire to restore the armed forces of West Germany led to 
renaissance in Clausewitz studies.151 Some of his original work was unfortunately lost, 
destroyed or fell into the hands of private collectors. Werner Hahlweg returned to the original 
manuscript for the 16* edition of Vom Kriege and compiled two sizeable volumes from 
materials eschewed by previous archivists.152 Eduard Rosenbaum welcomed the additions 
because they would help show that Clausewitz was more than just a crude militarist.153 
Clausewitz’s reputation was rehabilitated in English-speaking world by the efforts of Sir 
Michael Howard154 and Peter Paret155 as well as Roger Parkinson,156 Raymond Aron157 and 
W. B. Gallie.158 This biographical work was accused of exaggerating the liberalism and 
rationality of Clausewitz whose harsh political views in later life arguably placed him more 
on the side of counter-reaction.159
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In 1976 Howard and Paret et al produced what is considered the best edition of On 
War.160 Paret later collaborated with Daniel Moran to translate other historical and political 
writings.161 While these are invaluable for English-language readers Honig has pointed out 
some of their problems.162 For whatever reason significant words and passages have been 
altered: the concept of ‘ZweikampF (lit. two-struggle) is rendered as duel and ‘das Gefecht’ 
(the fight) is softened to be the engagement,163 There are many difficult phrases such as 
‘Wehrlos’ (defenceless) and ‘Niederwefung’ (overthrow) which are open for interpretation as 
to whether they encompass attacks on non-combatants. Clausewitz rarely uses the terms ‘total 
war’ or ‘limited war’ instead preferring long-winded expressions like a war in its absolute 
conception or that a limited aim can apply to both the offensive and defensive forms of war.164
It is not always clear whether Clausewitz is talking about a political or military aim. 
He sometimes refers to the former as ‘Zweck’ and the latter as ‘ZieF but not consistently.165 A 
chapter entitled ‘Zweck und Mittel im Kriege’ for example uses ‘Zweck’ interchangeably 
with the political object on the one hand and the object of combat(s) on the other. It gets 
confusing when such distinctions are not made clear, especially when Howard and Paret use 
terms such as ‘policies’ when Clausewitz is clearly referring to military methods or ways 
(‘Wege’). Subordinate engagements may not have the enemy’s destruction as their first, 
immediate concern. This could instead be the capture of a hill or bridge, or simply to engage 
in trial of strength. The object in this case is merely a means to inflict more damage and 
outright destruction on the enemy at a later opportunity in the battle or campaign. Clausewitz 
leaves it unclear whether subordinate objects include the destruction, or at least fight over, 
civilian assets like food supplies and shelter.166
To allow combat, killing or the capture of territory to become an open-ended goal in 
itself is a perversion of On War since it warns against striving solely for such windfall 
profits.167 The new Howard and Paret edition came out at time when the Americans were 
trying to understand where they went wrong during the Vietnam War. In the assessment of 
Harry G. Summers the U.S. military had successfully checked all major offensives undertaken 
by the enemy but had failed to adapt pseudo-economic strategies to undermine the Viet 
Cong’s support amongst the population. Poorly articulated political objectives and a divided 
American public did not help either. The ‘trinity’ was a convenient way to argue that in the 
future there had to be greater ‘balance’ between the politicians, army and people.168 The 1984 
Weinberger Doctrine henceforth insisted on specific and achievable political purposes and 
public support, while service manuals and academic works were written using the language 
and concepts expressed in On War.169
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The Vietnam War caused significant civilian casualties and exposed problem of 
identifying the ‘enemy’ in guerrilla situations. Greater discipline and education was needed 
for service personnel to internalise and uphold the norm of non-combatant immunity 
regardless of personal risk.170 This ideal was enshrined by the 1977 Additional Protocols to 
the Geneva Convention,171 which was accompanied by various bans on weaponry likely to 
cause indiscriminate and disproportional damage.172 It still remained difficult to target 
certifiable military targets without causing collateral damage or terror to nearby civilians.173 
The military necessity argument remained a strong get-out clause and it was still within an 
occupier’s power to hold civilians suspected of espionage or acts sabotage and terrorism.174
The 1977 protocols did extend the protection of combatants and non-combatants to 
‘armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination’.175 
Internal disturbances, riots, rebellion and civil war by indigenous people against their own 
government were not counted so the ruling authorities were entitled to re-establish law and 
order through strong-handed means. International supervision and law enforcement was also 
restrained by political factors such as state interests and the principal of sovereignty and non­
intervention.176 Numerous human rights abuses were therefore perpetuated in authoritarian 
states or those struggling to put down insurgency and civil strife. This is worth bearing in 
■;! mind when trying to understand the severity of measures used against popular uprisings 
during Clausewitz’s lifetime.
Mao Zedong apparently read On War when formulating his own strategy for 
protracted people’s war in which he described popular support as a sea in which guerrillas 
could swim like fish.177 Military history shows the more this is a great temptation for the 
counter-insurgent to try ‘draining the sea’ by targeting civilians.178 The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan for example showed that the more the Russians deviated from conventional 
combats and resorted to killing civilians the more they lost control in a spiral of brutality as 
described by Clausewitz.179 It is important to explore this area to discover what Clausewitz 
had to say about insurgency and whether he disliked people’s war because it debased 
professional warfare with its fearful costs.180
The enduring relevance o f On War
As the Cold War ended the treatise retained its relevance to inter-state conflicts like the 1991 
Gulf War; the trinity was a convenient way to conceptually separate the regime of Saddam 
Hussein and his armed forces from the Iraqi people as the centre of gravity or legitimate
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targets.181 The political and military changes of 1990s then brought the relevance of On War
1 ftO 1to other conflicts into serious question. Martin van Creveld, Sir John Keegan, and Mary 
Kaldor184 spearheaded the charge that Clausewitz had overlooked the influence of culture and 
based his assumptions too narrowly on regular armies seeking decisive battle for the rational 
policies of states. It appeared to these critics that Clausewitz’s writings were outdated and 
could not explain the increasing incidence of ‘low intensity’ conflicts, civil violence and 
international terrorism between non-state actors for whom civilians were the principal 
targets.185
The character of the violence internal to Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia 
made it harder to discern the logic behind the massacre, mass rape and ethnic cleansing of 
unarmed populations.186 These cases led to varying degrees of armed intervention by the U.N. 
and N.A.T.O. and a strengthening of I.H.L. through the Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda and Rome Statute of International Criminal Court.187 The criticism of On War on 
these ‘new wars’ stimulated debate yet no detailed investigation emerged on where exactly 
Clausewitz stood on the matter of civilians.188 Christopher Bassford at least defended the 
theoretical ideas and moral character of Clausewitz by explaining the mixed reception of On 
War among Anglo-American readers.189
There are still those who question the morality or practical application of keeping an 
nineteenth century treatise at forefront of military education or in sensitive situations like 
counter-insurgency.190 In such cases, strict political control and non-violent alternatives like 
economic sanctions are seen as preferable to all-out bloodshed. It is typical to use phraseology 
such as ‘hearts and minds’ or ‘carrot and stick’ for various political, economic and social 
strategies. These often encompass strong policing, re-education, acts of kindness, goodwill 
gestures, propaganda, bribery or some other positive appeal. Such policy by other means can 
be considered a form of interdiction to weaken the opposing enemy forces but should never 
be contused with war itself.191
U.S. field manuals repeat Clausewitz’s dictum that politics is the central object in war 
and legitimate military means include the destruction of enemy armed forces, seizing 
territory, and targeting vital objectives or resources to raise the enemy’s costs and reduce his 
will to fight.192 Clausewitz remains essential for understanding the political rationale behind 
recent acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism in which there is a strong element of civilian 
victimisation.193 The emerging threat of cyberwar again brings a new form of attack on civil 
infrastructure for the purpose of causing disruption, confusion and paralysis thereby 
compelling the victim to a fulfil the political will of the assailant.194
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Military colleges and civilian universities continue to prescribe On War as essential 
reading.195 Aside from those academics already mentioned others with a specialised interest in 
Clausewitz are Paul Cornish,196 Antulio J. Echevaria II,197 Stuart Kinross,198 Andreas 
Herberg-Rothe,199 Hew Strachan,200 and Jon Tetsuro Sumida.201 The most recent publications 
with a wide-range of content include Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century,202 Clausewitz: 
The State and War203 and Clausewitz Goes Global: Carl von Clausewitz in the 21st 
Century.204 The website Clausewitz.com features a regularly updated bibliography of multi­
lingual works.205
Focusing the research
Paret’s Clausewitz and the State, republished in 2007, remains the seminal biographical 
source and it recommends that more research be done on the influence of Frederick von 
Schiller and the Thirty Years’ War.206 This will be addressed in the course of this dissertation 
because it relates to the matter of civilian suffering. A fresh look at what Clausewitz has to 
say about on such issues requires greater consultation with the historical volumes of the 
Posthumous Work than is normally given. Lynn’s Wars o f Louis XIV for example contains 
only minimal references to the battle-centric Clausewitz of On War and does not draw upon 
the ninth volume in which Clausewitz displays an awareness of alternative strategies such as 
naval bombardments, coercive contributions and scorched-earth strategies.207
Academic output does seems to be shifting towards the historical.208 There are new 
English translations of the 1815 campaign history209 and a renewed interest on what 
Clausewitz had to say on the phenomenon of petite guerre and people’s war.210 These 
inquiries are revealing a much more ambiguous picture of Clausewitz as a man with little 
faith in the ability of politics to control the escalatoiy and violent tendencies of war; as a fieiy 
would-be insurgent who accepted the inevitable atrocities of people’s war; and an objective 
historian who recognised that it was Napoleon’s preference for battles and his inability to tap 
into the passions of the French people which brought the latter campaigns in France to a 
speedy conclusion.
It is perplexing that in the two hundred years following the Dos de Mayo and burning 
of Moscow the subject of civilian participation and suffering has not been studied with more 
rigorous reference to Clausewitz, especially given the eminence of On War and the blame 
often attributed to its legacy. Caleb Carr’s Lessons o f Terror is stinging: ‘We will never know 
how much gratuitous bloodshed might have been avoided had the brilliantly phrased but no
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less neurotic and incendiary intellectual exercise that is On War slipped quietly into 
obscurity.’211 This view seems to have filtered into popular culture because in 2009 movie 
Law Abiding Citizen the leading character justifies the assassination of civilian members of 
the U.S. justice system with references to the centre of gravity: “This is von Clausewitz shit, 
total fucking war.”212 Even Dresden’s Museum of Military History braces visitors with the 
quote: ‘War is an act of violence.’213
The style and content of On War can easily lead to revulsion if one does not try to 
place the book or its author in their proper context. Readers of On War are immediately 
presented with an amoral conception of war in the absolute and shocking sentences about how 
moderation and notions of humanity are absurd. The pedantic insistence on bloody fighting 
verges on the obsessive. Even the oft-quoted phrase that war is nothing but a continuation of 
policy by other means is unsettling because it is seen to legitimise war into being just another 
form of forceful negotiation, no different than sending diplomatic notes, as normal to human 
existence as commerce or reproduction.214 ‘Not only was the concept of battle central to his 
strategic thought,’ observes Howard, ‘but he wrote about it with a vigor and a vivacity which 
make those chapters leap from the pages like a splash of scarlet against a background of 
scholarly gray.’215
Using words Clausewitz was able to conjure up an image of war just as disturbing as 
Los Desastres de la Guerra by Francisco de Goya. Yet it would erroneous to think of 
Clausewitz as an amoral advocate of indiscriminate violence; On War does not prescribe the 
mass murder of civil populations. Indeed, such was the emphasis on conventional war that 
Rothfels noticed that Clausewitz almost seems to revive the ideal concept of war between 
governments and armies.216 Susanne C. Nielsen has also detected the underlying morality 
throughout seemingly amoral statements and argues that while Clausewitz does not explicitly 
argue that the means of warfare should be limited by moral considerations, he disapproves of 
senseless destruction, and does not fail to remind readers of war’s costs.217
Scholars have tended to skirt around these issues only to hold back. Martin Kitchen 
correctly identified some key areas where Clausewitz shows his personal sentiments without 
elaborating in detail.218 Geoffrey Best states only briefly in War and Law since 1945 that for 
all the strong language about war Clausewitz was a model of chivalry and humanity.219 This 
general assumption without detailed explanation has left a lot of unanswered questions. ‘We 
can only speculate’ cautions Kinross, ‘as to whether or not Clausewitz ever envisaged there 
being no distinction between military and civilian targets.’220 Michael C. C. Adams went 
straight to heart of the matter in a short review of van Creveld’s Transformation o f War:
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‘Clausewitz said that the tool of the state was the uniformed army of combatants, and 
that the civil populace, or noncombatants, must stay neutral. In this role, they must be 
protected from abuse but dealt with harshly if they invade the gameboard of war. The 
problem again is that the arbitrary classifications do not work in reality. Twentieth- 
century total war broke down the distinction between combatant and noncombatant. 
Bombs dropped on Berlin, London, or Toyko killed more civilians than soldiers.
Also, when wars are fought by scientists inventing weapons in laboratories, who is a 
combatant anyway? Even in Clausewitz’s own day, the Spanish resistance to French 
occupation, the rising of the Landwehr in Prussia, made a mockery of such fine 
distinctions. Because partisan activities violate conventional etiquette, they tend to 
provoke savage reprisal, as Francisco Goya’s pictures of the peasant war in Spain 
illustrated.’221
A way forward
A detailed study is clearly needed to bring the many disorganised and disparate interpretations 
together and assess their validity, as well as providing new insights and directions for further 
study. In order to make the case set out in the abstract and thesis statement above this 
dissertation will have to strike a balance between a chronological and thematic narrative. The 
chapters will follow the rough course of the wars and will be each moulded around a 
particular theme or set of research questions.
The next chapter will narrate the wars brought forth by the French Revolution with 
attention to the issues of nationalised warfare, radicalised politics, the pillage and plunder of 
armies, and low-level insurrectionary activity. In this way it will become clear that Clausewitz 
condemned the French in moral terms. It will also begin a recurring theme throughout the 
dissertation: namely, that Clausewitz thought the job of fighting the French was not for 
amateur militias or civilian-in-arms alone but required mass armed forces backed up by a 
militarised society.
The third chapter will focus more on Clausewitz as a conscientious military 
professional by addressing four main areas: his social position as an enlightened officer and 
gentleman; his theoretical understanding of war; his reading of military history; and his 
conventional recipe for success. In this way it will become more evident that Clausewitz 
knew civilians had often been targeted in the distant past and their increasing involvement 
made war more destructive. Despite the fact that civilians were becoming an key factor in a 
nation’s war-making capacity Clausewitz exhibited a moral and theoretical preference for 
battles between regular forces not the slaughter of those hors de combat.
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The fourth chapter will explain that in the wake of military defeat Clausewitz and his 
contemporaries wanted to reform the Prussian state, enlist the passions of the troops and 
resort to the desperate measure of a people’s war. The narrative has to be constructed around 
questions such as what is a people’s war, how is it to be used and what are the consequences 
for non-combatants? The answers will show that Clausewitz addressed subject from a largely 
military point of view. He dismissed the dangers of social revolution and accepted the 
possibility of atrocities and non-combatant casualties as necessary sacrifice to liberate one’s 
country or be destroyed in the attempt.
The last two chapters will cover the key events surrounding the downfall of 
Napoleon: namely, the protracted defence-in-depth and scorched-earth adopted by the 
Russians; the resurgence of Prussia; and the invasions of France by which the wars were 
ended in a relatively conventional manner. Clausewitz witnessed extensive violence against 
civilian lives and property during this period and was conscious of the passionate desire to 
seek revenge against the French nation and its confederates. He generally opposed punitive 
violence as either morally wrong, militarily ineffective and politically counter-productive. 
The question of how to defeat an enemy insurgency was left largely unexplored by 
Clausewitz despite the fact that his final campaign involved the suppression of a Polish 
insurrection.
Academic contribution
While this dissertation will help to contribute a largely positive image of Clausewitz it will 
not shy away from highlighting the uglier elements of his writing such as his acceptance of 
civilian casualties in more desperate times of war, his approval of harsh policies towards the 
Poles and the disturbing implications of his theoretical revelations on war. It could be argued 
that by putting so much such stress on combat, Clausewitz was, consciously or not, making a 
distinction between those who fight and those who do not. It is distinction based on more on 
logic rather than a subjective and temperamental sense of morality.
The way Clausewitz constructs his arguments strongly suggests that whoever picks 
up weapon (be they a man, woman or child) to use against their enemy’s armed forces will 
immediately expose themselves to the logical object(s) of war, strategy, combat, tactics, 
defence and attack. All lead to the disarmament or destruction of the opposing armed forces. 
Besides the friction operating on the military machine and the illogic of the human mind, only 
a very weak sense of humanitarianism and political restraint fetters this act of violence thus 
leaving war a chained down half-thing.
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These insights seem to backup contemporary academics like Downes in the 
assumption that ‘only those individuals who present a direct threat of harm to the enemy by 
using weapons surrender their immunity from harm.’222 The problems facing International 
Humanitarian Law today can be understood with reference to On War which argues that 
unless political or humanitarian considerations are vigorously asserted the self-preservation 
and security of the army will come first because all that really matters is the fight.223
In addition, political conditions may not necessarily be protective as Clausewitz 
explains with reference to cases like the Vendee or Spain. His insights support the claim that 
politics be aligned in such a way that a civilian population becomes characterised by the 
hostile belligerent as being as much the enemy (‘Gegner’ or ‘Feind’) as the military forces 
and therefore a target. In other words, the targeting of civilians may be a means to an end or 
the end itself, especially if the perpetrator’s political goal is the physical annihilation of his 
enemy (non-combatants included).224
Conclusion
This introductory chapter has made a sweeping survey of historical literature and academic 
debates to serve as the basis for further investigation into the matter of Clausewitz and 
civilians. It has explained what defines a civilian, their widespread victimisation and a lack of 
academic works engaging Clausewitz’s written work with the subject. Furthermore, it has 
mentioned some of the challenges relating to the motivations and intellectual character of the 
man, the unfinished nature of his work, its dialectic style, the problems of dating certain texts, 
and the pitfalls of translation into English. The dissertation will now proceed onto the 
terrifying force around which Clausewitz’s whole life revolved: the French Revolution and 
emergence of Napoleon Bonaparte.
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Chapter Two 
The French Revolutionary Wars
The purpose of this chapter is to narrate the destructive wars unleashed by the French 
Revolution and address the following general questions. What did Clausewitz think of the 
political changes in France and how did they change warfare? How did the Terror and civil 
war in the Vendee inform Clausewitz’s thinking on the role of policy or politics (Politik)? 
Where exactly did Clausewitz stand on the matter of supply over humanitarian suffering? Is 
there any truth to the charge that he advocated the ruthless exploitation of civilian populations 
for the military necessity of supplying one’s army? Are critics right to assert further that 
Clausewitz focused too much on decisive battles between the regular armed forces of states 
and ignored ‘low-intensity’ conflict between non-state actors? Was he aware for example of 
the civil disturbances in the Tyrol, Switzerland and Italy?
The origins o f revolution
In the post-war period between 1819 to 1823 Clausewitz wrote an essay entitled ‘Umtriebe’ 
which can be awkwardly translated as ‘Agitation’.1 The paper charts the historical transition 
from feudalism to absolute monarchies and democracies. During this course of history 
concepts of humanity and justice were broadened to apply to all classes of civilised society, 
including the middle classes and peasants.2 In some countries the nobles took up the civil 
administration where corruption and injustice flourished at the expense of the oppressed 
lower classes. The reaction to this sort of abuse or social neglect in France was a form of 
‘extreme democracy’ which went about persecuting people of all classes with great terror and 
cruelty.3
The paper was composed at a time when the German states and re-established 
monarchies of France, Portugal and Spain were suppressing the liberal ideas and reforms 
brought forth since the French Revolution. Clausewitz obviously knew that power could be 
concentrated in hands of cruel princes or abusive rulers who begun foreign wars out of 
ambition and pride, let hunting parties trample fields at home, starved the arts, stifled 
scholarship, and tyrannised the people with the guillotine, firing squad, imprisonment or 
banishment. Such cruel authoritarianism, in Clausewitz opinion, did not exist in the kingdom 
of Prussia or wider German society unlike it had in France during the 1790s.4
The long-term causes and course of the French Revolution need no great elaboration. 
By the 1780s the lower classes were discontented by poverty and taxes while the royal family
x x r iv& rr ur o
and the aristocratic nobles lived in apparent luxury. The Estates General and parliament were 
unable to remedy the situation and angry mobs stormed the Bastille on 14th July 1789. The 
citizenry were granted a greater measure of civil rights and freedoms in the Declaration o f the 
Rights o f Man on 26th August 1789 and Constitution of 1791. The successive National, 
Constituent and Legislative assemblies struggled to find domestic stability around a 
constitutional monarchy. The Girondin or Brissotin faction meanwhile pressed for an 
invigorating war to unite the nation behind a common cause.5
The radicalisation o f French politics
The War of the First Coalition did not pan out as the nationalists expected. The economic 
crisis worsened and political grievances caused public disorder, notably in the Gard and at 
Marseille.6 On the western frontier the French armies suffered humiliating defeat and the 
nation was moved to panic by the advance of the Austro-Prussian forces under the command 
Carl William Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick-Liineburg. Clausewitz later compared 
Brunswick’s 1792 campaign to Prussia’s armed intervention in the patriotic revolution of 
1787 against the Stadholder Prince William V of Orange and Princess Wilhelmina of Prussia.7
The latter was in Clausewitz’s opinion a ridiculously limited campaign during which 
Brunswick’s paltry army of 25,000 troops marched on Amsterdam, disbanded the free corps 
and pillaged the towns where political opposition was concentrated. Thousands of political 
refugees fled the country and the lingering resentment later helped the French to create the 
Batavian Republic.8 The Prussians had left no contingency for a French intervention and this 
half-hearted approach to war was later found wanting when invading France: ‘Overwhelming 
though the support for the [French] Revolution was, inner divisions would have emerged if 
France had been invaded in 1792 with 200,000 men, instead of 70,000, and they had 
audaciously marched on Paris.’9 Clausewitz repeats in On War that if Paris had been taken 
that year there would have been no need to defeat the enemy’s armies to end the Revolution.10
Brunswick’s campaign in France helps argue the case for the ineffective and counter­
productive results of terrorising the civil population of one’s enemy.11 On 25th July Brunswick 
issued a manifesto threatening to bum down Paris if any harm came to the royal family.12 The 
threat backfired and actually had the opposite effect of enraging the nation and empowering 
the Jacobins.13 Parisian mobs attacked the Tuileries on 10th August and 600 members of the 
king’s Swiss Guard were murdered. The Legislative Assembly gave way to the National 
Convention and power existed nebulously between this body, the Paris Commune, and 
various other committees and popular assemblies. Politicians like Georges Jacques Danton
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and Pierre Victumien Vergniaud called for the legalised overthrow of the monarchy. 
Meanwhile, the mood in the streets went sour as armed bands sought out internal enemies and 
murdered over 1,000 people detained in prison during the September Massacres.14
Clausewitz was disgusted by these extreme acts of violence. It was generally 
expected of ignorant mobs but Clausewitz was shocked at how educated men of talent and 
virtue in private life could become such ‘fools and villains’ in the maelstrom of political 
revolution.15 These events made Clausewitz ever distrustful of German republicans such as 
Josef Gorres who, in Clausewitz’s opinion, could have easily become ‘a Vergniaud or a 
Danton, driving men to extremes with a stentorian voice and volcanic eloquence until he 
himself is finally carried away by the flood of and hurled into the abyss.’16
The political climate was therefore radicalised by passionate personalities, internal 
divisions and fear of the allied advance, which was stopped by the Battle of Valmy on 20th 
September. This rather unspectacular victory steadied the nerve of the nation and emboldened 
the Convention to proclaim the First Republic.17 French victories soon turned into reverses 
and the number of men under arms fell dangerously low by February 1793. Even after an 
emergency levy of 300,000 conscripts the situation continued to deteriorate and Spain joined 
the coalition arrayed against France.18 The forces under General Antonio Ricardos Carillo de 
Albomoz crossed the Pyrenees border and invaded Rousillon where he threatened anyone 
taking up arms to fight as guerrillas would be hung like criminals.19
Towards ‘totalwar’
Clausewitz shared some of the prejudices of his profession and believed that war was a 
special business best carried out by those with proper training and military virtues. Yet he 
recognised that a country can mobilise all able-bodied men to bear arms as citizen-soldiers, 
thereby nationalising war.20 This ideal was enshrined in the new French constitution giving 
their armed forces an almost limitless source of manpower.21 The February levy of manpower 
in 1793 helped to bolster the existing royal army and national guards, albeit at the risk turning 
them into a Jacobin institution and sparking revolt throughout the country.22 In mid-August 
the French government took more extreme steps and appointed the dynamic Lazare Carnot as 
Minister of War.23 On 23rd August 1793 the National Convention declared a levee en masse:
‘From this moment until that in which the enemy shall have been driven from the soil 
of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the service of the 
armies. The young men shall go to battle; the married men shall forge arms and 
transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothing and shall serve in the
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hospitals; the children shall turn old linen into lint; the aged shall betake themselves 
to the public places in order to arouse the courage o f  the warriors and preach the 
hatred o f kings and the unity o f  the Republic.’24
This significance o f  this development did not escape Clausewitz:
‘Suddenly war again became the business o f  the people— a people o f  thirty millions, 
all o f  whom considered themselves to be citizens. ... The people became a participant 
in war; instead o f  governments and armies as heretofore, the full weight o f  the nation 
was thrown into the balance. The resources and efforts now available for use 
surpassed all conventional limits; nothing now impeded the vigor with which war 
could be waged, and consequently the opponents o f  France faced utmost peril.’25
Despite Clausewitz’s hyperbole and the idealistic rhetoric o f  the decree it was difficult to 
actually raise, train and equip 300,000 conscripts, let alone mobilise the potential energy and 
resources o f  thirty million people. While France had taken greater steps towards national 
unity and state consolidation through the ages the country was not a monolithic entity. It 
resembled an agglomeration o f  regional peoples sometimes beyond the reach o f the 
government due to the size o f the country and the poor condition o f  roads.26
The levy o f  taxes, military recruits and garrisoning o f  troops had always been 
unpopular and the exceptionally demanding period between 1793 and 1815 was no exception. 
The rural nature o f  society meant that men taken from their family farms expected a staccato 
service so they could return home to tend to the harvest.27 The regional departments were 
often inconsistent or unresponsive at fulfilling their quotas and a great many o f  the men who 
turned up for duty were unfit or lacked the proper clothing, equipment or discipline.28
The country certainly did take big steps which historians have interpreted as a 
foreshadowing o f  the ‘total wars’ o f  the twentieth century.29 By building upon the reforms 
and technological advancements o f  the ancien regime the government set up factories for the 
mass manufacture o f  weapons, ammunition, clothing and other military paraphernalia. The 
talents o f  civilian scientists, mathematicians, artisans and intellectuals to the task o f  supplying 
the troops and supporting the war effort.30 This all-out effort was hard to sustain and levee en 
masse became a temporary measure o f  expediency. The so-called nation-in-arms soon lapsed 
back into lethargy and left the same soldiers to suffer on repeated campaigns.31
In order to replenish the losses the state institutionalised regular conscription in the 
Jourdan Law o f  1798. In theory, all single and childless men between the ages o f  20-25 were 
liable for five years o f  service chosen by democratic ballot. In practice, there were many draft 
avoidances, substitutions and exemptions. Nor was it necessary to entirely fill the quotas until
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the crisis years of the late Napoleonic Empire.32 The army settled down into a more 
professional, self-sufficient entity numbered around the 500,000 men, which was maintained 
to a significant extent by exploiting manpower and material resources beyond France.33
Despite these real-life frictions, Clausewitz was fascinated by how the convergence 
of state governments and peoples propelled war closer towards to the absolute conception. 
Political changes had lifted some of the stifling conditions that had kept war a half-thing for 
so many centuries.34 The Revolution had set in motion new forces energy by giving the 
people a greater share in the fighting and an outlet for their hostile emotions.35 This trend put 
Austrian and Prussia in utmost danger and yet they still refused to change their semi-feudal 
societies to match the new military effort required to fight a republic.36 The Prussian elite so 
hated and feared the notion of democracy that Clausewitz had to discreetly attribute France’s 
wartime advantages to changes in policies and administration, by the new character of 
government and the altered conditions of the people.37
The Terror
The historical survey and trinity provided in On War show that Clausewitz considered the 
involvement of the common people, through growing state cohesion and democracy, to be a 
key factor in the level of violence in war. Their exclusion in previous centuries had helped 
suppress the destructive drive of passionate hatred and enmity.38 Clausewitz disliked the idea 
of entrusting something as volatile as war to a revolutionary democracy because the political 
system allowed ‘fools and villains’ to occupy positions of authority where they were easily 
swayed by their passions or the mood of the masses.39 Clausewitz’s political prejudices were 
course informed by the Reign of Terror for which he expressed nothing but horror and singled 
out Bertrand Barere de Vieuzac for moral damnation.40
Readers of On War should not accept blithely that policy-makers in government 
personify ‘pure reason’, nor that war is subordinated as rational instrument or continuation of 
policy by other means 41 Modem commentators have pointed out the crucial subtleties of his 
trinity and the expression Politik, which can mean both policy and politics.42 The conduct of 
the dictators and democratic politicians of the twentieth-century proved that policy-makers 
are not entirely rational or especially intelligent; they often misjudge situations, underestimate 
their enemies, alienate allies, forfeit the protection of non-combatants and lead societies to 
insane and suicidal destruction 43
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Clausewitz did acknowledge the possibility that policy can err in a false direction, 
subserve the ambitions, private interests and vanity of those in power and thus fail to be 
representative of all the interests of the community. But state policy, as Clausewitz 
understood it, is nothing in itself except a mere trustee of these interests, an exponent of them 
against other states. The aim oif policy to unify and reconcile all aspects and interests of 
internal administration, as welll as the spiritual values and other peculiarities of the age, 
including humanity and whatewer else the moral philosopher may care to add.44
The transition from monarchy to revolutionary republic was one of the bloodiest 
episodes in French history. The violence culminated in the period between April-July 1793 
with the creation of the Commiittee for Public Safety and the rise of Maximilien Robespierre, 
Saint Just and other psychopatBis like Public Prosecutor Fouquier de Tinville.45 Louis XVI 
was beheaded on 21st January 11793 and the republic’s leading general Charles Dumouriez 
deserted to the Habsburgs, leawing behind a scene of tyranny and mass executions against 
those who either opposed or faiiled the state.46
The repression was focused on nobles, royalists, intellectuals and churchmen but 
ordinary people of the middle and lower classes also fell victim to the state and the armies 
revolutionnaires.47 It is estimated that 16,000 to 40,000 people lost their lives to The Terror.48 
The country as a whole suffered from the effects of poverty, high taxes, confiscations, 
conscription and divisive policiies; towards the Catholic Church.49 By 1793 the republic’s very 
existence was threatened by internal uprisings in Brittany and the Vendee.50
C/v/7 war in the Vendee
Rebel forces in the Vendee bamded together to form the armee catholique et royale which had 
an elastic strength of around 20-45,000 combatants. By using the advantages of the bo9age 
countryside and skirmishing taccties of petite guerre the rebels were able win a number of 
military victories. They captured Saumur on 9th June and continued to clear the Loire valley. 
Despite showing great bravery and resourcefulness during times of crisis the rebels lacked a 
proper military organisation, command structure or long-term strategy and eventually suffered 
a serious reverse at Nantes on 29th June. After another crushing defeat near Cholet on 17th 
October the Vendeans tried to ©scape north to the coast and make a rendezvous with the 
British Royal Navy. The marchi was hounded back down into the Vendee by government 
troops. The rebels were given mo quarter at the Battle of Le Mans on 12th December and 
forced to make a last stand at SJavenay a few days before Christmas.
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The political atmosphere at the time was filled with self-righteous, exterminatory 
rhetoric about pulverising the rebel race (a derogative not ethnic term). In the absence of 
coordinated policy from the central government the generals and representatives-on-mission 
like Jean-Baptiste Carrier and Charles-Philippe Ronsin were allowed to vent their hatreds 
against the unarmed members of the population. General Jean Baptiste Kleber had wanted to 
pacify the Vendee region gradually with fortified posts and flying columns but from January 
1794 the new commander-in-chief General Louis Marie Turreau adopted a harsher strategy 
using colonnes infemales. The troops belonging to these hell columns were given license to 
rape, plunder, bum, and massacre without fear of reprisal or prosecution. The violence was 
neither systematic nor efficiently carried out yet it still resulted in the deaths of an estimated 
200,000-250,000 people.51
Clausewitz read of events in the Vendee as told by Alphonse de Beauchamp and 
Marie Louise Victoire de Donnissan, marquise de La Rochejacquelein.52 Historians have 
tended to overlook the place Clausewitz gave the Vendee rising in his own writing. They are 
rarely translated into English and deal with a historical subject matter that for most 
contemporary soldiers (a significant group of students on Clausewitz) may seem too ghastly 
or irrelevant to their current profession. Clausewitz tended to see war against non-combatants 
in much the same light. In the years following Prussia’s battlefield defeat and subsequent 
capitulation in 1807 Clausewitz looked to the Vendean insurgency for inspiration in his plans 
a popular uprising in Prussia.53
In 1815 Clausewitz visited the battle site at Le Mans and expressed his concerns to 
his superior Gneisenau that the Prussian occupation would provoke another terrible revolt 
throughout France unless humanitarian restraint and political control curbed the passions for 
revenge.54 The final volume of the Posthumous Work contains an unfinished overview of the 
conflict and the editors saw fit to include a hand-written note about events following the 
Battle of Cholet on the Loire. Clausewitz implies that the cruelty came not the logic of war 
per se but from the human passions and political conditions attached to the act of war, which 
had finished its business as soon as the rebel armed forces were destroyed:
‘After the great army of the Vendee in Brittany was defeated on the right bank of 
Loire, and a few chiefs and refugees, under the resolve of [Henri du Vergier, comte 
de la Rochejaquelein], reached the left bank of the Loire; after a part of the smaller 
army under [Fran?ois de Charette] was held back in Poitou; after the dying [Maurice 
Joseph Louis, Gigot d’Elbee], who had surrendered, was murdered on the island of 
Noirmoutier; and after Charette, with a weakened heap, went fugitively to the 
highland of Poitou, it was believed in Paris and the Vendee itself that the civil war 
was at an end. The division of the coast of Cherbourg therefore received orders to
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return to the northern coast (the department o f  Calvados) and it seemed that the only 
important thing was to destroy the remains o f  the royalist pile on the left bank o f  the 
Loire and crush the last sparks in the theatre o f  war. General Turreau, who 
commanded the republican military power, established the measures o f  reprimand 
that had come to be used in the proposals and debates o f the Committe o f  Public 
Safety. The terrible Barere had in great and energetic moves, from time to time, 
specified to the Committe the means which the revolutionary government had at their 
disposal to oppose the Counter-revolution. These means were large, comprehensive 
and strong, but they also incorporated a spirit o f  cruelty [and] insensibility which 
denied all dignity and humanity. That was the reason why human dignity was 
stamped out taking its bloody revenge! The Vendee, driven by cruelty to the point o f  
despair, resulted in new hate, new power and frightfulness. They outbid the furious 
republicans and forced them to return to moderation. The wisest measures were 
transformed and spoiled by cruelty alone, and it alone called forth a new war o f  life 
and death.’55
The Terror abates
Clausewitz evidently knew that political conditions can allow hatred and passions to force 
their way through the barriers o f  reason and humanity into military and political decisions -  
even in those taken against one’s own people.56 Barere had changed from a democratic 
mediator to one o f  most martial leaders o f the Revolution, preaching the philosophy that 
desperate times called for desperate measures, especially against enemies internal to the 
nation. He described the Vendee as volcano or rallying point for resistance so it was a matter 
o f  national survival to sweep the rebel soil with cannon and purify it with fire.57 The revolts o f  
Marseille, Bordeaux, Lyon and Toulon were treated with more varying degrees o f  severity 
depending on the political circumstances under which the cities had originally rebelled, the 
temperament ol the representatives-on-mission, and whether the government wanted to send 
out a message o f  terror or leniency to other places still outstanding. In each case hundreds o f  
people were executed.58
Over the course o f  1794 the instruments o f  terror and the people’s armies were 
disbanded and the ultra-revolutionaries like Ronsin fell from power. The Girondins and 
Herbertists were arrested and executed, followed by the Dantonists, and finally Robespierre 
went to the guillotine after a coup d'etat on 27-28,h July.59 Commanders like Turreau were 
replaced by the likes o f  General Louis Lazare Hoche who placed greater emphasis on military 
discipline and beating the insurgents either in conventional combats or by wearing them down 
with minimal damage to the civilian population. Hoche issued instructions prohibiting attacks 
on non-combatants even if  they were caught helping the rebel combatants with food and 
information.60
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The British-backed revolt of the Chouans in Britanny was defeated at Quiberon Bay 
in June-July 1795.61 Guerilla leaders like Charette and Jean-Nicolas Stofflet were neutralised 
either through peaceful negotiation or by arrest and execution.62 General Bonaparte had in the 
meantime avoided disdainful service with the Army of the West and was instead celebrated as 
the saviour of the republic for turning his guns on royalist crowds who tried marching on the 
convention during the 13 Vendemiaire (5th October 1795).63 Clausewitz noted that when the 
Directory came to power the French nation could turn its attention outwards:
‘The turn the French Revolution took toward the most extreme democracy, the 
cruelty that filled the years 1792-94, naturally tended to reduce sympathy for it in 
Germany. When more moderate principles, a more peaceful attitude, and a more 
reasonable constitution emerged during the years 1795-99, this sympathy revived to 
an extent, but now the public’s attention was diverted by the French campaign of 
conquest, by fear of war, invasion, contributions, quartering of troops, expropriation 
etc.’64
Pillage and Plunder: historical precedents
For centuries the incohesive armies of the west struggled to supply the enormous demands for 
food and water for the men and horses.65 Even the best-organised armies could not survive 
without staying close to populated areas in order to take advantage of local resources such as 
food, shelter and transportation networks.66 These could be procured through diplomacy, 
legitimate purchase or brute force, all of which had their inherent disadvantages 67 Putting 
soldiers in contact with civilians often resulted in disciplinary problems as shown by the sack 
of cities such as Persepolis (330 B.C.),68 Locha (204 B.C.),69 Cremona (A.D. 69),70 Lisbon 
(1147),71 Rouen (1562)72 and countless others. The suffering of civilians from the logistical 
demands and poor discipline of armies reached a zenith during the Thirty Years’ War when 
the fluctuating size of European armies approached the 100,000-man mark.73
Throughout the ages commanders were conscious of the political and military 
implications of break-downs in discipline: troops would break off in the middle of fighting to 
gather up cumbersome loads of loot, bum down valuable shelter and gobble up stores of 
food.74 ‘History knows many more armies ruined by want and disorder than by the efforts of 
their enemies’ wrote Cardinal Richelieu.75 The enlightened rulers and generals of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had the self-preservation of their armies and lands in 
mind when they subjected their soldiers to iron discipline and attempted to create an 
independent system of shelter and supply.76 Louis Armand de Vignerot du Plessis, Duke of 
Richelieu, earned the disreputable sobriquet “pere de la maraude” for his corrupt exploitation
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o f  conquered territories such as Hanover during the Seven Years War, indicating that such 
methods were deemed malpractice.77
The size o f  European armies were so staggering by the eighteenth century that their 
logistical demands could only be met by the organised mobilisation o f  state resources.78 The 
advent o f  technological inventions such as canning, railways and motorised transport helped 
ease the problems o f  supply but the ever-increasing number o f  men and horses meant ensured 
that any country traversed by an army bore a heavy burden.79 As mentioned in the 
introduction, On War was blamed for the ruthless exploitation o f  occupied countries by the 
Germans during WWI and WWII.
While the treatise should not be taken to entirely represent the personal views o f  
Clausewitz, who went out o f his way to ameliorate the suffering o f  civilians in the Rhineland 
one must first admit the costs to civilians behind the concepts he advanced in On War. 
Clausewitz’s views were partly influenced by the work o f Friederich von Schiller from whom 
he borrowed terms such as ‘the swift and mighty deeds o f violence’80 and the image o f  war as 
a merciless force o f  nature or a bustling activity that tramples men and fields underfoot, 
empowers brigands and brings disruption to commerce and the arts.81
Clausewitz on the theory o f  supply
It becomes obvious when reading On War that logistics or supply permeates all aspects o f  
military action. It has a major bearing on the relative strength and combat performance o f  
armies, as well as being a major cause o f  humanitarian suffering.82 Bernard Brodie pointed 
out that Clausewitz barely hints at the ruthlessness toward the foreign population through 
which one’s army passes but instead speaks o f the ruthlessness o f  the commander toward his 
troops.8 In the harsh theory o f  war soldiers are merely tools to be used in accordance to the 
plan o f the campaign. They can be replaced once they have been killed, wounded or worn out 
prematurely by exertion.84
The commander obviously carries with him the worrisome responsibility for 
protecting the human lives under his charge. He should seek to reward his soldiers either out 
o f  a sense o f  moral sympathy or military prudence.85 Yet Clausewitz leaves the reader will 
little doubt that if  moral and political considerations are not asserted to protect individual 
lives then all that matters for armed forces in routine matters is their self-preservation  and 
security so they can exist without any particular difficulty and fight as a unit.86 We thus find 
passages such as the following:
‘If war is to be waged in accordance with its essential spirit—with the unbridled 
violence that lies at its core, the craving and need for battle and decision—then 
feeding the troops, though important, is a secondary matter.’87
In order to move, supply, quarter their troops armies had to stay close to desirable agricultural 
areas or large populous towns with decent roads and waterways.88 Clausewitz knew from 
personal experience the humanitarian relief that nearby villages could offer soldiers exposed 
to the heat and dust of summer or the mud, rain and snow of winter.89 Heavy loads of tents 
and such can be abandoned, as can the routine practice of building camps, for the military 
advantages of speed or freeing up room for more guns, cavalry and supplies. The 
disadvantage is greater exposure to the elements resulting in more wear and tear on one’s 
fighting forces. Clausewitz skips over ‘the way in which the absence of tents contributes to 
the increased devastation of the countryside’ and seems more interested in preserving the 
soldiers from sickness.90
The matter of billeting becomes an important consideration between marches and 
campaigns to avoid any unnecessary attrition of fighting efficiency.91 Clausewitz roughly 
calculates that an army of 50,000 soldiers -  with an advance guard posted out -  can billet in
10,000 houses at four men per house 92 To be chosen as a billeting area was less a blessing 
than a curse hence the old adage that ‘every soldier needs three peasants: one to give up his 
lodgings, one to provide his wife, and one to take his place in Hell.’93
Clausewitz gives a short history about maintenance and supply explaining how the 
governments of Europe had assumed greater administrative and financial responsibility to 
meet the demands of their armies. By creating a more independent and self-sufficient system 
of supply the soldiers no longer had to live off the land and could rely on army bakeries, 
transports, magazines and depots freshly stocked at the expense of the state. The burden was 
thus distributed more evenly beyond those people within the immediate vicinity of military 
operations. Soldiers were no longer distracted by the search for food during which time they 
could commit outrages on the civilian population or desert their regiment.
The men were expected to sustain themselves on rations carried about their person or 
on the slow-moving wagon train until resupply. The feed for horses could not possibly be 
carried so it had to be procured through foraging expeditions. Clausewitz was under the 
impression this was far less common by the time of the Silesian Wars because there was a 
greater reliance on orderly requisition and deliveries. The overall consequence of this 
artificial system of supply was that warfare became more regular, better organised, and more
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attuned to the political purpose o f  war. The movement o f  armies on the other hand was much 
more limited and campaigns were waged with far less vigour.94
Armies in Clausewitz’s day used a combination o f  ways for provisioning the troops.95 
The first was to live o ff local households and rely on civil populations to furnish food for the 
passing columns. They could widen their fronts or take separate routes if  necessary to ease the 
demand.96 The second method was to let soldiers supplement their week-or-so rations by 
seizing goods for themselves; a very improvised and wasteful expedient.97 The more efficient 
third option was for the army commissariat to procure regular supplies from a wider area and 
have them distributed along the route or at the army’s static position. Local authorities and 
officials would either have to cooperate or be coerced into arranging the requisitions.98
The whole system starts to fall apart if  the army is in continuous advance through 
enemy territory,99 in hasty retreat, or when ‘the situation particularly favors resistance and ill 
will on the part o f  the local inhabitants.’100 None o f  the above methods was without military 
drawbacks and entailed a high cost to the civil population. Assuming that an area had enough 
agricultural surplus to feed an extra 150,000 mouths or had not been stripped bare several 
times already, then taking what food and fodder was available was bound to induce miserable 
hardship or famine for the people dependent on that land until the next harvest.101
Clausewitz saw for him self in Russia and the Rhineland that no country, even a 
willing one, could remain the chief-supply agent without failing in its obligations because 
armies would requisition to the point o f  complete exhaustion and impoverishment.102 ‘Even 
belligerent foreign forces that occupy a country for any length o f time will hardly be so harsh 
and pitiless as to place the whole burden o f  subsistence on the land.’103 Clausewitz was 
resigned to the fact that war was anything but humane and the old way o f  provisioning by 
depots would be abandoned at the crucial moments o f a campaign whenever it became too 
costly or too restrictive.104
Whatever logistical system adopted armies Clausewitz says they cope better in fertile 
agricultural areas or densely populated prosperous urban towns where a population o f  over 
2,000,000 people can support the needs o f  100,000 men (for a short time at least) through 
high levels o f  productivity and reserves o f  food. Experience had shown it was easier to feed 
an army in Flanders than Poland.105 ‘It follows that war, with its numerous tentacles, prefers 
to suck nourishment from main roads, populous towns, fertile valleys traversed by broad 
rivers, and busy coastal areas.’106 There seems moral disapproval in Clausewitz’s words when 
he writes that the French leaders discarded the humane and well-organised depot system:
‘They sent their soldiers into the field and drove their generals into battle—feeding, 
reinforcing, and stimulating their armies by having them procure, steal, and loot 
everything they needed.’107
French abuses go unchecked
The French had initially set out with the purpose to liberate foreigners from their old ruling 
regimes according to the noble ideals expressed in the Edict o f Fraternity (19th November 
1792), the military proclamations of General Dumouriez and popular slogans such as “Guerre 
aux chateaux, paix aux chaumieres!”108 French militaiy ventures during this period usually 
enjoyed a considerable degree of local support from local dissidents, radicals, religious 
minorities and general critics of the previous regimes.109 The Belgians and inhabitants of the 
Rhineland areas of Mainz, Coblenz, Trier, Aachen, Wurttemberg and Hamburg took the 
opportunity to abolish noble and ecclesiastical privileges.110 The Austrians were driven from 
Belgium and the Netherlands in 1795 whereupon the Dutch Republic was restyled the 
Batavian Republic.111
Despite the lukewarm reception abroad, the economic problems within France 
encouraged the policy-makers to permit the armies to nourish themselves on foreign lands.112 
Generals Dumouriez, Cambon and Cusine tried to requisition only the necessities but other 
commanders were less conscientious and bringing hungry soldiers into contact with civilians 
was bound to induce hardship regardless of kind words and good intentions.113 The French 
penal code of 1796 institutionalised discipline within the ranks but too many incidents of 
unsanctioned violence and abuses went unpunished by lenient judicial procedures reluctant 
put the welfare of foreign nationals before Frenchmen and French interests.114
The inhabitants of Belgium and the Rhineland paid a high price for liberation. Towns 
and cities were reduced to destitution trying to supply the demands of their occupiers and 
labourers were conscripted to perform military duties like building fortifications. Thousands 
succumbed to the effects of deprivation, malnutrition, hypothermia and beatings.115 Some of 
the younger officers and commissars were appalled by this unglamorous side of military life. 
Dumouriez and Soult worried that the behaviour of their troops would drive the people to take 
up arms to exact revenge for the rape of their women, the burning of their homes and theft of 
their livestock.116 An imperial edict on 21st January 1794 indeed called upon the German 
principalities of the Rhine to arm their people and repel the invaders.117 Whenever shots were 
fired upon French soldiers they reacted by defeating the insurgents in bloody combats, 
burning down nearby habitations and deporting priests and other potential rabble rousers.118
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Clausewitz understood that isolated acts of peasant resistance alone could not stop the 
revolutionaiy force of arms. The German armies were themselves barely able to stem the tide 
of victory and ‘this was really due to only to technical imperfections that hampered the 
French, and which became evident in the rank and file, then in their generals, and under the 
Directory in the government itself.’119 The Prussians beat the French repeatedly in Alsace and 
the Saar only to be distracted by the partitions of Poland. The war came to an unspectacular 
end with the Treaty of Basel 1795, which left most of the Rhenish lands to the mercy of the 
French. Clausewitz recognised that ideological changes within France had not alarmed 
Prussia enough and it still approached war in the traditional manner of scavenging over 
territory.120 The divergence of Austro-Prussian interests allowed France to gather its war- 
making strength and resurge forward as a dangerous hegemonic power under Napoleon 
Bonaparte.121
The campaigns in Italy, 1796-1797
The fourth volume of Clausewitz’s Posthumous Work is devoted to Bonaparte’s 1796 
campaign in Italy and this largely military narrative refers to the effect on the civil 
population.122 As a republican general Napoleon proclaimed friendship and respect for each 
person and their property and repeated the common maxim that nothing was better designed 
to disorganise and destroy an army than excessive pillage and plunder.123 Yet when he found 
the soldiers under his command in a ragged and demoralised state he too had to promise them 
the fertile plains of Italy as an incentive.124 The municipalities of Mondovi, Frabosa, Acqui 
were thus made to provide rations of bread and meat, bottles of wine, clothes, boots.125
Bonaparte went on the offensive by defeating the Austrians at Lodi on 10th May and 
overthrowing the Duchy of Milan. Italian intellectuals had initially welcomed the liberation in 
the form of a new Lombard republic only to be disappointed by the uncontrollable plundering 
of the French soldiers and official requisitions pressed by the Parisian government.126 
Clausewitz quotes General Claude Dallemagne, who belonged to the division of La Harpe, 
complaining to Napoleon on 9th May about his inability to stop the pillaging. Clausewitz 
writes that the robberies, maltreatment, plundering and cruelty -  by this time common in the 
French army -  the contributions and deliveries that were to be expected, and the general 
revolutionary tendency of threatening existing conditions all inflamed a general hatred in the 
people. The clergy also stirred popular feelings by spreading false rumours and atrocity 
stories.127
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The ensuing revolt of Lombardy during May and June was put down with swift 
retribution and exemplary punishment. Clausewitz uses the expression, ‘durch gewohnlichen 
Mittel von Fiisilieren, GeiBeln und Verantwortlichkeit der Korporationen befestigt’ roughly 
meaning that Bonaparte fixed the situation through the common means of firing squads, 
scourging and responsibility of the political authorities, presumably bound by threats and the 
taking of hostages. Order was restored to Milan on 24th May after General Despinois executed 
a councillor and a priest while Archbishop Monsignor Viconti made an appeal for calm. The 
next day 1,800 men heading for Pavia intercepted 600-1,000 peasants-in-arms (‘bewaffhete 
Bauem’) near Binasco; the rebels were scattered and the place looted and burnt; 74 hostages 
were also taken for future leverage. The French appeared at Pavia on the 26th May but the 
gates were closed. Clausewitz describes how the French stormed the city by driving the 
defenders from the walls, broke through the gates, fought from house-to-house and sent in the 
cavaliy to chase the armed rabble through the streets until city’s magistrate came forward to 
surrender. Bonaparte held off the destruction of the city until verification that the French 
garrison besieged in the citadel was in fact safe, whereupon he had one in ten men of the 
garrison shot and the commandant condemned by a military tribunal. The town was given 
over to the soldiers for many hours of rape and plunder. After this great act of determination 
and strength (‘diesem Akt groBer Entschlossenheit und Strenge’) Napoleon returned to 
Brescia and halted on 28th May.128
The terrible measures employed by Napoleon and his generals against civil 
populations in revolt was considered a normal feature of warfare, as were the excesses of the 
common soldier, 12,000-20,000 inhabitants of Praga and Warsaw were killed by the Russians 
of Alexander Suvorov during the 1794 Uprising and Sir Arthur Wellesley’s victory at the 
Siege of Seringapatam in 1799 was mired by the bestial behaviour of his soldiers.129 
Bonaparte’s campaigns were bloody affairs which sought to destroy the armed forces of his 
enemies and pulverise uncooperative communities, later entire countries, into groveling 
submission.130 From a republican general to emperor of Europe, Napoleon believed that men 
and nations were kept in line by a combination of fear and self-interest. His outlook on 
counter-insurgency was perhaps shaped the French takeover of Corsica after 1768.131
In June 1796 the French pressed ahead to occupy the papal provinces of Bologna and 
Ferrara. The town of Lugo was to the sack along the way in reprisal against the actions of 
insurgents (60 of whom were executed).132 The Church was forced give up vast wealth and 
treasure in the non-ratified Peace of Bologna.133 The campaign was then stalled by the siege 
of Mantua partly because, as Clausewitz observes in On War, Bonaparte merely probed the 
defences and chose to battle the Austrian relief armies in field.134 The blockade dragged on
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for six months inducing the kind of starvation, malarial sickness and ecological damage 
reminiscent of the terrible sieges in the Italian Wars (1494-1559)135 Clausewitz’s campaign 
history states that by the time Wurmser capitulated on 2nd February only 15,000 of his original
28,000 troops were fit for duty: 7,000 had died and a further 6,000 were hospitalised.136 
Modem historians place the number of civilian dead at 6,000 persons.137 Once Mantua was 
out of the way Bonaparte headed south as far as Ancona and forced the Papal States to 
capitulate more lands and treasures in the Treaty of Tolentino (19th February 1797).138
The campaign in the Alps, 1797
Bonaparte next turned his attention towards Vienna and planned to advance his forces across 
the Carnatic and Julian Alps while Barthelemy Joubert pushed through the Tyrol.139 This 
mountain region was a Habsburg possession with an historic tradition of drafting its 
countrymen for local defense missions and their sharpshooting skills.140 Clausewitz 
speculated that in theory the Austrian forces of under generals Laudon and Kerpen could 
expect assistance from the home guard or Landsturm,141 Joubert had the initial advantage until 
the armament of the civil population or Landsbewaffitung could come into full efficiency.142
The peasant resistance in the Tyrol was ineffectual but it captured the public 
imagination, especially in later years. During the combat at Springes for example a young 
woman named Katharina Lanz was supposed to have fought off French soldiers from the 
walls of a cemetery armed with a pitchfork.143 In March both Joubert and Bonaparte inflicted 
repeated defeats on the Austrian main forces and drove to Leoben, some hundred miles from 
Vienna by 6th April.144 This induced enough civil panic in the capital for the government to 
seek peace preliminaries resulting in the Peace of Compo Formio (17th October); Clausewitz 
scoffed at how a few provinces were given up to spare the Habsburg monarchy from 
destruction.145
Clausewitz’s account of the Alpine campaign of 1797 emphasises the danger into 
which Bonaparte had placed his forces and the failure on the part of the Austrians to pull 
together all their means of resistance to utterly destroy them. Clausewitz believed it was 
Bonaparte’s original intention to march on Vienna out of personal power and thirst for 
victory. Poor coordination with another army on the Rhine and the dangers of his own theatre 
of operations curtailed such ambitions. Had Archduke Charles assembled the necessary forces 
behind the Alps and organised a people’s uprising then it was quite possible that the Italian 
Army would have beaten and ruined in the high mountains. In the event, Joubert experienced 
many difficulties in the Tyrol, Carinthia and Krain (Camiola) and was lucky to get back in
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touch with Bonaparte after four weeks. Clausewitz states that sufficient troops were available 
to disarm the insurgents of the Tyrol and 10,000 should have been left in Verona frighten the 
people and secure the strategic rear and lines of communication.146
Clausewitz appears to reference the Veronese Easters (Pasque Veronesi) which was 
another armed rebellion against French occupational forces in the Veneto. This too was 
quickly put down by combats with the insurgent forces, execution of ringleaders, mass exiles, 
and large fines in cash, treasures and valuable goods.147 Venice was handed over to the 
Austrians after a thorough plundering,148 Bologna and Romagna were taken from the Pope,149 
and Bonaparte continued extracting vast amounts of wealth from Italy to support France and 
his own political career.150 The Roman Republic and Italian peninsula was never entirely 
secure so frequent incidents of rioting and open revolt persisted for many years.151
The Swiss insurgencies, 1798-1799
In order to secure the route to Milan the French Directory next turned its greedy attention to 
the rich cities and monasteries of Switzerland. At the invitation of Swiss republicans and the 
inhabitants of the lower Valais the French intervened ostensibly to liberate the country from 
patrician rule. The dominant Bernese forces were defeated at Fraubrunnen and Grauholz and 
the city was looted on 5th March 1798. Attempts to then create a Helvetic Republic based on 
its French parent were undermined by chronic political disagreements and a lack of centralist 
tradition. The government was further discredited by its association with the French occupiers 
who quartered their troops on the population and went about extracting vast sums of wealth 
(over 15,000,000francs initially) from places such as Zurich, Freibourg, Solothum, Lucem, 
St. Urban and Einsiedeln.152
In late April the Forest Cantons (Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden) rebelled against what 
they perceived to be a threat to their Catholic religion and local traditions. A bailiff or 
Landeshauptmann in Schwyz named Alois von Reding (brother to Theodor of Battle of 
Bailen fame) was entrusted with 10,000 fighters to make a stand. On 29-30th April the men of 
Schwyz pushed out in various directions, failing to arouse the support of neighbouring 
cantons. The French closed in from the directions of Rapperswil, Kussnacht-am-Rigi, 
Schindellegi and Einsiedeln, plundering the latter’s monastery on the way. Exhausted of 
ammunition and energy the insurgents fell back to Rotherthurm near the historic medieval 
battle site of Morgaten (1315). The opposing general Alexis Henri Antoine von Schauenburg 
offered the rebels a propitious truce at a moment of demoralisation. There had been talk of 
calling out a Landsturm and enlisting the help of women, children and old men. The cost of
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300 allied casualties had however spread a feeling o f  hopelessness and the Landsgemeinde 
(cantonal assembly) o f Schwyz capitulated on 4th May. The defiant action won Reding such 
fame and respect that he was offered a role in the new order but refused and led the Federal 
Diet when it all collapsed in October 1802.153
The canton o f  Schwyz remained in an agitated state throughout the summer o f  1798. 
The Landsgemeinde again tried to vote for active resistance and a few hundred people left to 
join the revolt o f  neighbouring Unterwalden. This was the excuse Schauenburg needed to 
occupy the town.154 The rising o f  2,000 armed men in Nidwalden prompted the government 
and French to send in 10,000 Franco-Swiss troops to knock down the rebellion. Under­
equipped and outnumbered the rebels frustrated the attackers with sniper tactics o f  petite  
guerre. In the heavy fighting around Stans on 9th September about 600 houses were burnt and 
somewhere between 360-12,000 men, women and children were killed. The Swiss pedagogue 
and reformer Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi was appalled by the carnage and took the orphaned 
children under his charge. The unpopular Helvetic Republic bound itself to France for 
military protection and became a battleground in the following year.155
In 1799 the French republic faced a severe crisis and the danger o f internal royalist 
rebellion as its ambitious grand strategy backfired on all fronts.156 The Army o f  Rhine under 
General Jean Baptiste Jourdan suffered a severe blow from Archduke Charles at Stockash 
between 21s1 and 26th March. General Andre Massena’s Army o f Helvetica was also 
threatened by the build-up o f  Austro-Russian forces in north-western Switzerland.157 It is 
clear from eyewitness accounts and church records that this was a terrible time for the villages 
and communities in the Brunnen-Schwyz-Muotathal area.158 Both sides requisitioned supplies 
and the French were inclined to execute any villagers found with weapons in their hands or 
believed to be giving food and information to the imperials and Freikorps sent from Glarus.159
In April and May 1799 the resentment towards the Helvetic Republic and its 
conscription plans provoked an armed uprising known as the Hirthemlikrieg (Sheppard’s 
War). Clausewitz’s account o f  the insurrection covers just three pages and is a valuable 
compliment to the ideas o f  people’s war developed in On War. It explains that the Swiss who 
emigrated to Austria were formed three battalions under General Johann Konrad Friedrich 
Freiherr von Hotze, a Swiss man by birth. In anticipation o f  Austrian assistance the men o f  
Schwyz, Uri and Wallis were brought to arms around 28th April: 3,000 insurgents in Schwyz, 
double the number in Wallis (Valais), 6,000 on the bridge o f  Reichenau and 10,000 appeared 
in the upper allied cantons. The French reaction was swift and decisive.
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General Menard first beat the Austrian General St. Julien and on 3rd May turned 
against the insurgents in the Rheinthals. At the same time Soult moved against the canton of 
Schwyz, which was boxed in by the positions the French occupied at Arth, Kiissnacht and 
Einsiedeln. Soult took part of a reserve division to Rothenthurm on 8th May and met an armed 
mob (‘bewaflfnete Haufen’) who willingly laid down their arms when challenged. Soult then 
threw himself against the canton of the Vierwaldstattersee and went to Altdorf in the canton 
of Uri. There he found 4,000 men with four large guns: these were beaten, forced to retreat 
and completely dispersed due the action of another division led by Claude-Jacques Lecourbe. 
Only in Wallis were the French unable to run over the 6,000 insurgents and seven guns 
blocking the valley of the Rhone. Eager to defeat them, General Xaintrailles gathered his 
forces and attacked several weeks later.160
Clausewitz states that through these defeats the main places of insurgency were 
calmed down and held in fear: ‘Durch diese Niederlage der hauptsachlichsten 
Insurgenthausen wurde die Schweiz beruhigt und das MiBvergniigen in Furcht gehalten.’161 
The outcome proved that a popular armament (‘Bewaffnung’) could not hold against a regular 
army and clear the land of foreign enemies. The reasons the Swiss failure lay in the 
circumstances of their insurrection rather than the actions of the enemy. If this impressive 
effort had been properly coordinated with main effort of the Austrians then Massena and the 
French divisions of Dessalus and Lecourbe would have had a hard time trying to escape 
because the whole Lombard side of the Alps was in the hands of the allies by that time. The 
action instead provoked a bloody reaction from the French after which the Swiss learned the 
terrible consequences of insurrection and blamed their misfortune on the Austrians.162
The success o f insurgency in Italy, 1798-1799
In regard to the campaign in northern Italy Clausewitz was concerned mainly with the major 
battles and places the insurrection of Naples within this context.163 King Ferdinand IV and 
Queen Maria Carolina had opposed Revolution and anticipated Austro-British support when 
the kingdom went on the offensive in October 1798. The Neapolitan army moved into Rome 
to restore papal authority that month. A Franco-Polish counter-offensive then routed these 
forces and carried the war to Naples, shooting down those who offered resistance as was the 
case at Itri on 30th December.164 The monarchs fled to Sicily allowing the new political 
authorities to disband all instruments of the previous regime and proclaim the Parthenopean 
Republic on 23rd January 1799.
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Clausewitz writes that the overthrow of Naples rendered large numbers men hungry 
and unemployed. Discontented members of the lower classes formed themselves into armed 
gangs of lazzaroni and turned to killing people of republican sympathy. The middle classes 
were also unhappy by the way the country was burdened with various ‘kriegslasten’. 
Clausewitz condemned the way that the neither the French Directory in Paris or General Jean 
Etienne Vachier Championnet and representative-on-mission Guillaume-Charles Faipoult 
gave the slightest consideration to the inhabitants of Naples. Championnet was recalled by the 
Directory and replaced by Etienne Jacques Joseph Alexandre Macdonald. The ill-discipline of 
the troops continued as did the official confiscations and state repression, all of which 
contributed to the fall of the republic in June.165
Naples had been an insecure conquest for the French during the Italian Wars.166 
According to Clausewitz there is no countiy made for resistance like Calabria: it is a wild 
land with wild inhabitants who cannot be mastered by concepts and shapes (‘begriffe und 
formen’) of political rhetoric. The island of Sicily also serves as the heart of resistance on 
which a people’s uprising (‘Volksaufstand’) can crystallise.167 From the court at Palermo 
Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies (as he was known there) appointed Cardinal Fabrizio di RufTo 
di Baranello to serve as vicar-general and recover his kingdom. The British and Neapolitan- 
Sicilian navies ferried Ruffo to the mainland of Calabria on 7/8th Februaiy. Brandishing little 
more than banners the cardinal’s small band grew to over 17,000 armed followers calling 
themselves the Armate della Santa Fede or Army of Holy Faith. The Sanfedismo movement 
relied on fanatical peasants and experienced guerrilla leaders such as Michele Pezza (Fra 
Diavolo) who organised a band of 4,000 men to hit French outposts and supply lines. An 
atmosphere of horrific civil strife and banditry overtook the country as the armada Cristiana 
swept through Apulia and Basilicata persecuting French sympathisers, collaborators, 
republicans, Jews and moderate figures within the Catholic Church.168
Clausewitz does not mention the atrocious side to the uprising and seems only to 
admit its military value within the context of regular campaigns. He explains that as the fire of 
insurrection got closer and closer to the capital, Macdonald readied himself for action. Then 
came orders in late April and early May to march north where there was another insurgency 
raging in loose conjunction with the conventional forces belonging to the Austrians, Russians 
and English.169 Macdonald was unable to return to Naples because he was defeated by 
Suvorov at Trebbia on 17-19* June.170 Macdonald left 5,000 men behind to garrison places 
like Fort St. Elmo, Capua, and Gaeta. The National Guard also strengthened the defensive 
forces to 20,000 men. This was not enough to defend Naples from Ruffo who brought 25,000 
men to the capital on 6th June. The republicans were fired into resistance but lacked the
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necessary war material and clung to fixed points all of which capitulated within a month.171 
Ferdinand returned in July whereupon the authorities reinstated a reign of legalised terror 
upon alleged Jacobins and collaborators.172
The battlefield defeats of the French in northern Italy necessitated a general retreat 
towards Genoa thus allowing the insurgency and units designated for petite guerre to 
thrive.173 Clausewitz mentions for example that Johann von Klenau and 6,000 men operating 
in the Apennines and Po river region were able to isolate French garrisons and were well 
received by the inhabitants north of Rome at Florence, Lucca, Pisa, Livorno where there was 
great public rejoicing and much war material to be collected.174 It should be noted that earlier 
in April the troops and rebel auxiliaries under Klenau’s command were able blockade Ferrara 
into capitulation on 24th May and the Jewish residents paid 30,000 ducats to avoid pillage.175
In short, Clausewitz was well-aware of the insurrectionary activity at this time but did 
not dwell on its humanitarian consequences. Nor did he have an exaggerated confidence in its 
capabilities outside of conventional war waged by states. The Tyrolese and Swiss had failed 
because they could not coordinate their actions with the Austrian armies. The insurrectionary 
units in Italy escaped destruction in 1799 because the French forces were beaten in battles. 
Suvorov could not repeat his success in Switzerland later that year and had to let his troops 
live off the land during his epic march over the Alps because the other Austro-Russo forces 
had dissolved through a combination of poor strategic decisions and the battles around 
Zurich. Despite plundering Swiss farms and villages to aid the escape Suvorov and his troops 
became folk heroes and their epic march over the Alps inspires fascination to this day.176
Clausewitz notes that during the first battle between 4-5* June the city’s 
entrenchments helped the French occupiers repulse the attack but superior enemy numbers 
and the dubious loyalty of the Swiss caused Massena to withdraw to the Uetliberg and settle 
his troops from Basle to the Tessin.177 The Austro-Russian forces under Archduke Charles 
and General Rimsky-Korsakov assumed positions around the city until Massena restored 
French hegemony in a big battle between 25-26tb September. The city was then subjected to 
another bout of requisitions protested by the likes of David Hess.178 The republic later 
collapsed in a civil war known as the Stecklikrieg or War of the Sticks because it involved so 
many armed peasants until the ravaged cantons were turned into Napoleonic dependencies by 
the Act of Mediation (1803-1815).179
Napoleon takes control
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Since Clausewitz has little to say about Bonaparte’s failed campaign in the Middle East it 
shall detain us no longer than to point out that it revealed the logistical weaknesses of a 
French army operating far from its home base in a poor and pestilential region, surrounded by 
a hostile population and vulnerable to the military actions of enemy forces (those belonging to 
the Mamluks, Ottomans and British in this case).180 Bonaparte returned to France in 1799 to 
find there was no stable constitutional regime and little popular support for the corrupt 
Directory, which he overthrew in the coup de 18 Brumaire (9th November).181 Bonaparte’s 
first priority as First Consul was to bring the War of the Second Coalition to a rapid 
conclusion. General Jean Moreau took command on the Rhine while Bonaparte led the 
Reserve Army into Italy looking for a decisive battle.182
As in previous campaigns there were many incidents of popular violence below the 
threshold of clashing armies. In the Electorate of Mainz for example the first minister Franz 
Joseph von Albini mobilised home-guard units to harass French units along the Main. General 
Ney responded to the rising of the Rhineland communities with great bloodshed boasting that 
his forces had killed 3,000 peasants and put 20,000 to flight.183 In April 1800 an Austrian 
army under Field Marshal Michael Friedrich Melas drove a French column of 10,000 men 
under Massena to Genoa where the soldiers and civilians alike had to endure a grim blockade 
on land and sea until the 6,500 French survivors capitulated on 4th June.184 The narrow 
battlefields victories at Marengo and Hohenlinden forced Vienna to sue for an armistice and 
peace was signed in the Treaty of Luneville on 9th February 1801.185
Clausewitz willingly bestowed on Bonaparte the title of military genius while 
refusing to hail him as a force for good in European civilisation.186 To German observers at 
the time the new ruler appeared a more benign and cultured statesman.187 The Consulate 
consolidated the stability of the state and helped to heal old religious wounds and grievances 
in the provinces. For all Napoleon’s liberal reforms France remained essentially a police- 
state. There was intrusive surveillance, restrictions of public expression, strong detention 
powers and special tribunals to punish acts of treason with death or deportation.188 Clausewitz 
was not fooled: Bonaparte was in his opinion a warlord only concerned about the happiness of 
his people so long as it was compatible with his lust for fame and power.189 Clausewitz was 
scathing in his criticism of the people’s compliance to the new order:
‘Bonaparte found the French to be obedient subjects, for which they excuse
themselves on the grounds that he fought off the hydra of Revolution; but Barrere,
one of the most its appalling offspring, lives in society and among friends in Paris.’190
Conclusion
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To conclude this chapter it has been argued that Clausewitz recognised the French Revolution 
as a powerful step towards absolute or total war but he did not morally approve of the 
violence it unleashed. Clausewitz was disgusted by the way the French government oppressed 
its own nationals and allowed its armies to pillage and plunder foreign countries. The people 
of Switzerland, Tyrol and Italy put up some insurrectionary resistance but without the support 
of regular armies it was easily knocked down by the French. This reinforced Clausewitz’s 
belief that such resistance was only useful in the context of conventional warfare. Having 
shown that Clausewitz morally condemned the Revolutionary Wars it seems natural to turn 
next to the standards by which he passed such judgement.
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Chapter Three
* * *
A Profession of Violence
The previous chapter revealed some of Clausewitz’s opinions regarding the popularised 
violence unleashed by the early French Revolutionary Wars. This chapter will concentrate on 
Clausewitz as a conscientious military professional by addressing four main areas. Firstly, his 
personal background and social position as an officer and gentleman. Secondly, his theory of 
war which allows for the restraining influence of humanitarian sentiment and political reason. 
Thirdly, his study military history in which he hesitates to engage in detailed discussion of the 
targeting of civilians in the past. Fourthly, his recipe for military success, which places 
emphasis on destroying the enemy’s armed forces in battle rather than massacring civilians. 
This will all help rebuff the charge that Clausewitz was simply an amoral advocate of mass 
destruction and total war.
Formative years: Schamhorst and the military institution
Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz was bom in Burg on 1st July 1780. He was one of six 
children belonging to Friedrich Gabriel and Friederike Schmidt. His father was a tax collector 
in Burg with a record of military service as a lieutenant in the Seven Years War. The visits of 
old comrades and tales of soldiering meant that Clausewitz always felt like he had been 
nurtured in a military-like family. His grandfather had been a professor of theology and the 
family had ambiguous claims to Silesian nobility. Since Clausewitz lacked the noble status 
that usually came with officers and generals of the period he felt very insecure and occupied a 
peculiar social position as a full-time, life-long member of a military institution or caste.1
At the age of twelve he enrolled as a Fahnenjunker or cadet lance corporal in the 34th 
Infantry Regiment. In January 1793 the regiment marched off to the Rhine and experienced 
the physical hardships of campaigning in that period.2 In June the allied forces closed their 
siege around Mainz and bombarded the city with incendiaries.3 The destruction of Mainz was 
lamented by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe4 and Prussia’s future prime minister, Baron 
Heinrich Friedrich Karl Freiherr vom und zum Stein.5 In adulthood Clausewitz confessed 
with great shame his fiancee: ‘I added my childish shout to the triumphant cheers of the 
soldiers.’6 His friend and mentor Gerhard Johann David von Schamhorst wrote to his own 
wife of the 1793 campaign:
T can face danger without difficulty; but I am enraged and thrown into an 
unsupportable mood by the sight of innocent people moaning in their blood at my
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feet, by the flames of burning villages, which men have put to the torch for their own 
pleasure, by the other horrors of this universal devastation.’7
It was Schamhorst above all whom Clausewitz looked up to as a paragon of personal and 
professional conduct by describing him as the father of his intellect and spirit.8 Bom the son 
of a free peasant Schamhorst rose through the ranks of the Hanoverian and Prussian army and 
believed that such institutions should be open and rewarding of talented and energetic 
individuals like Clausewitz.9 Schamhorst’s death following the battle of Liitzen/Gross- 
Gorschen in 1813 was a traumatic loss to Clausewitz who felt obligated to pay his fallen 
friend written tributes in the forms of an obituary and a biography.10
The early campaigns against France had revealed to Schamhorst the weaknesses of 
Prussia’s military institutions as well as a definite link between war and politics. He identified 
the reasons for the French military success lay in their use of interior lines, light troops, 
superior numbers and most important of all; a national population enthused by political 
emancipation and the terror that they were going to be enslaved.11 Clausewitz thus credited 
Schamhorst with the insight to see that the frightful power of war was no longer a shackled 
affair for kings and their armies. War had been released from its former diplomatic and 
financial bonds when politics returned it to the people through whom it could progress in its 
raw form.12
Clausewitz had in the meantime made his mark as a rather bookish, shy, sensitive and 
socially awkward member of high society; some its members later came to regard him as 
arrogant and possibly seditious.13 In the spring of 1795 Clausewitz’s regiment was 
demobilised and in the eleven years of peace that followed he concentrated on his education 
and matured into an intelligent and dignified young man who cared a great deal about matters 
relating to his country, whether it was subsistence farming in Westphalia or the highest levels 
of state policy.14
The first five years were spent as a subaltern in a royally patronised regiment 
stationed at Neuruppin. The town had been devastated during the Thirty Years’ War and 
rebuilt so it now gave Clausewitz access to the residency of Prince Henry, a renowned library, 
opera and theatre.15 At the end of 1801 the twenty-one year old Clausewitz earned admission 
to the War College in Berlin where he received a vigorous education in geometry, 
mathematics, politics, history and philosophy.16 He graduated the top of his class in 1804 and 
was appointed adjutant to Prince August.17
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Marie and the civilian publicists
Shortly afterwards Clausewitz began a long courtship of Marie von Briihl, daughter of Carl 
Adolf von Briihl and Sophie Gromm. Being the daughter of nobility and a favourite of Queen 
Louise made Marie slightly above Clausewitz’s station in life. Marie was gregarious, 
intelligent, well-balanced and serene. Clausewitz was withdrawn, introspective, and plagued 
with anxiety and worries. Marie’s English mother opposed a marriage and for all then- 
incompatible qualities Marie was inexorably attracted to the young officer whom she judged 
to be loyal, honourable, kind, and unable to standby and bear another’s misery.18 Both shared 
a strong admiration for the English and hated the French with xenophobic passion.19 On 26th 
June 1809 he confessed to his fiancee:
‘The thought is very good to me that one day I will delight in firing the bloody bullet 
at the arrogant, odious Frenchman. While people face one another in war one may be 
aware of the glory of existence. Those who have lived for years in slavery, scarcely 
allowed to have hostile thoughts about the French, let alone speak out with the 
thunder of cannons, must undertake a sad war with pride.’20
It is true that Clausewitz confided in Marie some dark thoughts about war and politics and she 
was ultimately responsible for publishing On War. It could be argued that aside from being 
chief editor Marie functioned as a moral compass for Clausewitz and helped him to stay in 
touch with his humanity during very emotionally turbulent times. In the preface of On War 
Marie described her late husband in glowing terms as a man of rare distinction and broad 
education who directed his reflections toward military affairs ‘which are of such great 
importance to the well-being of nations and which constituted his profession.’21 Clausewitz 
presumably read the major literary works of his times and was an exemplary product of what 
some historians have called the age of the Enlightenment.22
The ‘publicists’ Clausewitz refers to in On War were typically men of letters and 
culture who wrote for courts, cabinets, educational colleges and military academies.23 It 
appears that Clausewitz took inspiration from Baron de La Brede et de Montesquieu, 
Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Johann Gottfried Kiesewetter.24 There is 
a possible connection to Emer de Vattel given that he was one of the most prominent 
philosophers of the age and was in correspondence with the grandfather of Clausewitz’s wife 
(Count Heinrich von Briihl). There also appears to be a subtle resemblance between On War 
and The Law o f Nations (1758) in the choice of language, concepts, and references to 
historical matters and individuals like Heniy IV.25
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Pinpointing the exact intellectual influences on Clausewitz is a matter of conjecture. 
We know for certain that he was impressed by works of Friedrich von Schiller26 and Niccolo 
Machiavelli.27 Clausewitz was slightly contemptuous those petite-maitres, including the 
young Crown Prince Frederick (later Frederick II), who affected disgust for Machiavellian 
principles and took on pretentious airs of humanity.28 Yet according to Geoffrey Best, 
Clausewitz remained a model of model of chivalry and his strong language about the 
explosive unpredictability and violent tendencies of war was aimed at the dandies, pedants 
and sentimentalists would thought it could be conducted with kid gloves according to rule 
books.29
Professional polemics
It is important to bear in mind that Clausewitz was no academic philosopher but thinking- 
soldier who turned to real-life experience and the observation of events in order to discover 
general principles for practical results in the field of warfare and statecraft.30 Unlike previous 
writers on ‘military science’ or ‘art of war’ Clausewitz was always up for the fight (das 
Gefecht) and quick to pour scorn over alternative approaches designed to bring about 
bloodless victories. The preference for avoiding armed contact and compelling an opponent to 
concede through famine and clever logistical methods had been refined by military experts in 
the eighteenth century.31 Clausewitz emerged as outspoken critic of the antiquated and rigid 
state of the army and the overly scientific, didactic theories of men like Bulow.32
Clausewitz accepted that every kriegssystem was a product of its times, that every 
army depended on a base of supply and lines of communication, and the advantage lay with 
the side with the bigger economic power. On the basis of recent experience Clausewitz 
refused to believe that armies would in shy away from bloody fighting and not resort to living 
off the enemy’s lands. He consistently rejected indirect strategies of manoeuvre as outmoded 
methods and exalted actual fighting as the very essence of war: ‘Battle is for strategy what 
cold cash is for commercial transactions’ he wrote in his Strategic aus dem Jahr 1804. The 
purpose of war was to either destroy one opponent, to terminate his political existence, or 
impose conditions on him during peace negotiations. In both cases one had to destroy or 
paralyse his fighting power either through direct battle or by occupying territory thereby 
depriving him of military supplies.33
Clausewitz remained faithful to this doctrine throughout his military career.34 His 
Principles o f War written for the crown prince in 1812 repeats that one should aim at the 
destruction of the enemy’s armed power and take possession of his material sources of
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strength.35 The prominence of this theme has been considerable enough for critics to label 
Clausewitz’s work a culturally-specific product of its time. By thinking about how to wage 
war using battles Clausewitz derived a powerful understanding of what it was essentially all 
about and articulated a theory versatile enough to understand other forms of warfare. These 
include the targeting of both armed and unarmed persons, even if the latter lacked a proper 
legal definition at the time.36
To sum up, while Clausewitz was socialised to be an officer and gentlemen he was 
never deluded about the purpose of his profession: using violence in order to render the 
enemy defenceless and achieve a political purpose. This was a view shared by colleagues like 
Johann Friedrich Constantin von Lossau and Johann Jakob Otto August Ruhle von 
Lilienstem.37 Philosophers, theologians and soldiers such as Justus Lipsius, Hugo Grotius and 
Raimondo de Montecuccoli had long ago stated that war was the use of force against a 
foreign enemy, be it a single ruler or a whole people.38 Vattel defines war as ‘that state in 
which we prosecute our right by force’ before trying to make distinctions between the 
different kinds of war, who has the legitimate authority to employ it, and for what for just 
causes (to recover what is due to us, to provide for future safety by punishing an aggressor, or 
defence from injury).39
Absolute war
The juristic aspect of On War is clear from the very first page. Clausewitz rejects the efforts 
of publicists to define war with abstruse and pedantic definitions and asks his readers to 
simply imagine war as a Zweikampf or two-struggle between two wrestling fighters who both 
use force with utmost effort to throw down their opponent and make him incapable of further 
resistance.40 There is no such thing as a civilian or non-combatant, merely our enemy since 
war arises without reference to political life and is devoid of any real-world circumstances41
By using a theoretical construct or ideal, which readers sometimes refer to as 
‘absolute war’,42 Clausewitz defines war as an act of violence intended to compel our 
opponent to fulfil our will43 In theory, war is an instantaneous act of violence without 
duration44 and discharged to utmost effect45 There is no assembly of forces in time, no 
successive action of powers because the simultaneous application of all forces for the shock 
or collision is an elementary or primordial law of war.46 A zero-sum principal of polarity 
means there can be no suspensions in military activity,47 and the reciprocal interactions of 
both opponents would ensure the violence escalates to utmost and unconceivable bounds.48
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Whenever On War is demonised as a celebration of ‘total war’ and its author 
portrayed as an advocate of mutual massacre it is usually with reference to Clausewitz’s 
descriptions of absolute war. Similarly harsh language appears in Leon Tolstoy’s War and 
Peace,49 William T. Sherman’s address to Atlanta in 1864,50 and the “whirlwind” speech of 
Sir Arthur Harris in 1942.51 It is difficult to comprehend war in the absolute because even if 
every thermonuclear device on the planet was detonated simultaneously, the apocalyptic 
destruction would still fall below an unattainable level of absolute violence.52
It is unclear whether the term ‘overthrow’ equates to the physical disappearance of 
the enemy state or extermination of its people because the analogy of two wrestlers seems to 
imply that one allows their enemy to rise again after a peaceful submission. What Clausewitz 
leaves in no doubt is that the true or original aim in the plan of war, and therefore all military 
acts and supporting activity, is the overthrow of the enemy, to render him utterly defenceless 
and this means annihilating his armed forces (i.e. killing or disarming combatants). After this 
has been achieved the victor can carry out supplemental operations to further strengthen his 
position and dictate the conditions of peace to a prostate enemy.53
Decisive battle is the core argument in On War, far more so than the message about 
policy which was added belatedly during the redrafts. In the conceptual schemata of military 
aims (referred to interchangeably as Zweck or Zielf4 the destruction of the enemy’s armed 
forces always forms the underlying basis or object of war,55 strategy,56 combat,57 tactics,58 
defense59 and attack.60 There also exists in reality a human impulse to vent one’s hostility in 
bloody battles61 and a cultural celebration of militaiy honour and glorious victories.62 Put 
bluntly, all those who arm themselves for fighting, whether they be professional soldiers in 
the regular army {das Heer) or armed peasants (refered to variably as Landsturm, Volkshaufen 
or bewaffnete Bauem) can be considered part of the enemy’s armed forces (die Streitkrafte) 
and therefore liable targets for immediate destruction.
War in reality
From as early as 1801, Clausewitz struggled to find an answer to the question of why armed 
forces and their host societies do not engage in constant fighting to throw down the other 
opponent thus leaving war a fettered half-thing. Clausewitz understood that war could never 
attain its true, absolute conception because it operated within a non-conducting medium full 
of real-world impediments. He encapsulated many by identifying the illogic and passions of 
the human mind, the friction on the militaiy machine or play of chance, and the role of policy 
or politics. Another cmcial factor was the degree of involvement by the people who could
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either support the war effort in a non-combatant role or actually take up arms to oppose a 
foreign invader.63
After 1827 Clausewitz set about redrafting On War in order to incorporate the 
argument that war is nothing but a setting forth of political conditions or intercourse by other 
means. War should always remain an instrumental means to achieve a political purpose and 
politicians have the ultimate authority. Clausewitz suggests two conditions likely to raise 
levels of violence: a higher political end and the greater involvement of the people. The 
higher the political purpose, the more it affects the existence of whole peoples, the more 
policy/politics and hostile feelings will coincide with the destruction dictated by the logic of 
war. When war is charged with hostile spirit of the masses and policy-makers aim for an 
exterminatoiy overthrow of the enemy it will most likely try to approximate its absolute 
conception.64
In short, Clausewitz explained ‘absolute’ war as an untrammelled act of instantaneous 
and utmost violence intended to compel one’s opponent to one’s will. He then countered it 
with war in reality and clung to the essential idea that political goals are best achieved by the 
physical and moral destruction of the enemy’s armed forces. All military activities including 
the feeding, clothing and sheltering of soldiers have to seen as working towards this military 
aim.65 Whether individuals can be physically attacked for engaging in such non-fighting roles 
is left uncertain in Clausewitz’s writing but is now banned by the laws promulgated by 
Geneva, the Hague and U.N. Even with the benefit of these international humanitarian laws 
there remains much ambiguity and tension with the political interests of opponents and the 
destructive tendencies of war. Contemporary political scientists cannot be assured that even 
individuals who do not present a direct threat of harm to the enemy’s armed forces will be 
guaranteed to receive the immunity from harm for which they are now entitled.66
Humanitarian and political restraint
It would be erroneous to assume that Clausewitz had nothing but contempt for civilian 
publicists and politicians and ignored their influence on the causes, course, conduct and 
character of war. While it is true that Clausewitz did not digress into ethical questions of what 
is ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ he did accept that war existed within the realms of human morality and 
reasoning. Since political intercourse and diplomatic contact between two adversaries does 
not cease entirely when war breaks out extraneous forces such as humanitarian law continue 
to have a modest influence throughout. Instead of a being simple an act of violence war 
becomes saturated with social, ethical and political particularities or peculiarities
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(Eigentiimlichkeiten). These of course include cultural norms, social taboos and international 
laws or customs concerning violence against those engaged in combat as well as those who 
are not.67
Clausewitz was not an amoral theorist. He wanted to first wipe away concepts such as 
international law ( Volkerrecht), the humane standpoint (Humaner Standpimkt) or the soul of 
humanity {menschenfreudliche Seelen) because they risked misleading kind-hearted friends of 
mankind into thinking there was a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy 
without causing great bloodshed and believe this the proper tendency in the art of war. 
Pleasant as that sounds, Clausewitz felt it was wrong to shut one’s eyes in distress to all the 
horror and brutality that comes along with the true, ruthless nature of war because mistakes 
stemming from a spirit of benevolence (Gutmutigkeit) are the very worst.68
The self-imposed restrictions, termed usages of international law and custom, which 
are hardly worth mentioning in regard to war in the abstract conception are indeed worth 
mentioning as impediments weakening the violence of war in reality.69 The social conditions 
of states and their relationships to one another are what give rise to war and are the same 
forces which circumscribe and moderate it with principles leading to logical absurdity.70 
Clausewitz was not calling for these humane tendencies to be thrown away, merely warning 
against the dangerous tendency to regard war as nothing more than an intelligent act of 
governments, or a kind of algebraic action, because the facts of war teach us better.71 For 
Clausewitz, humanity or the moral progress of civilisation has little control on war:
‘If, then, civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death or devastate cities and 
countries, it is because intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of warfare and 
has taught them more effective ways of using force than the crude expression of 
instinct.
‘The invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement of firearms are enough in 
themselves to show that the advance of civilization has done nothing practical to alter 
or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of 
war.’72
Clausewitz appears to side with those argue that the killing of non-combatants and destruction 
of cities is an ineffective and counterproductive way to achieve one’s political aim.73 In other 
words, why kill civilians if serves no rational purpose? Another way of reading the above 
passage is to concede that if such methods are an effective mode of carrying on the war then 
that will likely be applied with intelligent reasoning. The human mind and passions maybe 
already inclined towards atrocity regardless of whether it is effective or not.74 War is anything 
but a rational activity because it is full of hostile feelings and intentions75 and can could
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approach the complete perfection of ‘ganz Krieg’ if the pure element of enmity was 
unleashed.76
The trinity
In order to accommodate these irrational and unpredictable factors Clausewitz brought in a 
synthesis that war was a trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity; the play 
of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and the element 
subordination to reason as an instrument of policy. These tendencies are mainly associated 
with the people, the commander and army, and the government.77 This certainly helps to 
understand why opposing armed forces are deviated from the task of mutual destruction in 
order to target civilian populations instead. In each case it could be frenzied passion by the 
perpetrator, or an attempt to beat down the enemy’s morale and neutralise his people’s 
passion to fight; an accident of chance, or calculated a form of interdiction to undermine the 
enemy’s chance and probability of military success; a military means to a political end, or the 
aim of policy itself.
The trinity helps orientate this reader’s understanding of cases outside Clausewitz’s 
lifetime. The damage inflicted on civilian property during Sherman’s March (1864) for 
example firstly satisfied the soldiers human urge to wreak havoc, as well making the 
inhabitants feel the hard hand of war for supporting secessionism. Secondly, it aimed to 
distract or disrupt the strength of the Confederate forces, thereby indirectly affecting the 
chance and probability of military success. Thirdly, the destructive inroads made into the 
South provided a political morale boost for the Abraham Lincoln administration, while 
discrediting the enemy government and applying coercive pressure on its leaders to make 
peace.78 It was only after the loss of Richmond and the defeat of their main forces that the 
military elite accepted ultimate defeat. They turned down the option of full-scale guerrilla 
war with all its attending atrocities and instead accepted a relatively lenient peace.79
The R.A.F bombing of Germany during WWI1 can also be understood in trinitarian 
terms: firstly, as a manifestation of British revenge and an attempt to demoralise the morale of 
the enemy nation (passion); secondly, as a way to disrupt the Germany’s industrial capacity 
and divert men and material from the decisive battles on the Eastern Front (chance and 
probability); and thirdly, as a political gesture for the Russian allies and a means to a coerce 
the German political authorities into unconditional surrender (reason). Despite political 
interference, technological limitations and general friction the R.A.F. succeeded at utterly 
devastating civilian quarters in Cologne, Hamburg and Dresden. The moral effect of these
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attacks was dampened by the defiance it inspired amongst the people and the fact that a war- 
weary population living under such a draconian dictatorship cannot so easily convert 
defeatism into political action.80
Civilians in the western way o f war
A superficial historical survey will be enough to show that Clausewitz knew the suffering of 
non-combatants was not just an accidental by-product of war, but as an instrumental method 
of violence employed by western combatants to impose their will. It is remarkable how little 
Clausewitz was prepared to admit this was employed as a rational strategy and puts it down 
mostly to the weaknesses of the human mind and political societies. What makes this point 
challenging to prove is that while Clausewitz was thoroughly well-read in the military history 
he had a preference for the in-depth study of single military campaigns rather than sweeping 
narratives covering entire wars.81 He was quite dismissive of historical sources prior to the 
Silesian Wars as untrustworthy and was irritated by those who pedantically cited the methods 
of the ancients to show off their classical knowledge.82
Clausewitz warned students not look upon the past with the perspective and 
assumptions of one’s own times otherwise it would be difficult to accept what appears 
exceptional or out of the ordinary.83 No two wars are ever the same due to differing political 
objects and the fact that the number of possible ways of reaching them rises to infinity.84 The 
war aims a belligerent adopts and the methods and resources he employs will be governed by 
the particular characteristics of his own position. They will also conform to the prevailing 
spirit of the age, its general character, its limiting conditions, its own peculiar preconceptions, 
scientific principles and its own theory of war. Finally, aims and methods will be governed by 
whatever conclusions are drawn from the nature of war itself.85 In a sweeping historical 
survey Clausewitz argues that the character and intensity of war, as well as the methods of 
waging it, showed variance according to differing circumstances:
‘The semi barbarous Tartars, the republics of antiquity, the feudal lords and trading 
cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the 
nineteenth century—all conducted war in their own particular way, using different 
methods and pursuing different aims.’86
The wars o f antiquity
Although it is difficult to accept the notion of a ‘western way of war’ European societies have 
since the Battle of Marathon (490 B.C.) celebrated the cultural and political aspects of
109
X  /  K J J  C sk J tJ  l i s t  t  K J J  ¥
combat, while exhibiting a moral ambiguity towards the destruction of outside persons and 
property.87 Greek philosopher-historians lamented the deaths of religious personnel and 
property or the wasteful devastation of crops and cities.88 The Greeks would forfeit moral 
qualms for reasons of booty,89 racism,90 or in revenge for some snub or infuriating insult 
leading to explosive revenge and communal feuds.91
The Peloponnesian War and Corinthian War were typically fought along the lines of 
battles, skirmishes, agricultural ravaging and the besieging of cities.92 Military experts such as 
Xenophon, Tacitus and Vegetius recognised the effectiveness of inflicting fire and famine 
upon one’s enemy, but cautioned against dispersing one’s soldiers for such a task left because 
it left them vulnerable to a counter-attack.93 Clausewitz did not give much attention to this 
epoch and wrote that the republics of antiquity, Rome excepted, were small and their armies 
smaller because the plebs or mass of people were excluded. War was confined to devastating 
the open country and taking some towns to ensure a certain degree of influence for the 
future 94
Clausewitz moves on to single out the achievements of Alexander the Great as a 
unique example of an exceptional leader and army operating without the backing of a mass 
republic.95 He leaves out the more brutal side to the Macedonian conquests by simply stating 
that Alexander led the army on a ruthless (or reckless) advance through Asia to India. The 
Persian Empire was in such a brittle and decayed state that it shattered on impact. Even so, 
Clausewitz omits the fact that Alexander also punished civil populations for stubborn sieges 
and instances of guerrilla resistance.96
The rise of Rome from a weak city to a mighty empire was attributed to the clever use 
of alliances, the assimilation or subjugation of neighbouring peoples, and an excellent army 
supported by the wealth of the people.97 Clausewitz was intrigued by the fact that the Punic 
Wars were conducted with much activity in the form of minor skirmishes, which did not lead 
to decisive consequences. The Romans consistently adopted a ‘peculiar’ or ‘round-about 
method of resistance’ (which involved butchering settlements in Italy, Sicily and Spain) while 
Hannibal was still victorious in the field. The Carthaginian forces were eventually beaten and 
the city was destroyed in 146 B.C.98
Roman wars were not ‘absolute’ in the Clausewitzian sense. They too were supposed 
to be regulated by fetial ceremonies and kept within the bounds of honour and justifiable 
revenge.99 Face-to-face battle rather than brigand-like raiding was glorified as true warfare, 
yet even in the hands of great commanders like Julius Caesar the army routinely made the
110
n  1 r u j v d d i u n  u j  r  t u i e r i w
lands and cities of their enemies suffer the devastation of fire and sword.100 The comparison 
Clausewitz makes between ancient Rome and Napoleonic France suggests that he 
disapproved of both as tyrannical empires.101 Rome conquered foreign peoples either for the 
self-satisfaction of plunder and prestige, or to punish obstinate resistance and acts of 
rebellion.102 Even those living peacefully within the frontiers were exposed to bouts of 
praetorianism, civil war and logistical demands of passing armies.103
The medieval age
By the late fifth century the pressure of migrating ‘barbarians’ caused the western empire to 
dissolve into an impoverished patchwork of pagan and Christian societies.104 Peasants were 
robbed and terrorised in all forms of war from the great Frankish conquests105 to the raids of 
the Vikings.106 It is curious that neither Clausewitz or his disciple Hans Delbriick had much to 
say on the Crusades given that popular religious energies were militarised with atrocious 
results far beyond Europe.107 ‘Since war is a means of politics and in the final analysis the 
conduct of war is always determined by its political purpose, the mystical original basis made 
it impossible from the start to have a rational strategy in the Crusades’, wrote Delbriick.108 Be 
that as it may, agricultural raiding was utilised for the rational purpose of bringing tribute- 
paying areas under one’s control, or to weaken the lands surrounding a target city as a 
precursor to laying it under siege.109
The spread of Christianity110 and ideal of chivalry111 represented a significant 
development in the notion of non-combatant immunity and Clausewitz was lightly imbued 
with these notions.112 Such intangible concepts were little understood or practiced by eveiy 
medieval warrior, especially when they were given licence by their masters to create havoc 
for the opposing lord and his subjects. Theologians were more concerned about the conditions 
under which a lawful authority could prosecute a just war to correct wrong-doing, vanquish 
evil and restore peace. The end justified means that would be considered atrocious by other 
moral standards.113 Even without devoting a study to the campaigns of successful Christian 
warlords such as William the Conqueror114 or Baldwin V of Hainaut,115 Clausewitz correctly 
identified some of the tangible factors that characterised the proprietorial warfare of the 
medieval age: small feudal armies and the dominance of castles and fortified places.116 
Medieval war became a form of litigation by other means:
‘They were waged relatively quickly; not much time was wasted in the field; but their
aim was usually to punish the enemy, not subdue him. When his cattle had been
driven off and his castles burned, one could go home.’117
I l l
Although the devastating struggle between England and France certainly stood out Clausewitz 
believed that like most warring societies of the medieval period the two kingdoms lacked 
domestic unity and military operations betrayed the marks of immature political cohesion.118 
The military events of the Middle Ages and Renaissance which appear to have interested 
Clausewitz the most were the destructive descents of the German emperors into Italy, and the 
restricted wars of the commercial cities and small republics.119 He describes the latter as more 
like armed negotiations using small and expensive condottieri forces putting up sham fights 
and so lacking in energy that war was robbed of risk and wholly changed from its proper 
nature.120
The medieval mercenaries who Machiavelli and Clausewitz so contemptuously 
dismissed were more than capable of fighting battles, especially in cases of personal or unit 
rivalries. Mercenary loyalties did not extend far beyond their contract of employment and 
raiding was normally sufficient for the job at hand.121 References to the invasion of Charles 
VIII, the dear price Venice had to pay for opposing the League of Cambrai, and the infamous 
Sack of Rome in 1527 also reveal that Clausewitz had read of the more extreme Italian Wars 
between 1494-1559.122 He appreciated the harsh context of Machiavelli’s writing which 
legitimised fear, cruelty and terrorism as indispensible parts of war and statecraft, sometimes 
necessary to preserve one’s political existence and limited only by effectiveness.123
The age o f religious wars
The power of France was at this point checked by the Charles V and the Holy Roman Empire, 
which Clausewitz described as a mighty colossus lacking internal cohesion and domestic 
stability yet supported by its enormous wealth until the split of 1556.124 Clausewitz says 
virtually nothing on the conquistadors in South America, Africa and India,125 or the 
philosopher-theologians such as Francisco de Vitoria who approved attacks on unarmed 
people for a just cause like punishing rebellion against a sovereign master.126 Passages from 
On War and a full overview of the Dutch Revolt between 1568-1606 do show Clausewitz’s 
awareness of the atrocious repression meted out by Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Duke of 
Alba to places like Haarlem in July 1673. Clausewitz does not go into the grisly details of the 
many sieges, nor the damage caused by the rebels whenever they flooded their own land.127 
The French Wars of Religion are barely touched upon in On War except to mention that 
Henri de Navarre (Henry IV) appeased the ‘internal dissension’ through his ‘noble feelings 
and a generous disposition’, after the fact that his attempts to starve Paris cost thousands of 
civilian lives.128
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Likewise, the initial religious disturbances im Germany and Switzerland receive little 
attention.129 The campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus between 1630-1632 were the subject of 
Clausewitz’s earliest in-depth studies in military history.130 Clausewitz denounced the 
massacre of Magdeburg by the troops of Count Johamn Tserclaes Tilly as an act of boundless 
cruelty (‘grenzenlose Grausamkeit’).131 He also criticised the form of strategic distraction and 
manoeuvre Gustavus had employed by moving his airmy along the Oder, plundering towns 
like Frankfurt.132 Clausewitz was conscious that strategic movements were highly influenced 
by logistics and the possession of civilian territory.133 His account of the Breitenfeld 
campaign for example points out that Tilly forced Leipzig to pay 200,000 talers and various 
other TebensmitteP to avoid pillage. Gustavus meanwhile tried to interdict the enemy’s food 
supply through the tactics of kleine Krieg as a preludie to the knock-out blow and subsequent 
occupation of Bohemia and Bavaria.134
The English Civil War135 and Cromwellian Conquest of Ireland136 also witnessed the 
extortion of fire-money and massacre of settlements lbut it was the Thirty Years’ War above 
all others that drove Hugo Grotius and the educated rmen of Europe to think hard about how to 
secularise international relations, discipline soldiers, and purge war of the destruction that 
brought Germany’s population down from 21 milliom to 13.5 million.137 Clausewitz read 
works by Schiller and chose to study the military events without presuming the universal 
standards of the Enlightenment applied to conditions; of that particular period. The nature of 
war had depended on subjective forces at work on thie minds and personalities of the 
commanders and the clash of wills between the coumtries and peoples involved, on their 
religion, customs, culture, and political circumstances.138 Clausewitz actually admired the 
way peoples of the past had the courage (or fanaticisim) to fight long and hard unlike the 
people of the present.139
War in Eastern Europe
These cultural influences and desultory forms of waging war were on Clausewitz’s mind 
when wrote the last few chapters of book six for On War. Without going into historical details 
he frequently mentions that fortresses and military cordons guard against incursions or raids 
intended to exact contributions or live off the enemy.. The Great Wall of China for example 
served as protection against the Tartars and Clausewiitz states that frontier defences are 
essential for states bordering Asia and Turkey where: a state of war with the Asiatic peoples is 
virtually permanent.140 A working note penned during the redrafting process questions 
whether the raiding parties of the Tartars should be considered representative of the 
phenomenon of war alongside its stronger manifestations.141 The Mongols and Tartars
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engaged in ravaging and plunder as often as battle because it was a culturally acceptable and 
served the policy or political interests of the tribes and their leaders.142
A short study on the Grand Hetman and warrior-king John III Sobieski, perhaps 
written sometime during the last two years of Clausewitz’s life, argues that the Asian nature 
and constitution of the principal opponents means one should not compare or measure the 
adopted methods by western European standards.143 Clausewitz was clearly aware of the 
terrible devastation and atrocities visited on Poland by its neighbours in the decades following 
the Cossack revolt of Bogdan Chmielnicki in 1648.144 The Poles had to fall back on partisan 
war to beat off the Tartars-Turks who raided for booty and slaves.145 Poland was finally 
trampled by the forces of Charles XII during the Great Northern War146 and fell under the 
malevolent of influence of Russia, Austria and Prussia.147 Clausewitz believed that the Tartar- 
like country had lost its place in the modem European balance of power and to reinstate 
Poland would be to the advantage of France.148
The age of Louis XIV
Clausewitz explains that in centuries between the reigns of Louis XI and Louis XIV the 
turbulent republics and precarious monarchies of Europe all undertook state consolidation and 
institutional organisation. Feudal service was replaced by a system of mercenaries, which was 
replaced in turn by a standing army paid for by the treasury. Ambitious campaigns were still 
curbed by military inefficiency, financial costs and prevailing political conditions. War 
resembled a forceful game or kind of armed negotiation between monarchical governments in 
which the people were largely excluded. The army entrusted to a general was a precious 
instrument to be used prudently in healthy campaigning seasons. It was customary to seize a 
few fortresses, a province or two, and fight a battle under the most advantageous 
circumstances possible.149 When the balance of forces were too evenly matched and neither 
side was resolved on battle whole campaigns turned on sieges or the retention and systematic 
exploitation of strategic towns and rich provinces until they were reduced to an emaciated 
condition.150 Taking a stretch of territory reduced the enemy’s national resources, yielded up 
food-supplies and contributions, satisfied notions of gloire and became an asset in peace 
negotiations.151
These reflections are most evident in the ninth volume of his Posthumous Work 
which is devoted almost entirely the campaigns of Marshal Turenne and Luxembourg in 
Holland and Flanders.152 Clausewitz appreciated that for commanders of this period the aim 
of battles such as Fleurus (1690) or Blenheim (1704) was to beat the opposing army as
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precursor to securing good quarters for the army and raising coercive contributions at the 
expense of the enemy’s subjects until their government requested a peace.153 He was also 
aware of the guerre de course and the naval bombardment of Genoa in 1684.154 In regard to 
the devastation of the Rhenish Palatinate in 1688-89 Clausewitz mentions that General 
Montclar destroyed the land before the opening of the campaign and Marshal Duras later 
made raids into Swabia to collect contributions and carry out select burnings.155
It can be argued that the study of these restricted, halfling campaigns impressed on 
Clausewitz less the importance of humanitarian sentiment and political control but more the 
idea that the logical development of war was stunted by human ignorance and political 
weakness. The Campaigns o f Luxembourg noted ‘how little objective conditions decided 
matters, how little compelling grounds determined actions, and how infrequently the strict 
order between means and ends was applied.’156 France was never really threatened with non­
existence during the Spanish War of Succession because its size and resources were enough 
to deter her enemies, nor did they even think such a goal was a possibility.157
Frederick the Great
By the time Clausewitz wrote The Campaigns o f Frederick he understood how wars of the 
early modem period were circumscribed by ‘the prejudices and the institutions of the time.’158 
None of the powers, with the exception of Austria, had any reason for making an all-out- 
effort during the War of Austrian Succession so strategic plans became saturated with 
political considerations.159 One common ordinance was not to let soldiers have their way with 
the civilian population. Clausewitz repeats at least twice that to supply the army in the manner 
usual since the French Revolution by living off the land, which was possible even then, went 
against accepted practice. It would have been regarded as completely despoiling the 
countryside and led to powerful reactions in the people’s feelings and opinions. Nor was it 
easy to live off the land became the army’s organisation and administration were not designed 
for such practices.160
The growing permanency of the military organisation (sustained through a system of 
volunteering, conscription and hiring of mercenaries) did help create faint normative 
distinctions between soldiers and non-combatants. There were those subjects who paid taxes 
in return for peaceful status and those who were paid or honour-bound to fight in the state’s 
armies, either under the leadership of aristocrats or the king himself in the case of Frederick 
II.161 While the Empress Maria Theresa let her light troops devastate Bavaria,162 Frederick
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kept his largely in check by draconian discipline and a general policy (one endorsed by On 
War) of taking advantage of disaffected enemy subjects.163
As a fellow Prussian Clausewitz naturally wrote about Frederick the Great with 
patriotic admiration and considered him a military genius for whom neither vanity, ambition, 
nor vindictiveness could deviate from his political object.164 Yet Frederick’s flawed mind and 
character were subject to the very temperamental passions, obstinacy, and abuses of honour 
(Ehrgeiz) and glory (Ruhmsucht) Clausewitz warned readers about in a chapter entitled ‘On 
Military Genius’.165 Frederick’s policies entangled the kingdom in the Seven Years War 
during which the Austro-Russian monarchs were determined to grind down Prussia’s military 
power, not to massacre its inhabitants who in East Prussia willingly transferred their 
allegiance to the Tsarina Elizabeth.166
Frederick’s victories at Mollwitz, Hohenffiedberg, Soor, Leuthen and Rossbach 
fascinated contemporaries and subsequent military historians like Napoleon and 
Clausewitz.167 The Prussian army was however bloodied many times in set-piece battles and 
harassed by the tactics of petite guerre, particularly by the Austrian forces under the 
command of Leopold Joseph von Daun and Ernst Gideon von Loudan.168 On 22nd November 
1757 for incidence the troops under the Duke of Beven were beaten at Breslau and retreated 
towards Glogau, pillaging on the way either out of ill-discipline or to hinder any enemy 
pursuit. Clausewitz speculates that Beven could have taken a position on the far side of 
Breslau had this not exposed the city and its supply depots to the risk of bombardment and the 
displeasure of the king.169 The shelling of defended places like Zittau and Prague had mixed 
military results.170 Frederick’s own bombardment of Dresden in July 1760 was an outrage that 
Clausewitz found hard to excuse especially since it failed to dislodge the garrison, tempt 
Daun to battle or even prevent Loudon taking Glatz (Klodzko) at the end of the month.171
There were many subsidiary raids and plundering expeditions between the battles and 
sieges. Berlin was twice raided in 1758 and 1760 leading Clausewitz to admit the military 
potential of flying columns.172 Frederick and Prince Henry organised successful forays into 
Poland, Bohemia and Franconia with the retaliatory object of causing arson or raising fire- 
money (‘Zweck einer Wiedervergeltung oder der Brandschatzung’).173 Money and manpower 
were extracted from occupied lands and as well as nearby German principalities and 
bishoprics to help carry on the exhausting struggle.174 Clausewitz must have known about the 
draconian exploitation of the Electorate of Saxony given that his wife’s grandfather, Heinrich 
von Briihl, had his estates vindictively ruined for crossing Frederick while serving as its first
•  • 175minister.
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Even with British subsidies and Frederick’s imperative to ‘maintain the strength of 
his army as far as possible at the expense of other countries’ in the words of Clausewitz, the 
costs in manpower and money were enormous for Prussia, as they were for all the participant 
powers.176 The allies struggled to coordinate their offensives thus allowing Frederick’s forces 
breathing spaces within which to operate. The near-suicidal king was finally saved by 
Austrian hesitancy in the face of costly danger, as well as the political changes following the 
death of the Tsarina and the ascension of Peter III.177 Clausewitz observes that the coalition 
wrung from Frederick all the desire and courage for conquest,178 save the desultory ‘Potato 
War’ of 1778-79179 and the tripartite partition of Poland in 1772.180
The Enlightenment
War was increasingly seen in intellectual circles as unnatural aberration to be abolished by the 
interdependence of states, secularisation of politics, or the satisfaction delivered by increasing 
wealth, commerce and trade.181 Kant argued that war made humans treat one another as 
disposable means and statesmen should instead strive for perpetual peace by respecting each 
other’s national domains, cultural values and citizenry.182 Francis-Marie Arouet (Voltaire) 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau were not naive enough to think that war could or even should be 
averted but like Kant and Hegel they hoped that the violence could be restricted to soldiers 
who were merely servants of the state and therefore entitled to basic human rights.183
Unlike Clausewitz, Vattel wrote plainly that one should go to war with as much 
forbearance and courtesy as safety will allow. A prince or general should obviously not put 
his own soldiers and people at risk for the sake of the enemy. He may even refuse prisoners 
quarter and resort to scorched-earth and reprisals when gentler methods are insufficient to 
stop an inhumane enemy or bring a very stubborn one to terms. The definition of one’s enemy 
could be expanded to encompass all the personnel and property within an opposing nation, 
especially if it was deemed barbarous like the Turks. It was unnecessary to widen such a band 
to encompass women, children, old men and sick persons if the worse effects of war could be 
limited to those actually in arms.184 Like Clausewitz, Vattel argues those who take up arms 
(including women) become legitimate targets but his reasoning seems to be based more on 
parochial morality and gender roles rather than universal military logic.185
Clausewitz and the publicists could not foresee the extent to which successive 
generations would seek to institutionalise this philosophy into international law and 
institutions.186 There was however a general cultural preference going back centuries that
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unarmed prisoners and innocent folk should not be put to death and spared any unnecessary 
suffering.187 Excessive cruelty and destruction for no military or political purpose was 
regarded as disreputable imbecility because it enflamed the enemy’s passions to fighter 
harder, alienated one’s allies and ruined one’s own army through hunger, ill discipline and 
desertion.188 The result of all these military, social and political developments was that 
civilians were largely isolated from what Clausewitz describes as a restricted, shrivelled-up 
form of war.189 While Clausewitz morally applauds the spirit of progress he regarded a 
comforting fa9ade without logical sense:
‘It had ceased to be in harmony with the spirit of the times to plunder and lay waste 
the enemy’s land, which had played such an important role in antiquity, in Tartar 
days and indeed in mediaeval times. It was rightly held to be unnecessarily barbarous, 
an invitation to reprisals, and a practice that hurt the enemy’s subjects rather than 
their government—one therefore that was ineffective and only served permanently to 
impede the advance of general civilization. Not only in its means, therefore, but also 
in its aims, war increasingly became limited to the fighting force itself. Armies, with 
their fortresses and prepared positions, came to form a state within a state, in which 
violence gradually faded away.
‘All Europe rejoiced at this development. It was seen as a logical outcome of 
enlightenment. This is a misconception. Enlightenment can never lead to 
inconsistency: as we have said before and shall have to say again, it can never make 
two and two equal five. Nevertheless this development benefited the peoples of 
Europe, although there is no denying that it turned war even more into the exclusive 
concern of governments and estranged it still further from the interests of the 
people.’190
This appears to be a repetition of Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert and Johann 
Friedrich von Decken. Guibert foresaw both the militaiy benefits and humanitarian costs of 
arousing the wrathful passions of the people in form of citizen armies or popular militias.191 
When quasi-democratic changes were married with concurrent technological developments 
and reforms undertaken by French army the results were astounding.192 In intellectual circles 
the Revolutionary Wars were seen as crude outbursts of violence. For Clausewitz it was only 
natural when the chains fettering war were loosened by men as ruthless as Bonaparte or 
political aims as high as regime overthrow or the extermination of civil populations.193
By the standards of other centuries these wars appear relatively civilised to historians, 
partly because they were ended so quickly by conventional military means.194 It can be 
asserted that Clausewitz was a dignified officer imbued with the normative standards of the 
Enlightenment and trained to fight battles. Anything less than combat like slaughtering 
prisoners, burning down cottages or bullying women and children was beneath a soldier’s 
dignity and simply useless against the massive armies of France.195 If one must go to war 
there was an underlying assumption in the writings of humanist philosophers like Vattel and
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Kant, or soldiers like Napoleon or Clausewitz that men, not women or children, should fight 
bravely and openly for their state in conventional or semi-conventional armed forces while 
the citizens should not be used as spies, assassins or spreaders of lies.196
The ‘Napoleonic-CIausewitzian paradigm,19?
The strong emphasis on conventional warfare in On War tends to undermine the argument 
that Clausewitz advocated the targeting of non-combatants as an instrumental means of 
violence. His martial definition of strategy is restricted to the operational level as the use of 
combat for the purpose of war.198 The cultural attraction to battle was alluring for Clausewitz 
because notions of honour and renown permeate all military activity.199 ‘It satisfies the vanity 
of the general, the court, the army, and the people, and thereby in some measure the 
expectations that are always pinned on an offensive.’200 Clausewitz wanted his readers to 
understand that war was no pastime for irresponsible enthusiasts who are easily captivated by 
the vicissitudes of chance, courage, comradeship and honour; war is a serious means for a 
serious end.201
The first and most comprehensive strategic issue for both commander and statesman 
is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor 
trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.202 In his opinion the commander-in- 
chief must be like a statesman simultaneously. In order to conduct a war right through to its 
successful conclusion he must have a knowledge of higher state policy and relations on the 
one hand; and on the other, he must know exactly what he can do or how much he can 
achieve with the means at his disposal.203
One must draft a war plan according to political aim and be prepared to continuously 
adjust and modify efforts, neither doing too much or too little.204 The worst decision is to be 
caught on devious paths applying the wrong standard of measurement by an enemy 
employing shockingly violent methods that do not go against the nature of war.205 Clausewitz 
did not live to see technological breakthroughs in the twentieth century render the strongest 
military means of his time, namely conventional battle between ground forces, a relatively 
minor measure yet many passages retain their relevance:
‘In order to ascertain the real scale of the means which we must put forth for war, we 
must think over the political object both on our own side and on the enemy’s side; we 
must consider the power and position of the enemy’s state as well as of our own, the 
character of his government and of his people, and the capacities of both, and all that
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again on our own side, and the political connections of other states, and the effect 
which the war will produce on those states.’206
The maelstrom o f strategy
As shall be elaborated later, On War conveys the message that one stays on the defence at 
their peril and violence must be inflicted at some point. At what exactly will be determined by 
military and political conditions unique to the given strategic situation. Clausewitz stresses 
that strategy is especially difficult because there is no positive doctrine and the infinite 
amount and range of attending information, not to mention the moral responsibility to save 
one’s own soldiers and people from death and suffering, can easily overwhelm the most 
brilliant of minds. This maelstrom requires a genius of great strength or steadiness of mind 
and character, acquired through birth or training, to grope out the truth, determine a way to 
achieve the goal, and not be diverted from this course of action.207
A commander must be prepared to accept responsibility for his actions either before 
the tribunal of some outside power or before the court of his own conscience.208 He is in a 
position to either earn distinction or blacken his reputation by committing some of the worse 
outrages and abuses on the human race in the pursuit of honour, glory and revenge.209 It is 
easy for modem readers with men like Sherman or “Bomber” Harris in mind to imagine an 
obstinate or impassioned commander who is set upon targeting civilians and will not be 
distracted from this course, even when others object on humanitarian or utilitarian grounds.210
It is tempting to categorise Clausewitz and agree with those who argue strategies of 
coercion and terrorism against civilians are counterproductive because they provoke an 
escalation spiral by galvanising popular support behind the enemy government.211 
Brunswick’s threats to bum down Paris certainly backfired in 1792.212 The Polish insurrection 
led by Tadeusz Kosciuszko in 1794-95 however could not withstand Suvorov’s Russian 
troops who sacked the suburbs of Praga with such terrifying severity that popular resistance in 
Warsaw and the rest of the country collapsed. Clausewitz confessed that he did not study this 
campaign in any great depth until file November Insurrection of 1830, which was again 
crushed by the Russians.213
Clausewitz does not explore the effectiveness of targeting civilians per se but states 
that if critics and historians (who enjoy the benefit of hindsight) wish to bestow praise or 
blame on any strategic decision, and suggest a superior means, they must place themselves in 
the position of the person whose act he has under review while at the same time trying to keep
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a larger and more objective view.214 This is ultimately impossible given that the countless 
obstacles, arguments and clashes of opinion preceding military operations are not always 
repeated in the memoirs of generals or their confidents because they touch political interests 
or they are simply forgotten.215
Battle and invasion
There is no attempt in On War to catalogue all the various styles that may derive from the 
characteristics of the army, the country and other circumstances -  history does not provide a 
solid basis for the formulation of principles, rules or methods.216 The treatise does however 
offer a basic blue-print to disarm the opposing state. The first step in the plan of war is to seek 
out and destroy the enemy’s armed forces in a great slaughter (Hauptschlacht). This fulfils the 
logic of war and further serves to humiliate and terrify the enemy government, people and 
their allies into signing a peace.217 Clausewitz warns that the play of passion and revenge 
brings the possibility of an entirely opposite, injurious effect of arousing the rage of forces 
that would have otherwise remained dormant.218
Since wars are rarely resolved by a single battle strategy allows for successive efforts 
in space and time.219 A defeated army can be restored in strength or replaced entirely by 
utilising the resources of conquered territory, a home base or supportive ally.220 It is obvious 
that the composition, strength, technology and military potential of an armed force are largely 
a product of its host society and Clausewitz seems to imply that a more cohesive and civilised 
state equates to a more dangerous foe.221 He therefore advocates invasion of the enemy’s state 
to undermine its existing armed forces indirectly by interrupting the process of production.222 
It is a natural human impulse to grab something tangible and territorial conquest serves to 
additionally shake the loyalty and confidence of the enemy’s people.223
If one does not seek a logical decision, or has already been achieved it, the possession 
of the country or some other physical object or component in the enemy’s war power (a city, 
fortress or supply depot) will be the next limited objective (‘Beschranktes ZieP). Clausewitz 
consistently warned against the occupation of enemy land before the enemy army was 
defeated as a slow-working windfall profit. The natural order would be to destroy the 
opposing armies first, then subdue the country. The effect of these two results, as well the 
position of strength we then hold, will hopefully force the enemy to make peace.224
Peculiar alternatives
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Clausewitz realised that the overthrow or disarmament of the enemy was not a necessary 
condition for peace because there are two other grounds: improbability of victory and 
unacceptable cost.225 Battle and territorial conquest are always the preferred methods but 
Clausewitz lists several other ‘peculiar ways’ (‘eigenttimliche Wege’): operations that have 
political repercussions;226 invasions or raids to exact contributions or lay the enemy’s lands 
waste; operations against objects which can do the enemy greater damage or suffering; or to 
let the duration of the war exhaust the enemy’s physical and moral resistance.227 The 
numerous other means and objectives that are possible are neither inconsistent, absurd or even 
mistaken if they achieve a military and political object.228 This of course leaves the reader 
questioning whether the atomic bombings of Japan would qualify as a short-cut to peace.229
All options Clausewitz lists could conceivably involve the terrible suffering of 
civilians over an indefinite period of time until the enemy government or policy-maker signs 
a peace and its people accept the decision.230 Even the capture of enemy lands as opposed to 
their devastation has its costs to the inhabitants. Conquered enemy provinces can bring 
additional wealth to the attacker and their long-term exploitation will increase the strain to the 
point where the resources are exhausted.231 Without strict reference to the political objective, 
one risks defining victory or success through the amount of damage or loss inflicted upon the 
enemy as if reducing the enemy’s relative strength were an end in itself.232
The centre o f  gravity
To help bring about the enemy’s quick collapse Clausewitz advocates hammer blows against 
the centre of gravity; a concept so vague it can mean almost anything from assassinating 
political leaders to wholesale attacks on civilian population centres (especially if one sees 
them as the ‘heart’ of the enemy’s power). For Clausewitz the focal point of the enemy’s 
power and movement was located ideally in one or all of the following: the army, its reserves, 
his capital city and the strongest of his allies.233 In the event of war against France he advises 
that Prussia and its own allies act with utmost speed to overwhelm her with sheer numbers, 
capture Paris, and drive the shattered remnants of her forces across the Loire.234 He presumed 
this war would be fought from the moral high-ground:
‘We are quite convinced that in this manner France can be brought to her knees and
taught a lesson any time she chooses to resume that insolent behaviour with which
she has burdened Europe for a hundred and fifty years.’235
Clausewitz certainly did not advocate that the Prussian army take fire and sword to the cities 
and villages of France. He prefers to restrict his recipe for strategic success to destroying the
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enemy in battle, disrupting the cohesion of the enemy’s state by occupying its lands and 
factories, and finally compelling the government to sign a peace which he hopes the peace- 
loving or reasonable majority will accept.236 All other peculiar alternatives (in which the 
reader can categorise attacks on civilians or civilian property) were dangerous and ineffectual 
distractions. Beatrice Heuser is quite right to assert that despite his knowledge of the Thirty 
Years’ War and scorched-earth strategies of Louis XIV’s generals, ‘Clausewitz never 
included the targeting of an adversary’s civilian population as a legitimate war aim.’237
Conclusion
When the reader takes into consideration Clausewitz’s social background, his theoretical 
conception of war, his study of military, and his recipe for military success it is difficult to 
accept the charge that he advocated war against civilians. He was raised an officer and 
gentleman and exhibited both a cultural and theoretical preference for battles between armed 
forces rather than slaughter of individuals outside the Hauptschlacht. He tended to avoid 
ethical questions and had little faith in the influence of humanitarian restraint, instead 
emphasising war as an instrument of policy. Clausewitz certainly advanced the logic of 
destroying opposing combatants and his trinity helps to understand why armed forces can be 
deviated to attack civilian populations. Such operations happened in the past largely because, 
in his opinion, western armies and states lacked the political cohesion or human resolve to 
fight the battle-centric warfare more conventional in the present. As we shall see next the 
preference for keeping war between politicians and soldiers was compromised by the need to 
marshal the energies of an entire people against the French.
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Chapter Four 
People’s War
It was argued previously that Clausewitz tended to dismiss attacks on civilian persons and 
property as a practice of weak societies in the past or those deviating from the logic of 
fighting. Such was his emphasis on decisive campaigns between regular armies that it has 
been asserted that, like Jomini, Clausewitz had preference for chivalrous battles and ‘was 
hardly enthusiastic about “people’s war” that debased “professional” warfare and involved 
fearful costs.’1 This chapter will explain that in the wake of militaiy defeat Clausewitz and his 
contemporaries wanted to reform the Prussian army and state, enlist the passions of the people 
and resort to the desperate measure of popular insurgency. It will address thematic questions 
such as what is a people’s war? Where did it come from? How should it be fought in 
Clausewitz’s professional opinion and what are the consequences for civilians? These lines of 
inquiry will reveal how Clausewitz accepted people’s war primarily as a military means of 
resistance even though it would invite atrocities for non-combatants on both sides.
What is people  ’s war?
What is a people’s war and how does it differ from the actions of volunteer units? Clausewitz 
tries to answer this question in The Campaign in Italy and Switzerland o f 1799. In this 
particular manuscript, apparently written after 1827, Clausewitz states there are two rules of 
thumb: the first is a true national armament or people-in-arms (‘Volksbewaffhung’); the other 
is the setting up of volunteer units called Freikorps or frevwilliger Korps. The first one 
consists of all the inhabitants who are courageous or well-equipped enough to offer resistance 
to the enemy invasion. These people can be organised into divisions of various sizes but 
should generally avoid the enemy wherever or whenever he is too strong. In this situation 
they should divert themselves to other areas or hide their weapons and return home.
The freiwiliger Korps on the other hand belong to a more fluid or mobile form of 
national armament (‘Landesbewaffhung’). They are formed solely to reinforce the existing 
war power and may be used in two ways: either without any consideration for local defence 
or entirely for local defence. In the first case the corps joins the army and follows its 
directions, backwards and forwards, and obeys it in every aspect. If the army decides to 
retreat the freicorps must go too because if they stayed behind the enemy would take away 
their weapons and make them prisoners. In the second case the free corps can stay behind 
with a division of the regular army and make a place like Tyrol into a fortress. These means 
have to be judged in relation to other strategic conditions and a Landesbewaffhung cannot be
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expected to do all the work on its own. The Austrians would have been better served in the 
campaigns of 1797 and 1799 by first winning with their regular armies. The alternatives do 
not guaranteed stand-alone success and entail immense risks to civilians:
‘There is no doubt that such a people’s resistance as we have in seen in Spain is
linked with plenty of victims and danger for the people, and a people who decide to
arm themselves must be ready to sacrifice those victims.’2
Like most themes in Clausewitz’s writing his views of popular warfare are difficult to 
assemble in a coherent manner for easy readership. The treatise On War represents perhaps 
the most comprehensive treatment on the role of the people in war but references are scattered 
until a sustained discussion appears in the twenty-sixth chapter of book six. Clausewitz 
generally wrote on the subject with interchangeable terms such as Landesbewaffhung, 
Nationalbewqffhung, Volksbewaffnung, Volksaufstand, Volkskrieg? The term ‘civilians’ did 
not exist in its modem meaning and it was more common to use terms like Bauem, Burger, 
Untertanen, Einwohner, Volk. It was a long-established fact that previously unarmed and non­
militarised elements of the population could make the transition from noncombantants to 
combatants, or vice versa, either voluntarily or at the command of their state or sovereign 
ruler.4
H istorical precedents
The wars of the ancient Greeks and Romans,5 the English wars against the Scots,6 Welsh7 and 
French,8 the Dutch Revolt,9 and Wars of Religion10 all involved ravaging operations and 
angry peasants set upon soldiers with grisly consequences.11 The outbreak of popularised 
violence or the revolt of towns and cities against their sovereign lords added a particularly 
vicious dimension to medieval conflicts as exemplified by events in Flanders following the 
murder of Charles the Good in 112712 or the rebellions of 1302 and 1379-85.13 In addition to 
civil revolts inside France the armies of Louis XTV responded with exterminatory vigour 
against popular resistance in the Netherlands, Spain and Vaud.14
Harsh counter-measures were considered normal militaiy protocol by commanders 
like Marshal Maurice de Saxe.15 The Scottish “Forty Five”,16 the rising of Genoa against 
Austria in 1746,17 the nationalists of Corisca,18 and the Pugachev Rebellion of 1773-75;19 all 
were put down with great damage and social dislocation for the civilian populations who were 
seen as complicit in the crime of rebellion. The American War of Independence made 
successful use of militia alongside the regulars of the Continental Army, but blurring the 
distinctions between rebels and loyalists did cause incidents of civil strife and reprisal.20
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The record of popular wars and insurrections in Western Europe tended to reinforce 
the traditional belief that they invited atrocities and could not stand against the enemy’s 
regular armies. Clausewitz was bom into an age when the state had the monopoly on the use 
of armed force. Eighteenth century combat and drill required a degree of weapons proficiency 
and discipline often lacking in peasants. Armies were kept relatively separate from their 
indigenous people who were supposed to provide food, taxes, and conscripts whenever it 
suited the interests of the state.21 To supply the demands for manpower in the Silesian Wars 
the Prussian army was forced to recruit more subjects (like Clausewitz’s father) from a wider 
social stratum. Mercenaries, free corps and rangers were also brought into existence to match 
the enemy’s expertise at petite guerre?2
From  petite guerre to p e o p le ’s war
It appears that Clausewitz initially approached the phenomenon of popularised fighting from 
a tactical or operational view ofpetite  guerre or kleine K rieg P  There were numerous writers 
on the subject;24 notably Johann von Ewald25 and Andreas Emmerich.26 In Clausewitz’s 
lifetime people’s war took on a character that went beyond what was traditionally understood 
as ‘small war’.27 It was generally regarded as the auxiliaiy domain of irregular light infantry 
and cavalry units (varying in number and organisation) made up from dependable regulars or 
specialised mercenaries. These troops did not fight for any ideological or religious cause; 
their loyalty was to their unit, leader and paymaster. The word partisan (Partheyganger in
German) originally referred to the leader who took his parties  or Partheyen on low-intensity
28operations.
Partisan warfare was especially prevalent in Eastern Europe. Clausewitz knew for 
instance that the Poles used ‘Parteigangerkrieg’ to resist the plundering invasions of the 
Cossacks, Tartars, Turks, Russians and Swedes.29 In 1672 for example the Turks rampaged 
through Poland along with their Tartar vassals and Cossack allies. The invaders captured 
Kamieniec, Podolski and Lublin, devastated Pokucie, and then moved on to Lviv in the Polish 
Ukraine. By October Grand Hetman John Sobieski had gathered a force of2,500-3,000 
cavalry, marched hundreds of miles, and caught the invaders in a battle which Clausewitz 
places near Kalusz (Kalush) in the mountains of Styri in Galicia:
‘The Grand Vizier Achmet Kiuperli took Kamieniec and besieged Lviv. Sobieski is 
so weak that he must lead a partisan war with several thousand men. In October he 
moves into the rear of the Turkish army by crossing the Dniester, and by lying in wait 
in the eastern foothills of the Carpathians bursts from hiding upon a corps of Tartars
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twenty times stronger, which, under the Sultan Galga, Brother, and Nuraddin, son of 
the Khan, carries an immense haul of booty homeward. He [Sobieski] defeats them, 
takes all their booty and frees a large number of people who they were taking into 
slavery.’30
Troops designated for small or partisan warfare were best used in operations auxiliary to 
pitched battles.31 Specialised duties covered scouting, intelligence-gathering, ambushes, 
attacking pickets and posts, or exacting contributions from the local populace.32 The standard 
procedure in the latter situation was to assail the local authority figure, take hostages and 
carry out burnings and executions until the civilian population met one’s demands.33 The 
Pandour Corps of Colonel Freiherr Franz von der Trenk became notorious for such activities 
so disciplinary procedures were necessary to stop pillaging and fraudulence.34
Between 1740 and 1813 freelance military entrepreneurs were integrated into the 
framework of armed forces and military service became linked to a higher social or political 
ideal. Encyclopaedic materials defined a soldier (soldat) as being synonymous with paid 
mercenaries whereas citizens fought to defend their lives, liberties and goods.35 Despite the 
political or nationalistic dimension emerging to popularised fighting Clausewitz’s perspective 
was that of a professional officer. His colleague Lilienstem likewise believed that ‘small war’ 
was merely complimentary ‘major war’.36 Later strategic theorists such as Mao Zedong and 
Vo Nguyen Giap also thought of people’s war as the early phases of a protracted armed 
struggle culminating in the destruction of the enemy by heavier conventional forces.37
The campaigns of 1792 and 1795 exposed Prussia’s need for light infantry similar to 
the tirailleurs or sharpshooters of the French. Schamhorst tried to overcome the general 
distain for the evasive and sniping tactics of half-trained levies by incorporating the fluid 
tactics of partisan units into his lectures and training manuals.38 Clausewitz took an interest in 
this field by reading all the major works, in particular those by Ewald and Emmerich.39 He 
also associated with colleagues such as Gneisenau who had briefly served in Jager formation 
in North America.40 Billow expressed admiration for the tactics of the Iroquis and Tartars, 
while others like Hegel and Heinrich von Kleist noted the successful, albeit atrocious, slave 
rebellion of Saint-Domingue 41
Clausewitz acquired some personal experience of skirmishing with a grenadier 
battalion at the Battle of Jena-Auerstadt.42 In 1810 he began lecturing on the tactics of small 
war at Berlin’s General War College. These lectures focused on tactical matters and 
apparently avoided the wider political implications. Clausewitz did include the idea of 
kidnapping enemy commanders, which was morally reprehensible at the time. As far as ‘the
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enemy’ was concerned Clausewitz envisaged them as opposing regular troops. He did not 
deal with the problem of combating the Hussars and Jager of the adversary, let alone how to 
stop enemy civilians taking up arms.43
Clausewitz on people’s war
There are various references in On War about the potential nationalisation of war and danger 
this presents to opposing forces44 Changing circumstances can expose weaknesses in the 
security of rear areas, strategic flanks and lines of communication, which are typically 
vulnerable to bands of raiders appearing from any quarter.45 Besides being the lines of retreat, 
roads running along rich agricultural areas and fortified cities are like arteries for moving vital 
supplies and personnel back and forth. Should they be cut or put under pressure an army 
would wither on the vine or have to retreat.46 Clausewitz refers to an example from 1758 
when Daun sent raiding parties to capture supply convoys destined for Frederick’s siege of 
Olmtitz and facilitated the king’s retreat into Silesia 47 Clausewitz was sceptical about 
distracting regular forces from decisive confrontations to alternative operations against these 
weak points.48 As far as the enemy’s smaller raiding parties went Clausewitz felt there was a 
good chance they would be caught and beaten up so badly as to disintegrate49
The prospect of enemy raiders receiving help from the civilian population was much 
more alarming.50 One should rate the value and vulnerability of lines of communication not 
simply according to physical and geographic features because the condition and temper of the 
local inhabitants is just as relevant.51 From the moment an invader enters his enemy’s territory 
it becomes hostile and must be garrisoned, weakening the strength of attack.52 Exposing one’s 
rear and lines of communication will be of little danger if the state being invaded lacks 
solidity because its people have gone soft and shed their war-like passions. But when faced 
with a stout-hearted and loyal populace the invader’s area of safety in hostile territory will be 
confined to a narrow triangle.53
For the defender a militia or armed population is to be regarded as important 
fortresses and geographical obstacles. Even if the population is not in arms and has no 
stomach at all for war its mere allegiance to one side remains a palpable disadvantage to the 
other. Raiding parties in particular can obtain food, intelligence and shelter from the people.54 
The role assigned to these units is to assault enemy’s weaker garrisons, convoys and minor 
units as well as encouraging national levies or local home guards {Landsturm) to join them in 
harassing operations.55 When the population takes up arms the attacker will be always and 
everywhere exposed to insurgent attacks and must treat the situation as if enemy forces were
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stationed all along his lines o f  communication.56 The armed uprising or insurrection o f  the 
people (Volkskrieg) is therefore an exceptionally favourable factor in defender.57
A chapter entitled ‘Volksbewaffhung’ tackles this relatively new phenomenon head 
on and in greater depth.58 It admits how many contemporaries ‘object to it either on political 
grounds, considering it as a means o f  revolution, a state o f  legalized anarchy that is as much a 
threat to the social order at home as it is to the enemy; or else on military grounds because 
they feel that the results are not commensurate with the energies that they have expended.’59 
Clausewitz avoids the ethical issues by professing that his interest is merely in its value as a 
means o f  combat given that conventional or social barriers have been swept away as war 
broadens beyond the old narrow military system:
‘Any nation that uses it intelligently will, as a rule, gain some superiority over those 
who disdain its use. If this is so, the question only remains whether mankind at large 
w ill gain by this further expansion o f  the element o f  war; a question to which the 
answer should be the same as to the question o f  war itself. We shall leave both to the 
philosophers. But it can be argued that the resources expended in an insurrection 
might be put to better uses in other kinds o f  warfare. N o lengthy investigation is 
needed, however, to uncover the fact that these resources are, for the most part, not 
otherwise available and cannot be disposed o f  at w ill.’60
The consequences for humanity are conveniently side-stepped. When a whole nation renders 
armed resistance, one must ask what is its potential value, what are the conditions it requires, 
and how it is to be utilised.61 Clausewitz judged its value within the framework o f  a war 
conducted by the regular army and coordinated together in an all-encompassing plan.62 The 
national character must be suited to this kind o f  war as should the terrain and geographical 
obstacles o f  the country 63 Scattered passages in earlier chapters similarly assert that frequent 
raids by partisans or a full-blown people’s war are able to work best when the enemy forces 
are dispersed or entangled in difficult mountainous terrain.64
The whole strategy o f  people’s war was counter to what Clausewitz said about 
decisive conventional war. Rather than trying to decide the war in a single stroke the idea is to 
spread violence in time and space and let smoldering actions bum up and consume the enemy 
ready for when the regular army delivers the knock-out blow.65 Clausewitz stresses that the 
militia bands, national levies and armed peasantry cannot and should not be employed against 
the main body o f  the enemy’s army, or even against any considerable corps. They should 
instead disperse in the face o f  such opposition and attack weak flanks, lines o f  
communication, isolated detachments or garrisons in the rear. Modest successes would then 
encourage the fire o f  courage and love o f  fighting to spread to neighbouring provinces.66
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Clausewitz appreciated the insurgent’s desire to defend their homes and native soil by 
fighting major battles.67 While their strength can be bolstered by parties of regulars to take on 
larger operations and sustain the momentum of the insurrection it was generally inadvisable to 
divide the main army up into small detachments, or even try to integrate national levies into 
the main army. The presence of regular troops attracts a strong enemy presence which hurts 
those inhabitants who must provide quarters, transport, contributions and so forth.68 
Landsturm units may defend the approaches through mountains, dykes, river-passages but 
must avoid getting caught in tactical positions where they will be destroyed.69 If the enemy is 
able to direct sufficient force at its core, crush it, and take many prisoners, the people will lose 
heart and drop their weapons.70 With a hint of professional snobbery Clausewitz assumes that 
the ardour of such second-rate troops will be dampened by repeated blows in an atmosphere 
full of danger.71
The failure o f stand-alone insurrections
Clausewitz was after all a professional soldier and many in his position doubted the military 
value and honour of irregulars.72 Clausewitz admitted that middle-aged men worn out by a 
lifetime of labour and dragged away from their families to serve in such reserve and militia 
units would never make ideal soldiers or cavalrymen.73 In On War he displays a slight 
disregard for bands of partisans (‘Parteiganger’) who have no right to claim for themselves 
the term ‘Armee’ because they lack what he calls its special military virtues (‘Kriegerische 
Tugend des Heeres’). The Vendeans, Swiss, Americans and Spaniards fought bravely but had 
no matter how much one tries to nationalise war by arming the common man (‘Burger’) 
fighting is a unique function best performed by the professionals who are better able to cope 
with its toils and the depressing effects of defeat.74
In short, insurgent actions must be coordinated with the regular armed forces to have 
any real value.75 Clausewitz makes it quite clear in his campaign histories that this was the 
reason for the respective failure and success of the insurrections in Switzerland and Italy 
during 1798 and 1799. Ferdinand IV and Maria Carolina recovered Naples only to loose it 
again in 1805 when Anglo-Russian contingents put ashore failed to win the support the 
people or stop the French invasion. The court fled once again to Sicily from where it tried to 
stir up guerrilla strife for the new Napoleonic kingdom.76 The land of Calabria was 
destabilised to the point that Joseph Bonaparte’s cabinet approved the use of punitive 
confiscations, village burnings and execution of captured insurgents.77 Without the legitimate
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backing of a state, regular army or the people the insurgents merely resembled bandits. Fra 
Diavolo was eventually betrayed to the authorities and executed in November 1806.78
The Napoleonic juggem aught
The reason why Clausewitz and his contemporaries turned to this apparently ineffectual and 
morally questionable form of resistance was out of sheer desperation to resist the French. 
Clausewitz sensed as early as 1803 that the reasons for their military success went beyond 
national resources or strategic geography and had more to do with the culture and spirit of the 
French people. He was appalled by the cowardly lethargy of the Germanic peoples as France 
went about enslaving the nations of Europe like a modem Rome.79
Like the Principate the Napoleonic Empire lacked a grand strategy because policy 
was such a highly personalised and a d  hoc affair reacting to events with a superb army.80 
Imperialistic policies such as the annexations in Italy and the execution of Louis Antoine, due 
d’Enghien, soured Napoleon’s reputation as a strong enlightened ruler and drove Austria into 
the Third Coalition in August 1805. Most German states, including Prussia, stayed neutral 
while Baden, Bavaria, Wurttemberg joined the French.81 In a spectacular campaign of speed, 
achieved partly by living off the land at the height of the potato season, the newly-christened 
Grande Armee defeated the Russo-Austro forces at the battles of Ulm and Austerlitz before 
sickness and hunger could weaken its offensive.82
Francis II sued for a separate peace and Napoleon went against the advise of his 
diplomats by demanding a conqueror’s ransom of money and land. This accelerated the 
dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. The numerous dukedoms, principalities and free cities 
were later remodelled into a more pliable Confederation of the Rhine to support Napoleon’s 
wars.83 The astonishing success of Napoleon’s offensive impressed on Clausewitz that a 
flimsy web of schemes was no substitute for the destruction of the enemy’s forces in battle.84 
Napoleon by now had taken charge of a military juggemaught, corrected all its technical 
imperfections and directed its pulverising course throughout Europe.85
Prussia  ’s catastrophe
Like Schamhorst and Stein, Clausewitz was fixated by the danger of French imperialism and 
therefore critical of the policy of acquiescent neutrality personified by Frederick William 
III.86 The king was indecisive, averse to confrontations, abhorred bloodshed and showed little 
interest in military affairs except for trivialities such as uniforms, music, and parade ground
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drill.87 His government had attempted to reaffirm friendship with France in the Treaty of 
Schonbrunn (15th December 1805) until intolerable displays of French arrogance and border 
violations, as well as political changes within Prussia, put the two countries on a collision 
course.88
As the post of foreign minister alternated between Christian von Haugwitz and Karl 
August von Hardenberg from 1804 to 1806 the king was pressed by generals, princes, 
politicians, civilian intellectuals and Queen Louise to make a show of defiance. The Russo- 
Prussian accord of July 1806 was followed by the decision to go to war in August.89 
Clausewitz was oveijoyed because like most junior officers of the period he longed for 
military glory won through a major battle.90 Clausewitz felt that ‘the arrogant Emperor’ was a 
degenerate gambler who would be toppled into a precipice by the combined efforts of all 
Europe.91 On 12th October Clausewitz confessed how he looked forward to the looming battle 
almost as much as his wedding day.92
In the event, the Battle of Jena-Auerstadt on 14* October was an unmitigated disaster 
which destroyed the army and shook the moral confidence of the kingdom.93 Discipline broke 
down in retreat as the soldiers looted nearby houses for food and surrendered in droves.94 
Clausewitz was captured conducting a rear-guard action and admired the way Schamhorst 
and Bliicher tried to fight on until die close pursuit of the enemy led to the Sack of Liibeck on 
6th November.95 The splintered remnants of the army were mopped up by French detachments 
and the garrisons of fortified places like Magdeburg capitulated with little resistance.96
In total, over 25,000 soldiers were killed and an estimated 140,000 were made 
prisoner during the battle and ensuing pursuit, representing a ninety-six percent loss in the 
Prussian armed forces.97 Few armies in history had been ruined with such thoroughness and 
Napoleon added insult to injury by robbing the tomb of Frederick the Great and then the 
wealth of the entire kingdom. Some Francophiles welcomed the French entry into Berlin on 
27th October only to find the conquerors went about restricting civil liberties, the freedoms of 
the press and trampling of over the pride of men like Kleist.98
The victory seemed to reaffirm Bonaparte’s military genius and his shortcut to 
success; the destruction of the enemy armies in battles and occupation of the capital as a way 
to trigger normal political protocol for peace.99 The commandant of Berlin instructed the 
inhabitants that their first duty was to remain passive until a decision had been reached by the 
king.100 Napoleon meanwhile encouraged dissenters to make their own peace with the French 
and form themselves into a regiment of four battalions much to Clausewitz’s disgust.101
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Frederick William refused to make terms perhaps hoping that the situation could be turned 
about by the remnants of the army supported by free corps and allied reinforcements from 
Russia, Sweden or England. Several months of grim campaigning in Poland passed until the 
Russians sued for an armistice. Only the personal appeals of Louise and Tsar Alexander I 
saved Prussia from total dismemberment in the peace negotiations at Tilsit.102
The reality o f  overthrow
The Prussian experience gives some meaning to the Clausewitzian term to overthrow one’s 
opponent. In addition to supplying the 150,000 French soldiers initially quartered on the land 
the kingdom was presented with a reparations bill of around 150,000,000 francs; more than a 
third of its normal revenue. When war damages and debts owed to creditors are taken into 
account the total costs may have exceeded a billion francs -  a crushing sum considering that 
Frederick William’s subjects were reduced from 10,000,000 to 4,600,000 because half his 
territories were carved up between the rulers of Wurttemberg, Bavaria and Westphalia. The 
Polish provinces were also stripped away for a new Duchy of Warsaw under the nominal rule 
of Frederick Augustus of Saxony.
The precise figure of indemnity was not resolved until Treaty of Paris (8 September 
1808) when it was reduced to 120,000,000 francs. The French would leave behind garrisons 
at Glogau, Stettin and Kustrin (paid for by Prussia) until the bill was settled. The Prussian 
army was cut down to 42,000 men yet even this force was an extravagant expense which 
exceeded the kingdom’s annual income (now below half of its 1805 level). The country saw 
food prices soar and land values plummet. Pandemics of cholera, typhoid, dysentery and 
famine ravaged the weakest members of the population: child mortality in Berlin reached 
almost seventy-five percent at one point. To continue the royal orchestra, opera and trappings 
of culture in such a time of financial catastrophe would have been obscene.103 Clausewitz had 
an unscathed English audience in mind when explaining how the country was kept in 
obedience:
‘The French not only enforced strict compliance with the Treaty of Tilsit, they also 
raised a thousand difficulties before vacating the occupied provinces, and by constant 
threats held Prussia in rigorous subjugation. This, combined with the sorry experience 
of the war itself, fostered the growth of a large party of despairing and fainthearted 
people, to whom anything like resistance—indeed, any measure displeasing the 
French—meant a betrayal of the country. Finally, the strongest impediment to any 
exceptional measure was the country’s total exhaustion.’104
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In short, the fate of Prussia highlights what severe social, economic and political disruption 
can be caused by a foreign invasion and one should always bear this in mind when reading 
Clausewitz’s emotional declarations to fight back. Not until 1813 was Prussia again able to 
summon up the physical and moral strength necessaiy to resume the struggle. Even then it 
took the combined efforts of the European allies to overthrow Napoleon in a very close-run 
contest. This desperate time helps to understand why Clausewitz was increasingly attracted to 
the desperate option of people’s war.
The need to reform the Prussian army and state
As we have already shown, Clausewitz was orientated towards large-scale battles and the war 
of 1806 was fought on highly conventional lines. The armies of Austria and Prussia were 
defeated and their countries rendered prostrate to Napoleon’s harsh demands because the 
French were fighting war closer to its absolute conception.105 Rather than being executed on 
the spot, as was common for insurgents or less-esteemed combatants taken in unfortunate 
circumstances, Prince August and his aide-de-camp were treated like gentleman and given 
parole in Berlin until 30th December. In the months that followed they were both kept in 
comfortable detention in Nancy, Soissons, Paris and Switzerland until their repatriation back 
to an impoverished Prussia by the terms of Tilsit.106
During their time in Switzerland Clausewitz met several other influential persons 
including Madame Germaine de Stael,107 August Wilhelm Schlegel and Johann Heinrich 
Pestalozzi whose educational endeavours were an inspiration for militaiy reform.108 Despite 
the comfortable surroundings Clausewitz hated the fact he was a prisoner and channeled his 
frustrations into writing bitter letters109 and articles for Minerva.no He helped the prince 
compile a memorandum calling for the reorganisation of the Prussian army, universal 
conscription, the meritocratic admission of bourgeoise men into the officer ranks, and the 
abolition of draconian discipline so that ambition, honour and patriotism could flourish.111
After regaining his freedom in November 1807 Clausewitz joined up with 
Schamhorst, Hardenberg, Stein and Theodor von Shon.112 These men wanted to galvanise a 
sense of independence so the country could again stand up and compel respect.113 Schamhorst 
had already been appointed head of the Military Reorganisation Commission and was in the 
process of overhauling the army’s recruitment, penal system and officer corps.114 
Schamhorst’s more ambitious plans for the national conscription of all fit and eligible men 
into either the regular army, reserves or home-guard militias were grounded on the 
controversial statement that ‘all inhabitants of the state are its bom defenders.’115 For
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Clausewitz a disciplined national militia was an emergency mechanism for raising large 
numbers of combatants and psychologically connecting the unarmed masses to the war 
effort.116
Historical inspiration
In an anonymous letter dated 11th January 1809 and addressed to the philosopher Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte Clausewitz wrote that the army would be superior if it treated its soldiers as 
more than just machines. It should infuse each man with vitalising energy and martial virtue 
‘so that the fire of war spreads to every component of the army instead of leaving numerous 
dead coals in the mass.” 117 Clausewitz was inspired by the Swiss peasant-infantiy of the 
Middle Ages who defended their lands against the Austrians and Burgundians.118 Clausewitz 
omits to mention that the Swiss were just as ferocious at plundering and blockading their 
enemies into submission as the Valois dukes of Burgundy and it was largely the petty feuding 
of the cantons which distracted their aggressive and expansionist energy.119
Clausewitz also imitated Machiavelli’s call for a citizen’s militia to replace the 
condottieri because without the popular support one’s position was vulnerable to the kind of 
internal dissention and foreign conquest Francesco Guicciardini described when he wrote 
about the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII.120 Weak states and insurgencies of the past did not 
always prevail like they have in more modem times. Florence employed agricultural raiding 
and a diplomatic offensive to successfully isolate the rebel city of Pisa between 1949 and 
1509.121 Machiavelli’s experimental citizen-soldiers helped recover Pisa only to be defeated 
in 1512 by the mercenaries and regulars employed by the Pope and Spanish with the result 
that Prato was sacked and the Medici were restored to power.122
History showed that tapping into the passions of the people was often a dangerously 
unreliable thing play about with but Clausewitz did not seem overly concerned at this time. 
From a military point of view popular commitment from the masses was the missing and 
consequently most urgently sought advantage in the Prussian capacity for war.123 The army 
was still a product of its semi-feudal society; the relations between nobles, bourgeoisie and 
peasants replicated itself in the recruitment and social composition of the rank and file, which 
in turn limited the enthusiasm of the troops and operational capability.124 Enlisting the 
passions of soldiers as well as morally regenerating civilian society at large was pressed for 
more rigorously after the army’s defeat in 1806.125
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In letters to his fiancee Clausewitz claimed that that German nation was like a lazy 
animal that had to be whipped until it found enough honour and dignity to burst the chains of 
cowardice and fear.126 Other notes from this period express the view that the Germans had 
withdrawn in the face of French cruelty and aggression into sullen defeatism.127 ‘No nation 
has ever responded to repression by another with anything except hatred and enmity’ he wrote 
in 1808, ‘We alone suffer from this asininity, this fool’s wisdom, which imagines itself 
wearing a crown while dragging the chains of a slave.’128 Clausewitz’s harsh tone had not 
diminished by the time he wrote ‘Prussia in Her Great Catastrophe’ in the 1820s. This 
reiterated the reasons for Prussia’s defeat as the inadequacy of the army, the desiccated and 
decrepit government, and the faint-hearted pacific spirit of the alienated people.129
War since the French Revolution war could no longer be measured by tangibles like 
the numerical strength of the army, wealth of the treasury and the degree of financial credit. It 
lay more in the unpredictable temperament or energy of the people.130 Clausewitz writes in 
On War that twenty years of revolutionary triumph were mainly due to the mistaken policies 
of France’s enemies.131 Not until the opposing statesmen grasped the new political conditions 
and fought back on the scale necessary for overthrowing Napoleon were they able to 
succeed.132 The treatise often makes the point that a moral superiority can make up for 
physical deficiencies in material and the inherent weaknesses of attack.133 The national spirit 
of an army (enthusiasm, fanatical zeal, faith, opinion) opens up greater possibilities for 
operational and tactical flexibility.134
Napoleon and his soldiers, like Alexander the Great and his Macedonians centuries 
before them,135 went about war with such ruthless or reckless energy that they could 
overcome logistical limitations and other frictions to press unremittingly toward a great 
decision.136 ‘The true nature of war will break through again and again with overwhelming 
forces, and must, therefore be the basis of any permanent military arrangements.’137 With 
fewer standstills campaigns thus took place with greater speed and intensity.138 ‘The greater 
tension of feelings from which the war springs, the greater therefore the energy with which it 
is carried on, so much the shorter will be the periods of inaction’.139 The intensification of 
popular support was a genuine new source of power which brought war closer to its absolute 
conception.140
The reforms o f Stein, Hardenberg and Schamhorst
The big problem was how to militarise society and mobilise its resources to fight the French 
without having to adopt their form of democracy and retaining the humanity and reason of the
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ancien regime.141 Clausewitz denied that the French version of republicanism was the best 
way to activate the heroism of the people: why in that case had the French state had to resort 
to terrorism and draconian conscription against its own people? Why was it necessary to 
reward the soldiers with booty and plunder? And why had the armies of the Revolution 
struggled to overcome weaker armies of the traditional type led by old men?142 The 
romanticism of the citizen-in-arms has indeed tended to obscure the fact that the origins of the 
French success lay in the military reforms of the eighteenth century and the defects in the 
armies and political conditions of opposing states.143
Prussia had to find its own unique way to emancipate the people, most of whom were 
not “Prussian” in a nationalistic or ethnic sense: Stein came from the Rhineland, Schamhorst 
from Hanover, Gneisenau and Fitche from Saxony.144 What Clausewitz and his 
contemporaries meant when they talked of the “nation” was a patriotic people united by 
common language, laws and traditions and all obedient to a king. The policy-maker and 
commander-in-chief were ideally united in a single genius like Alexander or Frederick the 
Great. Frederick William III could never aspire to be a warrior-king like Sobieski but his 
position as leader of the nation had to be better strengthened by oligarchic state reforms, a 
cabinet of able ministers, a British-style parliament and popular national service.145
There was no democratic process or public opinion to take into serious account in the 
formulation of policy. It was a rather complicated process involving many conflicting 
agencies and personalities gathered in the royal antechamber of power.146 Prior to the war of 
1806 Stein had already drafted a reform program for replacing counsellors with a stronger 
council of ministers excluding Haugwitz and other francophiles. Several months after 
Haugwitz had reassumed office as foreign minister Stein’s ambitious plans were presented in 
a rather abrupt manner to the king who misread the remonstrance as an act of mutiny rather 
than as well-meaning attempt to bring the monarchy into protective harmony with its people. 
Even if the king had endorsed the reforms it was too late to effect the changes.147
Despite the disruption caused by the invasion the monarchy remained a much revered 
and respected institution.148 Stein took charge as its chief minister in 1807 and pressed ahead 
with a major political program of parliamentary government, greater powers for more 
accountable ministers, changes to city and provincial governance, and land reform. The 
Emancipation Edict (9th October 1807) abolished serfdom and the reformers hoped that other 
progressive measures would kindle a renewed energy in every loyal subject (Burger rather 
than citoyen) to be used in the service of the state upon the command of the king.149 The bold 
proposals made by Stein and Hardenberg were blocked by the beliefs of conservatives like
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Friedrich August Ludwig von der Marwitz who had genuine fears of internal revolution and 
French reprisals.150
In the military sphere Schamhorst and the Commission struggled to navigate around 
entrenched values and the terms imposed after Tilsit. The hesitation of the king to arm large 
sections of the civil population was understandable. It was feared that if cultured society did 
not degenerate into anarchy and revolution it would at the very least compound the crippling 
economic problems left over from the last war. Any plans to expand the army beyond 42,000- 
mark would be in clear violation of the limits imposed by the Paris Convention of September 
1808.151 A clever system for training reservists managed to circumvent these restrictions and 
keep a large body of men standing ready to expand the regular army should a state of war be 
resumed.152
The risings o f 1809
Austria had in the meantime reformed and built up their regular army along with a sizable 
Landwehr}53 Chancellor Count Philipp von Stadion and other advisors to Francis I urged war 
to reverse the terms of Pressburg and protect the Habsburg dynasty.154 Civilian intellectuals, 
essayists, poets, clerics and court figures were also trying to drum up a sense of German 
nationalism by emphasising the injustice of the French and need to break the chains of slavery 
through self-sacrifice and the love of the Fatherland.155 Austria joined the War of the Fifth 
Coalition in April 1809 by launching its armies into Bavaria and the Kingdom of Italy. The 
Confederate states did not join the rising and contributed some 120,000 troops to Napoleon’s 
counter-offensive.156
The ensuing fight was not solely limited to open battlefields: the city of Regensburg 
for example fell foul of collateral damage and looting.157 On 13th May the French armies once 
again took possession of the vast supply stores in Vienna. The Landwehr defence melted 
away and it was easy to cow down the sullen inhabitants with threats of bombardment.158 
Stadion fell from power as Prince Mettemich ascended as foreign minister and chancellor.159 
The Habsburgs made peace on the basis that their armies had been beaten and their lands 
were threatened by enemy despoliation and rupture from ethnic divisions, particularly among 
the discontented Magyars.160
The Tyrol remained loyal and Austria’s opening victories inspired militia and peasant 
resistance to spring up on a scale far larger than that encountered by Joubert and Ney in 1797 
and 1805. The free corps and schutzen sharpshooters overwhelmed the Bavarian garrison and
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were able to repel the invaders at the battles of Bergisel. The overwhelming Franco-Saxon- 
Bavarian forces not only adapted to mountainous combat but also took reprisal on prisoners, 
churches and nearby villages to deny the insurgents food and shelter. The insurrection lost 
political legitimacy after the harsh Treaty of Schonbrunn (14th October). The principal 
resistance leader, an innkeeper named Andreas Hofer, was caught in early January 1810 and 
sent to Mantua for trial and execution on 20th February.161
Austria’s example excited freedom fighters and budding nationalists across 
Germany.162 The young officers of the army were in such an agitated state that several 
different advisors warned Frederick William that if he did not act, then it was quite possible 
his subjects would act without his permission.163 In trinitarian terms, there was tension 
between allegiance to the government as the chief policy-maker (or agent of reason) and the 
passionate desire to liberate the country as expressed by fiery intellectuals like Fitche or 
honourable army officers like Gneisenau and Clausewitz whose pride and patriotism had been 
wounded.164
The Prussian officers were inspired by the actions of the ‘Black Brunswickers’ of 
William of Brunswick-Oels,165 Colonel Wilhelm von Domberg,166and Lieutenant Friedrich 
von Katte.167 None could drum up much popular support partly because the men behaved like 
brigands or were dispersed by regular security forces. Those civilians who did show their 
colours were liable to be punished: after Domberg’s insurgents were defeated by government 
troops for example there followed numerous arrests, the confiscation of property and the 
dissolution of societies like the Foundation for Single Ladies at Homberg.168
It was Major Ferdinand von Schill above all who captured the imagination of 
Clausewitz.169 Under the guise of a training exercise Schill set out from Berlin on the night of 
the 27-28* April with Hussar regiment and company of Jager in the hope of sparking a 
Westphalian insurrection.170 Clausewitz applauded the bold decision: as far as he was 
concerned the disapproving officers could join the old ladies at pulling frightful faces while 
the rest of the country wished their most sincere blessings to ‘Gute Schill’ and his band of 
men.171 When they discovered that their commander was acting without political authorisation 
some chose to desert the regiment. Schill moved the remainder down the Elbe to the Baltic 
seaport of Stralsund where the French converged with forces belonging to the Dutch and 
Danish to destroy the insurrectionary units on 31st May.172
These episodes represent a significant point of transition from the petite guerre of the 
ancien regime to freedom fighting of the modem age.173 It is interesting to note that
182
x  w i / p t c -  j  r  f  u r
Emmerich and Ewald were on opposing sides during the insurrections of 1809. Emmerich 
was shot by firing squad for taking part in the anti-Napoleon rebellion in Marburg and Ewald, 
a Danish general by this point, helped destroy Schill at Stralsund.174 In the days that followed, 
Clausewitz expressed his sadness about the complete and honourable demise of Schill. He 
described him as a great man of intelligence (‘superweisheit’) who had had the ability to 
awaken the passions of others. Clausewitz felt it was a tragedy that such a man could not find 
a fine hand to guide his efforts and wondered how many others would go down in this same 
manner. In his opinion, Schill was better off dead and being well regarded by the public 
throughout the land rather than attached to the sordid political business left behind.175
Clausewitz was passionately stirred by these events and was on the verge of applying 
for a commission in the Austrian army before its defeat.176 A feeling of powerlessness then 
overcame the Austrians and it was left to Prussia and Russia to lead the struggle.177 
Clausewitz expressed admiration for the Spartan heroism of Schill and the Tyrolese.178 He 
hoped that ‘deep outrage at the wickedness and violence of the oppressor’ could subsitute the 
religious passion of the past.179 Clausewitz assumes, rather idealistically given the ineffective 
and criminal nature of popular resistance in Germany and Italy,180 that in this ‘truly poetic 
existence’ that the people would display great idealism and dignity and vent their violence 
upon the enemy army only:
‘Hatred of the oppressor would pervade the lower classes, the activity of the
government would quickly inspire confidence; what else is needed to invigorate and
unite the power of five million people?’181
What if this all this was not enough? What if the army was beaten shamefully again, the state 
totally destroyed and the nation enslaved? Clausewitz answers that such a glorious demise 
would set an example to their descendents. Human passion and the love of independence 
could never be conquered because it grows with sacrifices. A cowardly submission was like 
poison, eating away at the strength and vitality of a nation for generations. Yet it was within 
the power of a glorious monarch to apply a balm on a nation’s wounds.182
The Spanish ulcer
In the years following Clausewitz was increasingly attracted to the sacrificial ideal of a 
people’s war as were Stein and Gneisenau.183 Stein was forced to flee the country after 
November 1808 when agents intercepted his plans for such action.184 These men envisaged a 
German legion of 6,000 volunteers, partly funded by the English, cornering itself into 
defensive positions while inspiring the rest of the nation to rise up with rifles and pitchforks.
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Clausewitz’s inspiration was the rising in the Vendee, the Lines of Torres Vedras in Portugal 
and the insurgents of Spain who reacting against French occupation with a full-blown 
‘ V olksaufstand ’.185
It is important to keep in mind the sheer humanitarian cost to the methods Clausewitz 
was citing. The scorched-earth and defensive strategy enforced by the Anglo-Portuguese 
defenders brought the population down from 3,200,000 in 1807 to 2,960,000 by 1814.186 This 
did not deter Gneisenau from wanting to scorch the earth, remove grain, evacuate women and 
children to safe districts, barricade the cities and avoid all battles that played to Napoleon’s 
advantage.187 ‘In addition, Gneisenau called for the overthrow of all rulers who remained on 
France’s side, the confiscation of the estates of all disloyal noblemen, and the full 
emancipation of all peasants who took part in the fighting.’188 Such plans obviously met 
resistance from aristocratic reactionaries and professional soldiers who preferred more 
gentlemanly methods of war.189
The guerrilla route was adopted in the Iberian Peninsula largely because the regular 
forces belonging to the displaced royal families had lacked the strength to withstand the 
Napoleonic takeover in the first place. In March 1808 popular revolt spread across Spain with 
grisly consequences for the inhabitants of Madrid and Valencia.190 Royalist officers and the 
provisional juntas (led by the Junta Suprema after 25 September 1808) tried to douse the 
insurrectionary spirit by emphasising that the revolt was being organised for king, country 
and Church.191 The conflict quickly spiraled out of control into full-blown war of attrition 
which cost an estimated 164,000-300,000 imperial troop casualties and enormous amounts of 
gold, weapons, horses and material}92
Napoleon stabilised the military situation after the surrender at Bailen. On a political 
level his intervention damaged the economy, further discredited the afrancesados, and 
undermined Joseph’s kingdom so much that it was effectively turned over to harsh military 
rule.193 The French never properly developed a coherent and effective militaiy or political 
strategy to cut the enemy forces off from the civilian population and spent most of the war 
tied down to garrisoning strongholds or chasing the enemy units through the logistically- 
challenging and hostile countryside of Galicia, Asturias, Andalusia and Cataluna.194 There 
was no single centre of gravity and the resistance in regions had to be reduced systematically 
one army, one guerrilla band and one fortress at a time.195
The defence o f fortified places
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The capture of fortresses and cities in revolt was more difficult hence the reason why 
Clausewitz was shocked by the ease with which places like Magdeburg capitulated in 1806; 
Schill and Gneisenau had at least tried to defend Colberg in 1807.196 According to On War 
fortresses and walled towns exist for the protection of the inhabitants, to support one’s army 
or tie down large numbers of the enemy.197 Devoting one’s best soldiers for defence is 
unnecessary because the garrison can and should be made up of half-trained militia, 
convalescents, armed civilians, home guard, and those who cannot go on active service.198
Fortresses can act as the focal point for a general insurrection or arming of the nation 
by providing a refuge for the wounded, for civil authorities, a treasury and place for storing 
arms and munitions. Enemy forces are placed in a static situation while undertaking a siege 
operation, which invites attack by local partisans or national levies.199 In a country where 
every sizeable town is fortified and defended by its inhabitants and the farmers of the 
surrounding land, the speed of military operations can be reduced and the determination of the 
enemy commander will dwindle to insignificance.200 Clausewitz did not describe in detail 
how to successfully defend a fortified place. There are sterile discussions on the use of 
inundations, lines of circumvallation and attacks on army troops while in billets, all with little 
regard for civilian inhabitants who found themselves caught up in the contest.201
Clausewitz did at least warn that a city or township gambling on its strength, only to 
be taken few weeks or months later could expect ‘then to receive harsher treatment.’202 We 
have already shown his low opinion on the 1631 Sack of Magdeburg an act of boundless 
cruelty which killed 40,000 people by Clausewitz’s count.203 Protracted resistance did not 
necessarily mean brutal treatment as indicted by many acts of leniency from the Crusades to 
the Napoleonic War in Spain.204 In general, a city providing refuge for an army or adopting 
the kind of resistance described by Clausewitz exposed the civilian inhabitants to extreme 
danger, as verified by the destructive sieges of Zaragoza, Gerona and Tarrogona.205
The atrocities o f guerrilla war
The failure of the Spanish regular army to defend its cities or defeat the enemy in the open 
field forced the juntas and central junta (the Cortes from September 1810) to turn, with the 
mixed blessings of the Church, to partidas and privateers of the land.206 The war garnered a 
romantic image of ordinaiy people taking up arms in a unanimous and unbeatable national 
struggle; a myth the French were only too willing to perpetuate to explain their seemingly 
inevitable defeat. Modem historians have pointed out the parochialism to the movement, the 
lack of cooperation between different juntas and armed bands, and their suspicion of foreign
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armies. The guerrilla (literally ‘little war’ in Spanish) was for the most part waged by 
irregular troops who were trained, disciplined and organised until they resembled the 
partisans or troops traditionally designated for petite guerre operations.207
Clausewitz subscribed to the belief that the guerrilleros were not only cheaper than 
mercenaries but highly motivated by the love of their country for which they would show its 
people and property utmost respect.208 Such was the brigand-like appearance and conduct of 
some guerrillas and militia levies towards captured Frenchmen and collaborators that it was 
hard to distinguish them from patriotic heroes or self-indulgent criminals prolonging the 
agony of war.209 Philosophers had long been ambivalent about the blurring of distinctions 
between combatants and non-combatants. Although the common people have the right to 
defend their homes and cities Vattel believed that they should never to interfere with the 
business of armies. The general should in turn show gentleness towards the population unless 
the inhabitants try to attack his soldiers and need to be chastised.210
In Spain intellectuals, priests, peasant farmers and women were known to murder and 
mutilate captured enemy soldiers, which in turn gave the French an excuse for reprisal.211 The 
French at first refused to grant guerrilla soldiers and civilians-in-arms the status of legitimate 
combatants and responded in the usual way regular soldiers did toward rebels: maximum 
violence in the form of merciless combat conjoined with the arrest and execution of civilian 
hostages and the destruction of whole villages as depicted by Goya’s Disasters ofWar.2U 
Only in Aragon did Suchet keep the population under a modicum of control through a 
combination of counter-insurgency methods: mobile columns, strategically-placed garrisons, 
the use of experienced and disciplined troops (paid promptly to discourage pillage), as well as 
economic incentives for the inhabitants and reliance on local collaborators and police.213
It is considered a failing on Clausewitz’s part that he did not address the issue of 
military intelligence and deception in more depth, especially considering its enduring 
importance in insurgency situations.214 Clausewitz regarded the available methods of the time 
so rudimentary and flawed that armies of the day had to operate in a perpetual fog of 
uncertainty and assume that the enemy already knew about one’s own forces.215 To attempt a 
strategic ruse or surprise was useless because the movements were easy to observe and ‘will 
usually be announced in the press before a single shot is fired.’216 Clausewitz assumed that a 
population would give over intelligence willingly to the defending side and keep a constant 
report on the invader’s movements.217
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Clausewitz certainly did not suggest that one threaten civilians for military 
intelligence in the way recommended by Frederick the Great and petite guerre writers.218 The 
French governors and secret police in Spain made extensive such of intelligence gathering 
techniques such as spies, informants, and surveys of the population. Anyone absent from their 
home for an unauthorised period would have goods and property confiscated. Policy hardened 
to deportation or execution for those who would not offer up information or attended illegal 
public venues. The guerrillas also resorted to intimidating civilians in order to gain food, 
money and information at the expense of the French.219
Military victories and a terror campaign in Navarre cooled the spirit of the people and 
forced the local guerrilla bands to undergo several cycles of assimilation, dissolution and 
reconstruction between 1808 and 1811. Francisco Espoz y Mina emerged the strongest with a 
formidable force of some 4,000-6,000 fighters to prey on French convoys and isolated 
detachments.220 As control slipped away between July and October 1811 General Reille was 
under pressure to step up sterner measures of imprisonment and the execution of non- 
combatants.221 Mina responded in kind by refusing captured soldiers any quarter. This forced 
Reille and his successor General Abbe to grant the guerrillas the rights and privileges 
normally reserved for proper soldiers.222 By 1812 the French became hostages in cities like 
Pamplona and Tudela, which Mina blockaded partly by threatening the surrounding 
population to withhold food and other essentials from the enemy or face punishment.223
In short, killing non-combatants did not reverse the deteriorating situation for the 
French and made matters worse. Mina’s guerrilla divisions, for all their success as disciplined 
semi-permanent units, could only slow down a disorganised enemy. They could not win a 
war.224 It took the conventional forces under the Duke of Wellington to finally clear the 
Peninsula of imperial forces in 1813. Civilians in the meantime suffered largely from the 
logistical demands and ill-discipline behaviour of troops on all sides 225 Napoleon did not help 
the situation by releasing Ferdinand VII in the hope that the king would make a peace 
favourable to France. In the years that followed Ferdinand ordered the dissolution of the 
Cortes, reneged on promises to rule under the Constitution of 1812 and launched a bloody 
suppression of liberal patriots.226
Clausewitz calls fo r  a  p e o p le ’s war
Prussia in the meantime grew anxious as diplomatic relations between the emperors of France 
and Russia deteriorated.227 Frederick William was by now in deep mourning for his late wife 
and had no faith in winning an insurrectionaiy war modelled on Spain’s horrific example and
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consistently blocked proposals for a citizen’s militia or Volksarmee. He did approve 
clandestine steps to enlarge the existing regular army over the summer of 1811.228 When this 
secret rearmament was discovered Napoleon threatened to occupy Berlin and effectively 
terminate Prussia’s political existence. Blucher and Schamhorst were removed from their 
posts and replaced with men who more politically acceptable to the French. Hermann von 
Boyden was fortunately just as diligent and committed to the military reorganisation as 
Schamhorst.229
In February 1812 a French column under Davout made a sudden march towards 
Magdeburg causing general alarm throughout the country.230 It was during these tense weeks 
that Clausewitz dictated to his wife a long memorandum based on conversations with 
Gneisenau, Boyen and others like-minded patriots. The Bekenntnisdenkschrift dated 16th 
February consisted of three emotional declarations calling for a national uprising to assist the 
Russians. It would involve a regular army backed-up by national militias or home guards 
using guerrilla strategies and the tactics of kleine Krieg .231 As the enemy columns marched for 
Berlin the Landstrum of nearby parishes would assemble to the sound of church bells and fall 
upon isolated detachments and rearguard wagons, then disperse as soon as the enemy turned 
about to counter-attack. In this way ‘the enemy soldiers get a foretaste, an inkling of what 
awaits him, namely a Spanish Civil War in Germany.’232
The Prussian insurgents would use the advantages of terrain in the swampy forests of 
Pomerania, East Prussia, West Prussia and Silesia. Clausewitz calculated that out of a 
remaining population of 4,600,000 people there were about 750,000 men aged 18 and over 
available for military service. All those not conscripted into the regular army or the reserve 
Landwehr would be organised into the Landsturm. These home guard units were to be 
organised on a local or communal basis under a Landeshauptmann working in conjunction 
with the regular officers. The men of the Landsturm would bear their status as combatants by 
wearing provincial insignia and openly arming themselves with rifles, scythes, pikes or 
sickles. This fulfilled many of the clauses later specified by the Hague and Geneva 
Conventions for legal combatants.
A major obstacle would be the procurement of sufficient quantities of money, 
weapons, food, horses, and other kriegsmittel. A great deal of this was expected to come from 
England. It would be important to prevent the delivery contributions of all sorts going to the 
enemy and secure the necessaiy resources for one’s own side. In combat, Clausewitz writes 
that even a ridiculous worship of the sabre, cartridge and lower tactics was irrelevant in a 
dreadful setting where one faces a ten-fold superiority: what can 50,000 enemy troops
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realistically do against 500,000 people, or 500 against 5,000? The true function of the 
insurgents was to avoid the enemy and focus on ambushing convoys, destroying depots, 
capturing French officials, and tying down large numbers of troops like the 300,000 imperial 
troops committed in Spain against Wellington’s 40,000-50,000-man army.233 But what of the 
enemy’s passion for revenge?
‘It is common belief that the enemy would demoralise the rebels by mistreating 
imprisoned insurgents, with death penalties and so on. But what a useless concern! As 
if we could not be as horrible as the enemy, as if the enemy was not also made of 
flesh and blood like us! The enemy will employ the same means and the war will 
soon take a terrible turn.
‘But to whose disadvantage? Obviously to the disadvantage of those who can afford 
to put the fewer people at stake, those with regular armies. Let us get to the point 
when horror is repaid with horror, violence with violence! It will be easy for us to 
outbid our enemy and drive him to the limits of temperance and humanity. The tiger 
that ruled France in the years 1793 and 1794 under the name of republican 
government has had to stop drinking the Vendee’s blood with such thirst.
‘The Republicans were forced to slow down in the contest of atrocity. The Vendee 
was not defeated after having been fought with mixed results for a year-and-a-half, 
been more than once put to the swords of the armies, with death and fire -  human 
principles, forgiveness, respect, peace alone could soften the enraged human nature. 
This balm alone could heal the cancerous injury which Barere has in vain wanted to 
destroy with the knife and glowing iron.’234
Clausewitz clearly condemns the targeting of non-combatants as both morally wrong and 
strategically useless because it has counter-productive effect. To stop the French resorting to 
their usual barbarism the Prussian insurgents would have to commit a few atrocities of their 
own and Clausewitz prescribes the method employed successfully by Mina:
‘... these extremes, about which one is hearing in Spain, do not necessarily have to 
occur everywhere, and could perhaps be avoided by the measure alone that the 
government takes each armed man under its authority, and threatens reprisals against 
prisoners for each atrocity which is carried out [by the enemy] against the laws and 
customs of war against these real defenders of the Fatherland. How many executions 
[of his own men] will the enemy tolerate? And what are a few dozen people who are 
ready to die in this way for their Fatherland, against the mass of victims, which war 
claims on a daily basis?
‘Indeed, the images one has of this danger -  not more of a danger than any other in 
times of war -  are greatly exaggerated. Even in Spain things are not as bad as we 
hear, and the enemy would be persuaded, after a few shots across the bows by his 
military police, to treat the insurgent troops like any others.’235
If there was brutality then all the blame lay with the French:
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‘The world trembles at the thought of a people’s war, because it is bloodier than 
others, is rarely free of horrible scenes, and all misery and destruction is multiplied in 
it. But whose fault is this? The people’s war exists, you curse its pernicious effects, so 
curse those who have forced it upon us. If you make yourselves the judges of human 
actions, do not condemn the oppressed because he is weak. But be just, cast your 
curses against him who has made this evil necessaiy!’236
Clausewitz did not share the fear of his contemporaries about social anarchy and believed the 
passions unleashed could be controlled by the political reason of the state government:
‘This is precisely where our situation has its advantages: the government which 
provokes this storm remains its master. It is able to give it a general direction, and to 
drive it towards one goal. Even the divergence in opinion and action which in Spain 
is visibly destroying a large part of the effects, and which before divided the forces of 
the Vendee, can and will be prevented by a government which behaves [as well] 
towards its people as does that of Prussia.’237
Christopher Daase points out that Clausewitz assumes, either out of naivete or political 
calculus, that the weaker party can control the dynamic spiral of brutality and terror. This 
seems at odds with the Clausewitz who argues there is a tendency for escalation and it is the 
opponent who fights with all his strength and uses violence without reference to bloodshed 
who will most likely prevail. Even in small wars there is nothing in the dynamic between 
opponents to stop either side restraining themselves within the bounds of state institutions, 
international rules and normative standards.238 For Clausewitz and like-minded 
contemporaries such a war was not simply a rational act for furthering one’s state interests; it 
was also a matter of honour to fight and assert one’s independence:
‘I believe and confess that a people can value nothing more highly than the dignity 
and liberty of its existence. That it must defend these to the last drop of its blood.... 
That the shameful blot of cowardly submission can never be erased.... That the 
honor of the king and government are at one with the honor of people, and the sole 
safeguard of its wellbeing. That a people courageously struggling for its liberty is 
invincible. That even the destruction of liberty after a bloody and honorable struggle 
assures the people’s rebirth.’239
This sort of language is often repeated in On War: ‘The defeated state often considers the 
outcome merely as a transitoiy evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political 
conditions at some later date.’240 After a battlefield defeat a turn of fortune can be brought 
about by developing new sources of internal strength and ‘it is the natural law of the moral 
world that nation that finds itself on the brink of an abyss will try to save itself by any 
means.’241 Even if the regular armies were beaten or driven out of the country entirely one can 
fall back on the passions of people:
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‘No matter how small and weak a state may be in comparison with its enemy, it must 
not forego these last efforts, or one would conclude that its soul is dead.... A 
government that after having lost a major battle, is only interested in letting its people 
go back to sleep in peace as soon as possible, and, overwhelmed by feelings of failure 
and disappointment, lacks the courage and desire to put forth a final effort, is, because 
of its weakness, involved in a major inconsistency in any case. It shows that it did not 
deserve to win, and, possibly for that very reason was unable to.’242
To modem eyes the Bekenntnisdenkschrift is arguably the most dreadful of all Clausewitz’s 
texts because it is so callous about civilian suffering and later inspired militant nationalists.243 
It belongs to a time of early nationalistic thought during which others thought in much the 
same way. Fichte’s concern with liberty, morality and rational philosophy slid into thinking 
that a just war was necessary to save the superior German civilisation.244 Kleist hailed 
Leonidas, Arminius, William Tell and Jose Palafox as heroes and believed one must be 
willing to sacrifice women and children to destroy an evil enemy.245 Ernst Moritz Amdt went 
further in his racist language with calls for regenerative and exterminatory war against the 
French.246
It was precarious for Clausewitz and his contemporaries to speak of national self- 
sacrifice and regenerative struggle without leading to obstinate self-destruction or implying 
that the enemy should be subjected to the same vigours of a Vemichtimgskrieg?41 Despite the 
acceptance of civilian casualties one gets the sense that Clausewitz and his fellow officers 
hoped that the weight of resurgent conventional forces (100,000 regulars at least) could be 
brought quickly to bear to stop the French from having free rein to commit such atrocities 248 
It should be appreciated that for Clausewitz a people’s war was a means of salvation 
(‘Rettungsmittel’); the last, desperate resort of self-defence aimed at the annihilation of the 
invading army.249 Clausewitz was not entirely comfortable with the idea of pitting entire 
peoples against each other but it was now a necessary factor in the act of war:
‘The war of the present is a war of all against all. It is not the king who fights another 
king, not an army another, but a people fights another and the people includes king 
and army. War will hardly change this character again, and it would truly not be 
desirable that the old bloody and yet boring game of chess of the soldier’s battle 
would ever come back. But I do no mean by that the people’s uprising in masses [i.e., 
the levee en masse], that we have now seen twice in big examples (France and Spain) 
will henceforth be the only way in which peoples will wage war against each other, 
Heaven protect us! That phenomenon is particular to the present with its fateful hours 
. . .  But while there may be future centuries in which none of the peoples is forced to 
take recourse to the last desperate measure of the people’s uprising, we can still say 
that in these centuries war will be regarded as the business of the nation, and it will be 
conducted in this spirit.’250
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Frederick William was not prepared to take such a course and caved in to a Napoleonic 
alliance on 24th February 1812. This designated Prussia to provide 12,000-30,000 soldiers for 
service as auxiliaries against the Tsar, as well as supplying the 300,000 soldiers trampling 
their way to assembly points in the east. To observers it was a policy of submission deserving 
of a conquered satellite state of Rome and the devastation which followed recalled the Thirty 
Years’ War.251 The kingdom was financially ruined for a second time and the king’s 
credibility sorely damaged. Hundreds of capable officers went into enforced or voluntary 
retirement or, in the case of Clausewitz, offered their services to the Tsar.252 ‘I consider 
myself entirely free of self-interest’ he declared, ‘I would consider myself lucky to die 
gloriously in a noble struggle for the freedom and dignity of the Fatherland.’253
Conclusion
This chapter has revealed that people’s war had its origins in the tactics ofpetite guerre and 
Clausewitz wanted it adopted as a military means to resist the French. Clausewitz recognised 
the military advantage one obtained by enlisting the passions of the people and pressed for 
this to be incorporated into Prussia’s war capacity without dwelling too much on the 
humanitarian implications. Clausewitz was aware that by imitating the guerrilla war in Spain 
the inhabitants of Prussia would have to endure have to endure terrible suffering at the hands 
of the French. He accepted the possibility of such atrocities and hoped they could be averted 
by a reprisal killings and quick resolution of the war delivered by the resurrected conventional 
forces. He was callous or realistic enough to accept that civilian casualties were a necessary 
sacrifice to liberate one’s country, or be destroyed in the attempt.
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Chapter Five
* * * * *
Hunger and the Sword of Vengeance
It was argued in the last chapter that Clausewitz embraced the idea of waging a people’s war 
even though it would entail suffering for non-combatants. This chapter will continue the 
theme of civilian participation and sacrifices during the invasion of Russia and the armed 
resurgence of Prussia. The first campaign provides an excellent opportunity to explore 
Clausewitz’s thoughts on scorched-earth, the strategy of exhaustion and the power of defence. 
The second will explain how popular resistance was activated in Germany and test 
Clausewitz’s assumption that the horrors of a people’s war could be averted if it was 
subordinated to the regular army and state government. Both campaigns illustrate the problem 
of collateral damage and bigger dilemma of a government and people who do not give in to 
an invader but fight on regardless of the costs to civilian society. Finally, the conquest of 
Saxony and the dissolution of the Confederation of Rhine help to pose the question of what 
one is supposed to do with the allies or accomplices of one’s enemy.
The invasion o f  Russia: historical precedents
Napoleon’s disaster in Russia was not without historical precedent. In 1709 the army of 
Charles XII of Sweden was destroyed by the Russians at Poltava after a protracted campaign 
of withdrawal and scorched-earth, causing immense agricultural loss and privation to the 
peasants.1 Clausewitz labelled Charles a reckless failure compared to Alexander or Frederick 
the Great and implies the reason for their differing places in military history lay in the 
political conditions of the societies under attack. Unlike Alexander, Charles could make little 
head-way against Russia because he was not attacking a weak Asiatic empire.2 Similarly, Jan 
Sobieski’s campaigns after the victory at Vienna in 1683 were frustrated by scarcities of food 
and shelter in hostile lands like Moldavia, as well as political conditions within Poland and its 
diplomatic relations with jealous neighbouring powers.3
As the threat from Sweden and Poland receded the Russians concentrated against the 
Tartars and Turks. One the first studies Clausewitz undertook was a short narrative on the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1736-39 with particular attention to the campaigns of Marshal 
Burkhard Christoph von Munnich and General Peter Lacy. These operations took place 
largely in the Crimea where, despite careful logistical preparations, the Russian armies 
(peasant labourers and drivers included) suffered staggering losses from sickness and the 
effects of operating over such large distances in difficult terrain. To worsen the invader’s 
supply problems the Tartars scorched the land and launched offensive raids into the Ukraine.
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MUnnich concentrated on the Dniester front by beating the Ottoman Turks at Stavuchany 
(August 1739) and made tentative drives into the plague-infected Wallachia and Moldavia 
until peace was negotiated. The Russians were unable to annex the Crimea until 1783 and 
conflict with the Turks persisted with acts of brutality such as the massacre at Ochakov in 
1788 and Izmail two years later.4
The prelude to the invasion
It has already been shown that Clausewitz understood the importance of logistics and losses 
from disease and geographic conditions would remain high for European armies throughout 
the nineteenth century.5 Military success depended on the extent of political or social 
cohesion within the opposing society and Clausewitz predicted as early as 1804 that Napoleon 
would fail in Russia.6 After resigning from the Prussian army the ex-major arrived at the 
Tsar’s HQ in Vilna on 20th May 1812. He was commissioned a lieutenant-colonel to help 
General Ernst von Phull, a former Prussian quartermaster general and close military advisor 
to the Tsar.7 Russia’s strategy was tom between an offensive into the Duchy of Warsaw and 
beyond, or a protracted defence-in-depth inside Lithuania and Russia. In the latter case all the 
damage would done on the Tsar’s soil at the risk of a serf rebellion. Phull’s plan was to avoid 
battling Napoleon on the frontier and instead strike his forces in the flank and rear from the 
fortified base at Drissa near the Duna River.8
Napoleon on the other hand assumed that he had only to demoralise the Russians in 
one or two big battles to get peace from what he considered a wayward ally rather than a 
mortal enemy. To that end he did not enlist the passions of the Polish people and was cool to 
their ambitions for an independent kingdom. The requisition and plunder of supplies hurt the 
Duchy of Warsaw as badly as East Prussia and Russia.9 On 24th June Napoleon’s armies 
crossed the Niemen and made a strong central thrust from Kowno (modem Kaunas) for Vilna. 
Napoleon entered four days later rather mystified about the fact that the Tsar’s armies had not 
stood in battle but escaped further east. The harsh weather and poor geographic conditions 
took a foreboding toll on man and beast. The Poles and serfs of Lithuania who had initially 
welcomed the French were bitterly disappointed to find themselves plundered and put under 
the rule of a provisional government as if they were a conquered people.10 Clausewitz was 
aware of how the invasion and subsequent counter-offensive caused immense civil disruption 
and many inhabitants fled their homes for nearby woods.11
The strategy o f  exhaustion
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Contrary to the logic of destruction dictated in On War there was no big decisive battle in the 
opening phase of the campaign. Clausewitz was actually among those who identified the 
deficiencies of the camp at Drissa and advised a withdrawal deeper into Russia.12 This 
requires some explanation to discover whether Leon Tolstoy was right to fictionalise 
Clausewitz in War and Peace as an aloof and heartless theoretician who tells a colleague that 
in war ‘the only aim is to weaken the enemy, so one cannot of course, take into account the 
losses of private persons.’13 Tolstoy’s Clausewitz was referring to what On War lists as an 
alternative strategy designed to bring about the exhaustion of the enemy {‘das Ermiiden des 
Gegners’).14
This defensive activity amounts in practice to using the duration of struggle to bring 
about a gradual exhaustion of the enemy’s physical powers and will of resistance. By this 
process the stronger opponent is worn out and forced to make peace.15 Clausewitz cites the 
Seven Years War and 1812 Russian campaign as key examples.16 In both cases the defender’s 
civil population and resources were put under strain and the outcome depended on political 
conditions within Russia.17 Clausewitz did not dwell too much on ‘Ermattungstrategie’ (as 
termed by Hans Delbriick) because like Frederick the Great and the Prussian soldiers who 
followed he was more attracted to quick, aggressive victories (‘Niederwerfungstrategie’) 
intended to overthrow and render the enemy prostrate before one’s own army and state 
became too exhausted.18
The strategy of exhaustion was intended to take advantage of the logistical 
vulnerabilities of pre-modem armies. Book five in On War explains that insufficient logistical 
supply, excessive marching and numerous combats are key factors in time and space which 
influence the strength of militaiy forces and their readiness for battle.19 Unless thorough 
preparations are undertaken troops will suffer from the effects of shortages, sickness and 
excessive marching several days before they go into combat.20 Disproportionate exertions 
take their toll on man, beast, wagons and clothing. Such attrition is only exacerbated in a zone 
of operations lacking roads, sufficient provisions, shelter and other resources usually provided 
by civilian communities.21
The inhumane system of requisitioning revived by the French helped to overcome 
some of these problems but its inherent problems were painfully evident during rapid 
advances through enemy territory or in shambolic retreats 22 Earlier Napoleonic campaigns in 
Europe and the Middle East had already revealed some of the shortcomings that would 
become fatal in Russia. In Clausewitz’s opinion the logistical failure had two causes. Firstly, 
the organisational neglect and reckless gambling of Napoleon who, quite rightly from a
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purely military point of view, attached greater importance to the object of fighting the enemy 
rather than the feeding his own men.23 The second reason was of course the impoverished, 
thinly populated and hostile state of Russia:
‘How vast a difference there is between a supply line stretching from Vilna to 
Moscow, where every wagon has to be procured by force, and a line from Cologne to 
Paris, via Liege, Louvain, Brussels, Mons, Valenciennes and Cambrai, where a 
commercial transaction, a bill of exchange, is enough to produce millions of 
rations!’24
For all the emphasis on decisive battle On War also explores situations where the likelihood 
of victory is deprived as strength ebbs away so that a halt or retreat becomes unavoidable.25 
Book six argues that one that one should be prepared to sacrifice territory to advancing 
enemy.26 A decision can be effected through a number of smaller fights and actions leading to 
a change of fortune either because they actually end in bloodshed or because the probability 
of their consequences necessitates the enemy’s retreat.27 When an enemy offensive has run its 
course, its troops have been detached or killed, and those who remain are weakened by 
hunger and sickness, then it is the fear of our opposing forces that make the enemy general 
turn about and retreat.28 The defender can therefore formulate a plan ‘depending on whether 
the attacker is to perish by the sword or by his own exertions’29 Clausewitz referred to how 
Fabius Cuncator let Hannibal exhaust himself in the field, how Wellington stayed behind the 
fortified lines of Torres Vedras, and of course his own experiences in Russia.30
The logic o f scorched-earth
These examples provide the principal sources of inspiration for a retreat into the interior of 
the country whereby the defender falls back onto available supplies and gathers up 
reinforcements.31 The attacker must either leave his sources of supply behind or have them 
forwarded.32 When the latter is not practical the essentials must be either captured or 
requisitioned along the way.33 A countryside already exhausted of food and fodder is a fatal 
weakness.34 If the attacker were to capture supplies this would be a matter of pure luck or 
gross neglect on the defender’s part; the implication being that the defender should try to 
deprive the attacker of this potential advantage.35
Ancient armies had a zero-sum relationship when it came to food and fertile territory. 
In a situation analogous to a ‘burning ladder’ an army had to keep moving into search of new 
supplies. To follow in the devastated wake of retreating army or be forced to retrace one’s 
own steps usually meant logistical disaster.36 Clausewitz articulates a zero-sum principle of
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polarity to explain why armies should, theoretically, engage in constant fighting because if  it 
is in the interests o f  one side to stay on the defense it must be in the other’s to attack. 
Clausewitz realised o f  course that such strict polarity does not really exist but there always 
exists an opposition o f  interests. The polarity lies not in strictly attack or defence but that in 
which both sides bear a relation.37 Clausewitz states that lesser combats can aim at the capture 
o f  an advantageous hill or bridge yet it is left unclear whether subordinate objects include the 
destruction, or at least fight over, civilian assets like food supplies and shelter.38
It can be argued that the reasoning for scorched-earth strategies and the targeting 
civilian property is derived from the zero-sum principle o f  polarity in theoiy, the opposition 
o f  interests in reality and the logic (or ill-logic) o f  the human mind which may spitefully 
reason, without regard for political or moral concerns, that whatever is an advantage to my 
enemy is to my disadvantage and therefore to be either denied to the enemy or usurped for 
myself. This can be likened to a situation akin to hedging the bets whereby one is gambling 
that by cutting o ff or at least reducing such advantages, the enemy will weaken, and the 
balance o f  forces will alter enough to bring about conditions or circumstances favourable for 
success in battle i f  or when it arrives.39
A strategy o f  interdiction is not easy to attribute to Clausewitz who consistently 
warned his readers against such indirect methods. They are tempting because they cost so 
little and are preferable to pointless battles. They are generally overrated because they seldom 
achieve so much as true success in arms and involve the risk o f  drawbacks previously 
overlooked: ‘They should always be looked upon as minor investments that can only yield 
minor dividends, appropriate to limited circumstances and weaker motives.’40 There are 
occasional passages on the matter o f  troop deployments, billeting arrangements and 
manoeuvring with a view to cover the fertile countryside and prevent the enemy from 
requisitioning food supplies 41
The treatise On War endorses the logic o f  interdiction or denial only as far as it is 
accomplished by possession or physical obstruction rather than destruction o f  civilian 
resources. Collateral damage was accepted as a side-effect o f campaigning. ‘The retreating 
army has first call on, and usually exhausts, the local resources. A ll that remains are 
devastated towns and villages, harvested and trampled fields, empty wells, and muddied 
streams.’42 These forces can ‘make the pursuit more difficult for the enemy by destroying 
bridges, making bad roads worse merely by using them, denying the enemy the best camping 
places and watering points by occupying them itself, and so forth.’43
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The campaign in Russia was unique: its sheer size, sparse population, severe weather 
(the heat and dust of summer followed by the cold and snow of winter) would weaken the 
strength of Napoleon’s gigantic invasion force and ensure logistical disaster regardless of 
whether the Russians scorched their own land or not. The deciding factor would be how the 
political authorities reacted to the invasion and whether they could rely upon a truly loyal and 
warlike people.44 Clausewitz listed the main drawbacks of retreat: namely, the abandonment 
and wastage of land, having to give up commercial cities and the loss of war material, 
whether in finished form or in the process of production.45 More importantly a retreat has a 
paralysing psychological effect beyond the army’s morale:
‘There may be times when the army and the nation fully understand the reasons for 
withdrawing to the interior, when confidence and hope may even be fortified as a 
result; but they are very rare. As a rule, the people and the army cannot even tell the 
difference between a planned retreat and a backward stumble; still less can they be 
certain if a plan is a wise one, based on anticipation of positive advantages, or 
whether it has simply been dictated by fear of the enemy. There will be public 
concern and resentment at the fate of the abandoned areas; the army will possibly 
loose confidence not only in its leaders but in itself, and never-ending rear guard 
actions will only tend to confirm its fears. These consequences of retreat should not 
be underrated. Moreover, in the abstract it is, of course, more natural, simpler, nobler 
and more in keeping with a nation’s moral character to face the challenge squarely, 
and ensure that an enemy who violates a frontier will be made to pay a penalty in 
blood.’46
The Russians withdraw, Napoleon pursues
When the Tsar saw for himself the deficiencies at Drissa he ordered a withdrawal be carried 
out between 12-17* July 47 Clausewitz served with the rearguard as it fell back on Vitesbk, 
then on to Smolensk.48 He witnessed the Smolensk’s destruction as the enemy bombarded the 
city on 16-18* August in an attempt to drive out its 15,000 defenders 49 The Russians pulled 
back towards Moscow and Napoleon decided to pursue rather than consolidate his position in 
Lithuania-Belorussia. The marching was physically and mentally exhausting for the men on 
both sides and went totally against the instinctive desire for decisive battle.50
The attrition of marching so far so fast was compounded by the heat, rain, lack of 
food and the harassment of foraging parties by Cossacks and peasants-in-arms.51 Clausewitz 
wrote that from Vitebsk to Moscow the Russians found plentiful stores of cereal, biscuits, 
wheat, and meat. There was seldom grain for the horses so they made do on hay. The French 
followed through spoilt countryside and without proper maps were forced to send out scouts 
in search of food and wells. Clausewitz remembered however how everyone was tortured by 
thirst and tiredness and relieved themselves by stopping to drink from dirty puddles.52 From
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Dorogobuzh he complained to Marie o f  gout, his hollowing teeth, thinning hair and how his 
un-gloved hands looked like yellow leather:
‘The difficulties o f  this campaign are extraordinary. For nine weeks now we have 
been on the march. For five weeks we have had no change o f  clothes. Heat, dust, 
filthy water and often near-starvation. Until now I have spent each night in the open, 
with few  exceptions, because few people live in this locality and their pitiful huts 
have been destroyed.’53
The absence o f  billets, tents and adequate baggage trains made the campaign especially 
arduous for the troops who were exposed to the rigors o f  the climate for six months.54 
Clausewitz knew from personal experience the humanitarian relief nearby villages could offer 
to heavily-laden and hungry soldiers falling ill on the open road, mired in mud and rain, or the 
dust and burning heat o f  summer.55 The Russians had no coherent plan to deny the invaders 
the respite o f  food, water or shelter. Most acts o f  sabotage were carried out on the initiative o f  
individual commanders while ordinary soldiers sometimes found it heart-breaking to bum 
down peasant property.56 Clausewitz recalled the logic behind the vandalism:
‘It became the custom o f  the Russian rear guard to bum villages as they were leaving 
them. Usually the inhabitants were already gone, whatever food and forage remained 
was quickly used up, and the only things left were the wooden houses, which in this 
region are not worth much. Under these circumstances no great care was taken to 
protect them from being burned or tom down, and that by itself was sufficient to 
cause the destruction o f most o f  them. What had at first been thoughtlessness and 
carelessness gradually became policy, which was often extended to small farms and 
large towns as well. The bridges were also tom down, and the numerals were hacked 
out o f the mileposts, which eliminated a useful source o f  information. A s very few  
inhabitants remained, the French must often have found it difficult to know where 
they were on the highway.’57
Clausewitz calculated that the French needed twelve weeks to march the 530 miles from 
Kowno to Moscow, and o f the estimated 280,000 men who undertook the journey not more 
than 90,000-100,000 reached the capital.58 The retreat had such a detrimental effect on 
Russian morale that national honour and professional pride impelled them to stand and fight 
on occasions like the Battle o f  Borodino (7th September).59 This slugging match left Napoleon 
with 120,000 men to march on Moscow and it was on that everything appeared to hinge. 
Clausewitz was clearly shocked by the enormous loss o f  life because he repeats several times 
that Napoleon’s centre crossed the Niemen with 300,000 men and lost over half from the 
effects o f  rapid marching along a single road, the shortage o f  supplies, sickness, stragglers, 
the need to detach men to guard conquered places and the fighting itself.60 By the time the 
invaders reached the capital their casualties totalled 198,000.61
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The great fire  o f  M oscow
The Russians made the final seventy miles to Moscow in seven days, passing through on the 
14th September still 70,000-men strong.62 Clausewitz reflected in hindsight that had the 
Russians planned a retreat from Smolensk to Kuluga in the first place they would have lured 
the invaders away from the capital and saved Moscow altogether. The logic of destroying the 
enemy’s armed forces and the danger of detaching any sizeable force for any other object 
(like a civilian settlement) would have compelled Napoleon to give Moscow a wide berth. Its 
capture came about from a lack of forward planning and the fear of disgrace at leaving the 
capital totally unprotected.63 Clausewitz applauded Napoleon’s decision to seek battle and 
occupy Moscow as an admirable attempt to shake the confidence and sow dissension in the 
government, the army and the people.64
The advance certainly did create an atmosphere of hysterical fear and panic amongst 
the civil population. The memoirs of Count Philippe-Paul de Segur recorded the effort made 
by propagandists to convince the inhabitants that the French had not come to slit everyone’s 
throats. Segur lamented the shameful destruction of cities and mortal suffering of prisoners 
and civilians.65 Moscow had a pre-war population of 300,000 inhabitants but everyone except
6,000 fled the city, leaving it stripped of valuables and paralysed of social services like fire­
fighting.66 General Miloradovich tried to negotiate a handover of the city without assault and 
spare it the same fate as Smolensk, Viazma (Vyazma) or Mozhaysk.67 Clausewitz recalled the 
sight of the capital as he passed through on 14th September:
‘Moscow seemed more or less abandoned. A few hundred people of the lowest 
classes met General Miloradovitch and begged for his protection. Here and there in 
the streets we encountered other groups, watching us sadly as we passed by. The 
streets were still crowded with wagons leaving the city, so that General Miloradovitch 
had to order two cavalry regiments to ride ahead and clear the way. The most painful 
sight was long rows of wounded soldiers, who lay along the house and were vainly 
hoping to be moved away. All these unfortunates probably died in the city.’68
Clausewitz saw how the loss of their city had produced grief, despair, dejection amongst the 
Russian soldiers and people. The damage ultimately had a counter-productive effect because 
it was generally felt by everyone, especially Prince Kutuzov, that too much had already been 
sacrificed just to give up and surrender.69 After abandoning the capital a great debate flared up 
over what direction the Russians should take next. Clausewitz was among those who 
recommended the southern route to Kaluga where the Russians could advantage of space and 
economic resources.70 As the French took over the capital fires broke out mysteriously and
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spread rapidly to engulf the city between the 15 to 18th September.71 Clausewitz witnessed the 
blaze from afar on the Podolsk-Thula road:
‘During this march we saw Moscow burning day and night, and although we were 
thirty miles from the city the wind occasionally carried ashes all the way to us. Even 
though the burning of Smolensk and of many other towns had accustomed the 
Russians to sacrifices of this kind, the burning of Moscow saddened them and 
increased their anger at the enemy, on whom they blamed the fire as a true expression 
of his hatred, arrogance, and cruelty.’72
Clausewitz never discovered whether the true cause of the fire was arson or a deliberate act of 
scorched-earth instigated by Count Theodore Rostopchin. The governor-general had been 
hysterical about defending Moscow and encouraged peasants to arm themselves (with pikes 
rather than the muskets stored in the Kremlin) on the road to Mozhaisk (Mozhaysk) for a 
battle that never materialised.73 Clausewitz later met Rostopchin who denied all responsibility 
for the fires and protested his innocence over such a dishonourable act.74 He was prepared to 
admit that the fire, intentional or not, turned out to be useful from a military point of view. It 
helped to worsen the situation for the enemy troops as they huddled in the blackened city 
ruins subsisting on the flesh of 20,000 horses and whatever provisions they could gather up 
from an ever-expanding radius.75 The fire was unnecessary in Clausewitz’s opinion because 
Napoleon’s retreat was inevitable:
‘That the burning of Moscow proved highly detrimental to the French cannot be 
denied. If the fire made the possibility of peace negotiations seem even more remote 
in the Czar’s mind, and if it became a way of enraging the Russian people further, 
this probably constituted the main damage it caused to the French. On the other hand, 
it is exaggerating the significance of a single act to regard the burning of Moscow -  
as the French usually do -  as the main reason for the failure of the campaign. The fire 
certainly deprived the French of resources they could have used, but their most 
important need was for soldiers, and these they would not have found in an 
undamaged Moscow either.
‘An army of 90,000, of exhausted men and horses, at the point of narrow wedge 
driven 550 miles into Russia; to its right an enemy army of 110,000; on all sides a 
population in arms; forced to face the enemy in all directions, without depots, without 
adequate supplies and ammunition, depending on a single, devastated line of supply 
and communications—that does not add up to a situation one can tolerate through a 
winter. But if Bonaparte was not certain he could maintain himself in Moscow 
through the winter, he had to retreat before winter came. Whether Moscow still stood 
or had been destroyed would not significantly influence the issue. Bonaparte’s retreat 
was inevitable; his entire campaign failed the moment Emperor Alexander refused to 
sue for peace. All his moves had been designed to bring about a negotiated peace, and 
Bonaparte certainly did not deceive himself this point for a moment.’76
The French cere forced to retreat
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Napoleon was slow to extricate his army from this grave situation and passed the time 
sending letters to the Tsar blaming criminal elements for the lamentable fires and asking for a 
peaceful settlement.77 Clausewitz believed that to occupy and subjugate a country as large as 
Russia was impossible and Napoleon had gambled on the psychological effects of his 
offensive to terrorise the government into signing a peace.78 The retreat had already been a 
terrible personal experience for Clausewitz, who was almost killed in combat when a horse 
shot from underneath him, yet he remained convinced that only a premature peace could save 
the French.79 The Russian forces meanwhile moved to establish a position near Kaluga where 
they help the Cossacks and peasants-in-arms to threaten the enemy’s lines of communications 
and block the flow of supplies and replacements.80
Clausewitz was ordered to go north and after being detained by ignorant militiamen 
who were convinced he was a French spy arrived safely in St. Petersburg by the mid- 
October.81 Boyen, Stein, Mme de Stael, Arndt and many other German nationalists were 
already gathered around the Tsar, urging him to fight on.82 His sister the Grand Duchess 
Catherine was another vigorous supporter for continuing the war and asked Clausewitz for his 
appraisal on the military situation. He confided in her the opinion that Napoleon would have 
no choice but to retreat if the Russians stood firm.83
Clausewitz was careful not to offend Russian sensitivities over the suffering of their 
countiy. He was at least relieved to see that in St. Petersburg the Tsar and his counsellors 
were at least able to make firm decisions in an atmosphere of relative calm, isolated from the 
horrors of ‘bloody battlefields, devastated villages and towns, and the painful retreat of the 
Russian army’.84 In On War he repeats that only internal weakness and disunity could ruin 
Russia but the people remained loyal and steadfast behind the government which refused to 
make peace in the face of lost battles, captured cities and occupied provinces.85
On 19th October Napoleon decided to retreat and ordered the country be ruined, either 
out of spite or to slow down the enemy’s pursuit. Governor Mortier was therefore instructed 
to booby trap the Kremlin as it was abandoned to the Cossacks a few days later.86 The drive 
south was obstructed at Maloyaroslavetz and the ensuing battle ruined the contested town. 
Rather than pushing on to Kutuzov’s defensive positions at Kaluga Napoleon made the 
controversial decision to turn northwards and retrace his steps over spoilt ground already 
depleted of supplies.87 Clausewitz believed the invaders had little choice but to retreat the way 
they had come into Russia, relying on depots, rather than plunging into unknown and hostile 
territory: ‘What officer would have been willing to ride ahead of the army to organize the 
collection of food and what Russian officials would have obeyed his orders?’88
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The horrors o f retreat
The Grand Armee was frequently harassed by Cossacks, irregular partisans and outraged 
peasants who hacked down faltering French soldiers with an animal-like lust for slaughter that 
frightened even the Russian landlord classes.89 Clausewitz makes a few references to the 
actions of partisans mentioning that they blocked the capture of food and scooped up 
prisoners.90 Segur’s account complains repeatedly about how the Cossacks blew up bridges, 
interfered with the collection of food, picked off stragglers, recaptured lost ground and 
necessitated wearisome tactical deployments to stave off potential attacks to the main bodies 
of troops.91 Prince Eugene’s Army of Italy for example lost over 2,000 soldiers, as well as its 
cannon and baggage train crossing the River Vop and dragging itself to the town of 
Dukhovschina while under harassment from partisans92
The retreat was so horrific that of the 100,000 troops who left Moscow only 50,000 
reached Smolensk on 13* November. There were desperate scenes at the storehouses as the 
men ransacked what food was left before stumbling onwards in search of food, warmth and 
shelter.93 The Russians were reluctant to attack this disintegrating mass directly because they 
too were experiencing their own share of horrors as Clausewitz recalled: ‘Wittgenstein also 
lost a good third of his troops in the last four weeks of the campaign, for he had above 40,000 
men at Czaniski and scarcely 30,000 at Vilna.’94
It is important to bear in mind that armies of the pre-modem age were accompanied 
by a considerable number of non-combatant helpers including women and children who 
shared the toils and dangers.95 Clausewitz had been little more than a child when he first 
experienced the life-threatening fatigue of going on a military campaign.96 The Grande Armee 
had by this point accumulated some 40,000 civilian refugees and helpers of all sorts who 
Segur identified as former French residents of the capital, Russian women of easy virtue, and 
hordes of greedy peasants staying close to the baggage train.97 He described how these 
refugees perished from starvation, the cold and enemy attack.98
The starving and frostbitten exodus was caught trying to cross the Berezina River at 
the point of Studenka, close to Borisov on 26-29* November. The bridges were blown on the 
last day leaving behind thousands of terrified people to face slaughter or try their chances 
swimming the freezing waters. The exact number of soldiers and civilians involved is difficult 
for modem historians to gauge. Clausewitz’s puts the figures of enemy troops at 30,000 plus
40,000 unarmed stragglers. It is generally believed that during the three days of fighting on
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both banks the French lost up to 25,000 people (including as many as 10,000 non-combatant 
stragglers), of which a third were killed. Russian losses have been estimated to be somewhere 
around 15,000."
The massacre at Borodino was the most traumatic experience in Clausewitz’s already 
hard life. ‘What ghastly scenes I have witnessed here’ he wrote to his wife back home. ‘If my 
feelings had not been hardened it would have sent me mad. Even so, it will take many years 
before I can remember what I have seen without shuddering with horror.’100 Clausewitz said 
he would never forget the smoking ruins, the corpses, the dying ghostlike men crying for 
crusts of bread.101 ‘I hear that we are being condemned’ he wrote to Marie when he learned 
that tribunals were being held against him in Prussia. ‘Let them do it in God’s name! Anyone 
who has witnessed the scenes of misery and need here, which the German governments 
helped bring about, will not feel his pride broken their condemnations.’102
In early December the skeletal soldiers of Napoleon’s starving army reached Vilna 
where they devoured all the remaining rations of biscuit, plundered the city’s inhabitants and 
abandoned them to the mercy of the oncoming Cossacks. By mid-January the survivors 
reached the relative safety of Posen and East Prussia.103 The true extent of the disaster is 
difficult to ascertain: the invading army set out with a paper-strength of approximately
600.000-655,000 men but less than 93,000 returned.104 The Russians meanwhile lost between
110.000-150,000 military dead.105 These figures cover servicemen so it is impossible to tell 
how many civilians perished from battles, sieges, or simply from cold or hunger as a result of 
having to flee their homes. The figure could be anywhere between 150,000-1,000,000 dead 
divided between both sides.106 Three-quarters of Moscow lay in burnt ruins and damages to 
the country as a whole were estimated by the Russian finance ministry to be around
200,000,000 rubles}01
Switching to the offensive
Prior to this awful campaign Clausewitz had wrote The Principles o f War with a warning that 
if one side remains on the defensive, submitting to the blows of an adversary without ever 
striking back and running the war at a disproportionate expense, that side will become 
exhausted and would succumb eventually.108 In On War Clausewitz repeats that the 
exhaustion and tiring out of enemy can work on special occasions in reality but the theory of 
war or combat demands a more positive threatening aim.109 Frederick the Great could not stay 
entirely passive and launched minor offensive operations in the form of raids, diversions, 
capturing fortresses and the seizure of assets.110
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Clausewitz admits there are two reasons why an indefinite struggle might exhaust the 
defender sooner: firstly, he is usually the weaker party anyway so losses tend to hurt him 
more; secondly, ‘the enemy will usually deprive him o f  part o f  his territory and resources.’111 
Russia was so big it could absorb the blow and Napoleon’s boundless ambition had already 
stretched his resources to the limit. Congratulations were in order for the Tsar and his subjects 
because they had not caved in to his invasion. ‘The highest wisdom could never have devised 
a better strategy than the one the Russians followed unintentionally.’112 Clausewitz was not 
morally insensitive to the terribly high price in blood and perils in person, but he could 
celebrate the power o f  the defence in historical hindsight or in theory:
‘The Russian campaign o f  1812 demonstrated in the first place that a country o f  such 
size could not be conquered (which might well have been foreseen), and in the second 
that the prospect o f  eventual success does not always decrease in proportion to lost 
battles, captured capitals and occupied provinces, which is something that diplomats 
used to regard as dogma, and made them always ready to conclude a peace however 
bad. On the contraiy, the Russians showed us that one often attains one’s greatest 
strength in the heart o f  one’s own country, when the enemy’s offensive power is 
exhausted, and the defensive can then switch with enormous energy to the 
offensive.’113
While there may be confusion about how to formulate a winning strategy On War leaves the 
reader with little doubt that violence must be inflicted with a positive purpose at some point. 
As early as 1804 Clausewitz could not accept idea o f  unitary war o f  one side against an 
unresponsive combatant; the defensive must nurture the idea o f  attacking the enemy.114 
Defence is only justifiable to gain some temporary advantages whenever physical and moral 
superiority is lacking, or if  one wanted to preserve one’s armed forces and state assets until a 
better time. Even a limited aim can never be absolute negation or passivity; it must bear some 
adherence positive aim o f  combat and to the final aim o f  war. Clausewitz envisaged defence 
to be like a shielded warrior, who parries the blows o f  his opponent, and then returns well- 
directed counter-attacks as soon as opportunity and strength permitted. In order to avoid 
repeated onslaughts that reduce one’s state to ruins the defender must make a transition to the 
offensive using the flashing sword o f  vengeance ( ‘das blitzende Vergeltungsschwert’): how, 
when, and where that reaction is to happen will depend on many circumstances.115
There is o f  course the danger that as the defender moves over to attack he may end up 
doing more violence and damage than was originally intended. Readers can anticipate 
situations involving haphazard violence against enemy civilians as strategists struggle to 
gauge their efforts, or deliberately set themselves on a course o f  completely ruining their 
enemy’s state.116 The resurgence o f  Prussia dredged up a passionate desire for revenge against
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more than just the soldiers of Napoleon but also his confederates and civilian national base. A 
feeling of shame and enslavement over the years had produced a groundswell of nationalistic 
hatred which found its unofficial expression either in secret societies like the Tugendbund or 
the works of fiery intellectual’s Fitche, Kleist, Arndt, as well as Theodor Koner and Josef 
Gorres. The massive outpouring of plays, poetry, essays, sermons and speeches in 1813 called 
for a purifying crusade against the French.117 Patriotic women and clerics were just as vocal in 
their calls for war and played an active role by supporting the soldiers.118
State policy and the passions o f the people
It was fortunate that this popular passion was tempered and controlled by the state 
government. After the fall of Moscow, Clausewitz was designated chief-of-staff to the Russo- 
German Legion under the command of Count Ludwig von Wallmoden-Gimbom. Until it 
became operational Clausewitz was given a temporary assignment with the army of General 
Wittgenstein and General Hans Karl Ludwig von Diebitsch.119 In late December these forces 
pursued Marshal Macdonald’s X Corps into East Prussia and came into contact with a force 
of 14,000-20,000 demoralised Prussian soldiers bound by a hated treaty to the French.120
In reluctant command was Hans David Yorck von Wartenberg who was willing to 
defect if it could be done without breaking allegiance to the king. Clausewitz was among the 
truce-feelers sent out by Diebitsch and on 29th December he won Yorck over through the 
cogency of his arguments and sincerity of his conviction. The next day the general undertook 
what Clausewitz considered to be one of the boldest decisions in Prussia’s history: he signed 
the Convention of Tauroggen and established a base at Konigsberg for rallying the nation.121 
‘He is now our king,’ wrote a subaltern, ‘he concludes peace and makes war.’122
This unsanctioned policy of a non-state actor was helped by Stein who returned as a 
plenipotentiary for the Russian and grasped the opportunity to liberate Germany by 
instigating a something close to people’s war.123 In January Clausewitz wrote a paper about 
organising the male population in militia for the defence of Lithuania, East and West Prussia. 
All fit and eligible men aged 18-40 would supplement the regular army by serving in the 
Landwehr reserve, all those aged 40-60 would serve in the Landsturm homeguard. Yorck 
adopted the plan the following month by calling upon the local political authorities for a 
Landwehr of 20,000 and 10,000 additional reserves.124
The provincial governor Hans Jakob von Auerswald was naturally hesitant to throw 
in his lot with the insurrection. Count Donhof believed it was despotic and selfish of Stein to
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ask men essential for working the land to go get themselves killed trying to be amateur 
soldiers.125 The East Prussian estates, presided over Auerswald’s deputy, assembled for a 
special session on 5th February. Yorck added weight to Stein’s cause by stressing that he 
intended to fight on behalf of the king who was assumed to be held under duress. The estates 
secured some get-out clauses and by 9th February it was agreed to reinforce Yorck’s corps 
with volunteers and conscripts. On 11th February a Konigsberg newspaper published an order 
for all officers on half-pay in the province to report to Clausewitz for assignments.126
Clausewitz later justified Yorck’s actions as speeding up the whole process of 
overthrowing Napoleon.127 It should be pointed out that Yorck was conservative by nature 
and wanted his actions legitimised by the state. As early as the 3rd January he wrote the king a 
letter professing his personal loyalty but dared to presume that he could arbitrarily decide the 
policy of the ‘nation’ towards its ‘true enemy’.128 It is difficult to discern the king’s true 
intentions: Frederick William initially ordered Yorck court-martialed then rescinded his 
orders under pressure from the Russians and public opinion.129 The early rumours of French 
setbacks in Russia had been greeted with heartfelt schadenfreude and the survivors limped 
through Konigsberg, Berlin and Neustadt where they entered ‘an atmosphere poisoned by 
hatred’ in the words of Segur.130
Frederick William received a flood of petitions pleading the case for war and as the 
Russians liberated Berlin he joined his restless subjects and reasserted his role as the chief 
policy-maker.131 Prior to the declaration of war the king had already begun to take steps 
towards national rearmament. Napoleon had already permitted the Prussian army to expand 
by 20,000 soldiers for the war against Russia.132 Blucher and Schamhorst were now recalled 
to help coordinate the bustling activity in Breslau and Silesia. A general call went out in 
February for anyone wealthy enough to provide their own military clothing and equipment to 
form themselves into to light volunteer detachments offreiwillige Jager. Major Ludwig Adolf 
Wilhelm von Liitzow’s ‘Black Band’, or ‘unruly volunteers’ in Clausewitz’s opinion, rose 
1,200-3,000 troops in Silesia where they were blessed by a local pastor as honourable 
crusaders for the Fatherland.133
The Landwehr and Landsturm
On 17th March the king issued an address ‘An Mein Volk’ calling upon all the Prussian, 
Silesian, Pomerian and Lithuanian subjects left under his control to support his declaration of 
war. Men of all economic backgrounds including the middle classes and landed peasantry 
were liable to universal and compulsory military service. Special Jager formations existed for
234
higher classes and reserve units for all those able-bodied males aged 18-40 not enlisted in 
regular regiments of the line. The Landwehr decree (18-19th March) was followed up with a 
much more radical development towards popular war. According to the Landsturm decree on 
21st April everyone was to disobey the orders of the enemy. Every man aged 18-60 and 
physically-capable of bearing arms was to help local army commanders, district governors 
and committees with local civil defence by harrying the enemy troops with whatever came to 
hand including clubs and pitchforks.134 The decrees were designed to channel popular 
resistance through legitimate means which satisfied an ethical preference for openly 
displaying one’s status as a combatant in the service of a state-govemment. Armed action, 
scorched-earth activities or the confiscation of property outside the framework of military 
hierarchy was likely to be seen as mutiny.135
Clausewitz was committed to the establishment of the Landsturm under these 
conventional auspices. A paper dated to April 1813 mentions how companies of Jager and 
squadrons of Husaren should be the core or heart of the Landsturm. They can also work with 
bodies of regular troops 5,000-6,000-strong and take exploit the advantages of terrain and the 
inability of the enemy to concentrate in mountains. In addressing matters of supply 
Clausewitz mentions that towns like Landshuth and Liebau should be made into munitions 
depots and military hospitals. It is interesting that he says that hospitals need not be fortified 
because the sick and injured make bad conquests: ‘Ein Lazareth braucht nicht befestigt zu 
seyn, denn Kranke sind eine schlechte Eroberung.’ It is difficult to tell whether this means the 
enemy would preserve the humanitarian decencies towards captured and wounded insurgents, 
or the French would not bother diverting their manpower to attacking hospitals simply 
because they are worthless targets and would add to their medical burdens.136
It would be anachronistic to claim that Clausewitz and his contemporaries were 
forerunners of international law but it is remarkable how similar their views were with the 
requirements for combatants as laid down by the Geneva Conventions and Hague Rules of 
Combat. Both the Landwehr and Landsturm decrees proved enormously popular with even 
Fichte drilling in a Landsturm unit, although such parade ground antics were better 
propaganda than practical help.137 The Landwehr and Landsturm did yield significant military 
benefits such as the alert response (or ‘Great Fear’) in Neumark, the rising of Halle on 25th 
May and the ambush of a French artillery convoy at Halberstadt five days later.138 Lutzow’s 
ffeicorps was however almost annihilated near the village of Kitzen on 17th June when it was 
ambushed by Rhenish forces violating an armistice.139 There was a general distain for 
militiamen as somehow lacking stamina and discipline; one chaplain recorded how military
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service had a barbarising effect on the civilian-soldiers.140 Stein therefore insisted that the 
commanders of popular units had to exhibit a great deal of humanity and firm discipline.141
The king and the more conservative elements of Prussian society still questioned the 
military effectiveness of the Landsturm and worried that any scorched-earth operations would 
degenerate into destructive unruliness. Strict disciplinary orders were issued against looting 
and assaults on friendly subjects or allied peoples.142 The government regarded the militia as a 
desperate measure of last resort and feared that French retaliation would treat all adult males 
as insurgents and the rest of the civil population as potential spies and guides.143 Legal experts 
were anxious to avoid the savage reprisals and banditry that came with guerrilla wars, as seen 
in America and Spain, by clearly defining the legal status of combatants (proper insignia, 
bearing arms openly) and bringing them under state control.144 The French indeed acted with 
cruelty to risings of Hessian and Silesian peasants and the Landsturm was unable to stop 
looting by the enemy troops or within their own rank and file.145
The regular armies check Napoleon
The liberation of Germany did not see the horror of Spain for two major reasons. Firstly, the 
political regimes and populations did not have the same character for guerrilla actions. 
Secondly, the military campaigns were decided along orthodox lines in the most colossal 
battles of European history.146 Clausewitz wrote that by this stage Napoleon’s fearful sword 
had been blunted by its failure in Russia.147 Napoleon regained his military strength for 1813 
by calling up conscripts, national guards and allies.148 His intent that year seems to have been 
to defeat his enemies in battle, then punish the intriguers and political daredevils who had 
misled the Germans into rebellion.149 Frederick William regarded Clausewitz in much the 
same vein and left him serve in the Russo-German Legion on the Baltic flank until the former 
Prussian officer proved enough loyalty and distinction to be recommissioned in April 1814.150
Clausewitz later recalled how precarious Prussia’s situation looked in the spring and 
summer of 1813. The army was scattered in at least separate contingents of 20,000-30,000 
each under Bliicher, Yorck and Biilow. The number rose to almost 80,000 front-line soldiers 
which was just enough to help the Russians break the tide of French resurgence in the costly 
battles of Lutzen-Grossgorschen and Bautzen during the month of May.151 These battles 
shook up the allies and mutual recriminations abounded to the point that the Russians wanted 
to fall back of Poland and abandon Prussia.152 The danger of re-conquest must have been 
terrifying to the civilian population; when the French threatened Berlin that month Marie and 
her mother left the city convinced that as relatives of such a well-known enemy of France
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they would be exposed to ‘special dangers’.153 Clausewitz warned Marie on 31st May to stay 
away from Landshut because it was exposed to great danger and to remain calm as rumours 
and unrest spread throughout the land.154
The aforementioned battles fought the French to a standstill. Clausewitz approved 
the Armistice of Plaswitz (signed on 4th June and extended to 10th August) because it gave 
Prussia the time it needed to complete the reincarnation of the field army (whittled down to
60,000 men) and overcome the resistance to popularised forces.155 Over the spring and 
summer of 1813 the Landwehr was built up to thirty-eight infantry and thirty cavalry 
regiments (about 120,000-150,000 men) complimenting the regular regiments of the line. 
Through a combination of volunteers, conscripts and augmentations of militia the regular 
army overcame many exemptions on military service and increased in troop numbers to
130,000-160,000 by 10th August. Prussia’s total men under arms would go on to a level of
270,000. This was a remarkable per capita effort from a population of fewer than five million 
souls.156
Clausewitz celebrated the rising of Germany in On War as the amazing culmination 
of recent trends in Austria, Spain and Russia. War was made a concern of the people and thus 
waged with an exceptional degree of energy and resourcefulness; without money or credit 
Prussia mobilised a force twice as large as the one annihilated in 1806.157 Historians have 
questioned whether this effort represented a true national war or just a stronger form princely 
war with a greater degree of popular support than was usual.158 The nobles, middle class 
merchants and city dwellers of Berlin and Silesia objected to their loss of privileges while the 
great mass of the population obeyed the political authorities and remained passive unless 
otherwise instructed.159
The majority of the manpower came from East Prussia and the resistance to 
conscription was more widespread in parts of West Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia or from 
certain demographic groups such as the Catholics, Poles and Jews. Royal ordinances allowed 
Jews to buy their way out of military service because money was deemed more valuable to 
pay for equipment.160 The uneducated lower classes were likely reacting to the requisitions 
and abuses inflicted upon them the passing French armies rather than out of a sense of 
German nationalism.161 Despite the blurring of distinctions between combatants and non- 
combatants there were so many frictions working against conscription that Prussia’s effort felt 
far short of a true people’s war.162
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By mid-October the opposing sides had each amassed a field force over half a 
million-strong, not counting the thousands of men in second-line reserves or in garrison 
duty.163 The treaties of Reichenbach and Teplitz bound the coalition forces closer together and 
Mettemich’s efforts to arrange a Habsburg peace with Napoleon floundered on the latter’s 
intransigence.164 Even with the advantage of numbers the allies adopted the so-called 
‘Trachtenberg plan’ to wear down Napoleon’s forces in a campaign of mutual attrition.165 
Clausewitz recognised a key weakness in Napoleon’s strategy was his inability to be 
everywhere at once. Subordinate commanders sent off to capture and possibly take revenge 
on civilian objectives like Berlin were caught off guard by animated Prussian commanders: 
Ney’s march towards Berlin in May had to be called back for the Battle of Bautzen, Marshal 
Nicolas Oudinot was stopped at Luckau (6th June) and GroJB Beeren (23rd August), Macdonald 
was defeated at Katzbach (26th August) and Ney was finally rebuffed at Dennewitz (6th 
September).166
It was the fight at Dresden (26-27th August) and the Volkerschlacht or Battle of the 
Nations at Mockem and Leipzig (16-19th October) which finally settled the struggle in the 
favour of the allies.167 ‘The highest satisfaction in life is to avenge oneself upon an arrogant 
enemy’ wrote Gneisenau to Blucher.168 The aftermath of battle was appalling: 90,000 dead or 
wounded men lay around the ruined area creating pestilential conditions for the inhabitants 
cleaning up the mess.169 Clausewitz was not there and omits the human costs by simply citing 
the Leipzig campaign in On War as a clear example of what can be done with superior 
numbers. It was an immense gamble and the wear and tear of marching and fighting had a 
weakening effect on Blucher’s forces.170 The feigned defence on the Rhine further sufficed to 
bring the main allied armies to halt for several weeks, although swarms of Cossacks and light 
troops were still very active.171
The defection o f the German states
After the Battle of Leipzig there was confusion and procrastination over what political course 
to take over the surrender of the city so it was simply bombarded and stormed.172 Unlike 
Prussia, the kingdom of Saxony and the states of the Rheinbzmd were less resentful towards 
France, partly due to the better economic conditions and the collaboration of the ennobled and 
middleclasses.173 The princes of the Rhine stayed loyal to Napoleon despite his heavy 
demands for new recruits and resources.174 This complicity brought into question of what one 
should do against the enemy allies or neutrals standing in one’s way.
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Clausewitz addressed the problem of enemy confederates in purely military terms for 
On War. If the enemy’s political power lies in two or more states the centre of gravity lies in 
the common interests and cordiality so it is there that one’s blows should fall.175 Clausewitz 
conceived this violence in conventional terms against the strongest ally of an enemy 
coalition.176 This excluded the targeting of non-combatants belonging of weaker third parties 
in order to force them into neutrality or to switch sides as was commonly the case with from 
the Punic Wars to the colonial conflicts in North America.177
The reasoning for targeting third parties and neutral powers is always political in 
motivation. It can also be an expression of hostile passion or an attempt to undermine the 
enemy’s overall war-making capability. Vattel upheld die principal of free access to the sea 
and non-interference for neutral nations; although he did concede the right to obstruct trade 
and confiscate useful war commodities including provisions ‘when we have hopes of 
reducing the enemy by famine’.178 The British had for centuries thwarted the overseas 
ambitions and war-effort of France by using their superior naval power to destroy warships, 
intercept shipping and pluck away colonial possessions.179
During the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars, both Britain and France clamped one 
another in a naval blockade and only allowed food and war materials to slip through when it 
was perceived to suit one sides interests more than the other.180Napoleon’s Continental 
System was unfortunately enforced to the economic detriment of Prussia, the Hanse towns, 
and the major trading ports of France.181 The pressure Britain exerted on France brought them 
into open war against civilian and state property belonging to America, Denmark and 
Prussia.182 Unlike many of his countrymen Clausewitz admired the English because they were 
the most implacable opponents of France. Yet he appreciated that Britain’s supremacy at sea 
could not guarantee the balance of power on the continent unless the German powers actively 
kept French arrogance in check.183
The English landings in Holland in 1799 and 1809 had failed due to poor logistics, 
sickness, enemy action and a lack of support from the Dutch. In the former case the English 
achieved little except fighting desultory battles, rounding up cattle and ruining the 
countryside.184 According to Clausewitz, both operations could only be justified by the fact 
that the troops could not be used in any other way and they did at least serve to divert enemy 
forces to coastal defence. When landings can count on the support of the area’s inhabitants 
against its government then such diversions can really stir up a situation.185 In 1813 the 
British could pour in money and equipment to aid the rising of Prussia and Austria.186
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Gneisenau put it simply to all the other states when he said the world is divided between those 
who fight, willingly or unwillingly, for Napoleon’s ambition and those who oppose him.187
By the Treaty of Breslau March 1813 the Prussians and Russians agreed to a Central 
Executive or Administrative Council. Presided by Stein, it was charged with virtually 
dictatorial powers for dividing areas up into civil-military districts and levying manpower and 
requisitions for the allied war effort.188 A proclamation to the princes and people of Germany 
on 25th March invited them to help with the liberation or lose their estates and risk 
‘destruction through the strength of public opinion and the power of righteous arms’.189 The 
business communities of Cologne, Aachen and Rhineland simply went about raising money 
and running their areas in the interests of France until they were relieved by allied 
administrators.190 Johann August Sack and Justus Gumer wanted to stop public disorder and 
retaliations against collaborators and propagandists by focusing popular passions against the 
French.191
Clausewitz was not happy about the character of some the other individuals Stein had 
appointed and was conscious about the negative consequences of making overbearing 
demands.192 From Neustadt in Mecklenburg-Schwerin he wrote Marie on 1st September that 
the arrest of local officials, including a certain Amtshauptmann v. St., risked causing a stir 
throughout the land. When Clausewitz discovered that of the 60,000 rations promised, only
6,000 were presented, the soldiers of Mecklenburg did not see the funny side. ‘Had we not 
urgently put provision-commissars to the task, so they would have given way to plundering 
the whole countryside.’193 Mecklenburg-Schwerin adhered because the duke was related to 
the Tsar and was compelled to renounce the Confederation by the arrival of Cossacks.194 
Saxony on the other was despoiled by Prussians because Frederick Augustus had aligned his 
kingdom so firmly with Napoleon.195
The self-righteous and punitive policy towards Napoleon’s former German 
accomplices was held-back by the Tsar and Mettemich who were keen to restrict Stein’s 
authority.196 Mettemich was diplomatically adroit to exploit the common fear of Prussia to get 
Bavaria, Baden, Wurttemberg and Westphalia to transfer their allegiance and contribute 
military resources to the coalition in return for Austrian guarantees of protection. There were 
a civil uprisings in the Hansa ports, the Grand Duchy of Berg and Jerome was driven out of 
the kingdom of Westphalia by defections and political instability.197 The revolt of Hamburg 
was not so fortunate: after years of economic hardship the burghers rose against the imperial 
garrison in anticipation of liberation. A flying column of 1,500 Cossacks did make it to the 
city only to be overmatched by the arrival of a stronger 6,000-man force under Marshal
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Davout. Those citizens who could not flee were bombarded into surrender whereupon the 
French sequestered the property of notable rebels such as Frederick Perthes.198
As the empire recoiled in central and northern Germany many garrisons were left 
stranded in fortified towns and cities Dresden, Torgau and Mainz. The resultant sieges 
worsened the destitution, hunger and disease for the civilian inhabitants.199 To conserve food 
supplies in Hamburg 20,000 people were expelled around Christmas and New Year (an 
unknown number of whom died of exposure and starvation) and Davout prolonged the city’s 
agony by holding out until the end of May.200 Clausewitz must have been aware of these 
events because the Russo-German Legion helped lay siege to Harburg-Hamburg and crossed 
the Rhine in mid-March to blockade Antwerp.201 Clausewitz does not always go into civil 
affairs because of most of his writings are from a military perspective. In On War he thus 
criticises the ‘senseless march through Switzerland to get to Langres’ without acknowledging 
the financial and political pressure 200,000 men brought to bear on the country to sever its 
ties with France.202
In other writings Clausewitz did express great moral concern about the side-effects of 
military supply. The passage of armies, the effects of bad harvests, rises in debts, the 
disruption of trade and reduced revenues of state all meant that the Rhineland region was in a 
poor economic condition after the wars.203 Clausewitz witnessed the poverty first-hand when 
he was sent to draw up plans for the defence of Cologne and Trier.204 During a month-long 
tour through the Eifel Mountains in April 1817 he witnessed the pitiful effects of famine and 
described the ‘wasted figures, scarcely human in appearance, creeping around the fields 
trying to glean some nourishment from unharvested, immature, and already half-rotten 
potatoes.’205 Clausewitz protested that quartering of troops on the Rhinelanders without 
adequate compensation was not helping the situation and his concerns were passed on to 
Gneisenau, Chancellor Hardenberg and Minister of War General Boyen.206
Conclusion
During the campaign in Russia Clausewitz witnessed terrible humanitarian suffering and he 
opposed scorched-earth actions as ineffective because Napoleon’s army would face logistical 
disaster regardless of whether the Russians ruined their own land or not. Despite the immense 
costs to civilians the protracted defence did exhaust the invaders thereby allowing Russia, 
Prussia and Austria to mount a successful counter-offensive. The dreadful aspects of a 
people’s war were averted by the subordination of popular energies to state control and 
conventional warfare. The decisive battles of 1813 led to the conquest of Saxony and
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dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine. Although Clausewitz did not provide a proper 
course of action toward enemy confederates he did oppose the harsh exploitation of lands like 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin or the Rhineland. This finally brings the narrative back to France and 
how the allies managed to invade the country without kindling the same kind of national 
resistance as in the revolutionary period.
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Chapter Six
******
The Fall of France
Up to this point the dissertation has largely focused on Clausewitz’s ideas and experiences of 
waging defensive warfare and the implications for civilian populations. The final campaigns 
in France and Poland provide a better opportunity to discuss the dilemmas of attack and 
address certain questions lfom Clausewitz’s point of view. Namely, why did France fall so 
easily despite Napoleon’s genius for war? Where was the people’s war Clausewitz so feared? 
How should one treat a conquered nation in his opinion? What can be done to defeat an 
enemy people should they take up arms? Finally, why was Clausewitz so harsh on the Polish 
desires for independence? These inquiries will reveal a Clausewitz who urged political 
restraint towards the French people and understood that it was their lack of involvement 
which brought the wars to a speedy conclusion. On the negative side, Clausewitz expressed 
some militarist or cynical views regarding Prussian policy and the future of war.
The prelude to invasion
By the end of 1813 the Napoleonic Empire was coming apart all over Europe: the Continental 
System broke down; Wellington completed the conquest of Spain; Bavaria signed a treaty of 
alliance, as did various other German satellites; Holland was evacuated; the Illyrian provinces 
were lost to theAustrians and a Croat rising; the kingdoms of Italy and Naples were 
destabilised by civil insurrections and Joachim Murat entered into negotiations.1 When 
Napoleon rejected an ultimatum to restore France back to its old boundaries the allies pledged 
themselves on his overthrow. To that end, success would ultimately depend on how the 
people reacted to foreign armies on their soil.2
In The Campaigns o f Frederick the Great o f1741-1762 Clausewitz concedes the 
military potential of raiding with the purpose of causing divisions or capturing/destroying 
magazines and material. He then lays down three warnings: first, that while this form of 
attack costs little we must be sure the enemy does not punish us with stronger methods; 
second, that while there is some leverage to be had in letting the troops run wild this provokes 
cruelty and evil on all sides; and third, one must consider the mood of the people in order not 
to arouse new enemy forces in the equivalent of a Landwehr or Landsturm?
It is interesting that in On War Clausewitz advocated cooperation with the enemy’s 
disaffected subjects rather than doing their lives and property any harm in order discredit the 
enemy government or tempt a portion of the enemy’s military forces away from a decisive
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engagement where its presence could make a difference.4 Clausewitz did not probe the 
humanitarian or escalatory effects of tit-for-tat raiding or diversions, nor did he think that 
such operations had much potential of success: he instead warns against dividing one’s 
strength in the face of a strong force or arousing a people in arms.5
Just like the possibility of an emotional backlash against defeat in battle, a penetrating 
venture into previously untouched enemy territory, whether it be a full-blown invasion or a 
simple diversion, could bring previously dormant forces to life. When a region is suddenly 
threatened capable officials on the spot may be able to mobilise a militia by distributing arms 
to the populace. The attacker should always try to avoid provoking the enemy nation into 
arming itself for guerrilla resistance because in that case ‘one may be digging one’s own 
grave.’6 A chapter on the culminating point of victory attributes the decreasing strength of 
attack partly to the increased resistance aroused in the enemy populace: sometimes they may 
be stunned and panic-stricken enough to lay down arms, at other times they may be seized by 
a fit of enthusiasm and rush to arms. The probable reaction will depend on the character of the 
people and the government, the nature of the country, and its political affiliations.7
Weakening public support
In October-November 1813 an English army crossed from northern Spain into south-western 
France where Wellington repeated a threat made by the Spanish twenty years ago: unless the 
French fought openly the civilian population would face reprisals.8 Wellington was actually 
so worried about the Iberian troops taking revenge that he dismissed these contingents and put 
his forces at a numerical disadvantage.9 Fortunately, the opposing forces withdrew, the 
Bonapartists fled, and the cities of Bordeaux and Toulouse welcomed the invaders as 
liberators.10 There was no revolutionary government or Terror to keep people in check as was 
the case in the early 1790s; Jeanbon Saint-Andre had been a Jacobin member of the 
Committee of Public Safety before he became a Napoleonic prefect and scoffed at the way 
France folded in the face of the defeat.11
Clausewitz had sensed long ago that enthusiasm for military service was somehow 
lacking in France. While a prisoner there he saw thirty to forty conscripts tied two by two and 
led by gendarmes to the prefectures. This gave him hope ‘because the shameful procedure 
suggests [the need for] extreme compulsion’.12 His travel journal remarked that although 
French state may exhibit extreme militarism, ‘no trace of this tendency could be found in the 
character of the nation’.13 By 1814 the dissipation of popular support was evident in the 
widespread draft avoidance and the failure of prefects and deputies to fulfil their obligations.
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Old grievances resurfaced in regions like the Vendee and Gard, while public opinion in Lyon, 
Burgundy, Dijon, Alsace-Lorraine tended to be more pro-Napoleon. It was fortunate that 
Napoleon had little time or personal inclination for an ochlocratic people’s war and stuck to a 
a more exclusive soldier’s war.14
The campaign o f 1814
If Napoleon could destroy Marshal Bliicher’s Army of Silesia, the centre of gravity in 
Clausewitz’s opinion, he could then turn on General Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia. In 
February, Napoleon inflicted a string of defeats on invaders by hitting their over-extended and 
divided forces at Champaubert, Montmirail, Chateau-Thierry, Vauchamps, Etoges, and 
Mormant and Montereau.15 These victories helped inspire the nation and peasants living in 
Champagne and lie de France to take up arms.16 The general fear was heightened by the 
appearance of the Cossacks and the pillage of Soissons.17 The Tsar reiterated that the political 
purpose of the campaign was not the contrivance of destruction and strife but the restoration 
of France so that her sciences, arts and trades could flourish to advantage of all nations.18
Even with these attempts to keep the war within the bounds of humanity and sound 
political reason there was a real danger of escalation. Wellington’s niece Lady Burghersh had 
witnessed the collateral damage and scorched-earth caused by the campaigns in Germany and 
feared that the same kind of pillaging and requisitioning by the invaders of France would 
inflame its inhabitants with hatred.19 Blucher pushed his soldiers so hard that Bulow and 
Yorck complained the half-starved army would resemble a shameful band of robbers.20 ‘If we 
stand still and wait we exhaust our supplies and render the people here desperate’ wrote 
Blucher, ‘they will rise en masse against us’.21 Clausewitz noted that Blucher’s victory at 
Loan on 9th March had no great military effect. Fear and defiance was meanwhile being 
instilled in those who witnessed the exhaustion of the provinces.22
Napoleon was unable to decisively destroy any of the allied armies and inflicting 
minor defeats fired the Prussian rank and file with a greater desire for revenge.23 The Austro- 
Prussian forces rallied from their setbacks, bypassed Napoleon’s field army and by marching 
on Paris precipitated a political crisis which forced his abdication.24 Paris had been left 
relatively unfortified as a show confidence and after a brief and bloody battle on the outskirts, 
its many liberal, royalist and Jacobin inhabitants welcomed the prospect of foreign 
liberation.25 Marshals Auguste de Marmont and Edouard Mortier took it upon themselves to 
save Paris from armed assault by requesting an armistice. Napoleon honoured their agreement 
and chose not to prolong the country’s suffering by inciting a people’s war.26
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The failure o f peace
For Clausewitz the campaign of 1814 was not free of human errors, weak personalities and 
diplomatic considerations, all of which act like water on the blazing fire of war. Both sides 
were nevertheless driven by greater political motives and human energies so war closer 
approached its natural state.27 He was amazed at its speed and intensity: ‘In the space of only 
eight months the theater of operations changed from the Oder to the Seine. Proud Paris had 
for the first time to bow her head, and the terrible Bonaparte lay bound and chained.’28 
Clausewitz was at first disgusted by the lenient terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleau (11th 
April) by which the allies, from a position of weakness, had not prosecuted Napoleon for his 
atrocities (‘Grauelthaten’) but instead granted the emperor and his dependents some six 
million francs to continue their life of luxury: ‘Bonaparte is as obstinate as a Jew and just as 
shameless’ fumed Clausewitz. He worried that under the electrified circumstances and 
political tensions a new king would struggle to gain the support of the generals and 
unsatisfied parties.29
Once Napoleon was banished to Elba the allied politicians got down the business of 
redrawing the map of Europe. The House of Orange was restored to the Netherlands and the 
Belgian departments were incorporated under Dutch rule. After much squabbling and the 
possibility of war between the former allies Congress of Poland reached a settlement: the 
Grand Duke Constantine took charge of the parts of Poland-Lithuania for the Tsar; Austria 
retained Galicia and district of Tamopol; and Krakow became free city. Prussian got the 
Duchy of Posen, the cities of Danzig and Thom, as well as parts of the Rhineland and 
Saxony.30 In response to patriotic demonstrations in Leipzig General-Commandant Bismarck 
told people to calm down or face harsh punishment.31 The Austrians also found it hard to stop 
civil violence in the Veneto.32 The kingdom of Naples was destabilised by bands sent over 
from Sicily by Ferdinand IV and Murat was eventually executed by the re-established 
Bourbon authorities.33
The restoration of the Bourbon dynasty in France was undermined by post-war 
economic and political problems. Clausewitz identified the passion of the nation, the affection 
of the marshals, the lack of gold and condition of the National Guard to be the fundamental 
liabilities.34 In March 1815 Napoleon returned to France where he was well-received by the 
citizens of Grenoble and Lyon. Government troops under Marshal Ney who were sent to 
apprehend the outlaw defected to Napoleon’s cause and Louis XVIII fled the capital on 
19720th March.35 Napoleon tried to broaden his base of support to encompass old
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revolutionaries like Barere and Carnot and liberal opportunists like Benjamin Constant. The 
government worked to promulgate a more liberal constitution and plebiscites showed strong 
public support in east, less so in the south and west.36 When Clausewitz heard of Napoleon’s 
escape he worried most of all about the reaction of the French people. He felt assured that 
beyond the screams of the Parisian mobs the majority of soldiers and civilians would continue 
to support of the Bourbons or remain passive bystanders. To avert the possibility of civil war 
and unite the nation Napoleon would try quick conquests to awaken the vanity of the people 
and the army. It was of utmost importance in Clausewitz’s opinion to intervene quickly and 
save another year or more of fighting.37
The campaign o f 1815
At the Congress of Vienna the Quadruple Alliance renewed their mutual pledges for a second 
invasion to overthrow the regime.38 Displaying once again his amazing energy and 
determination Napoleon extemporised a field force some 188,000-men strong with another
100.000 regulars stationed in forts and depots. An additional 300,000 hastily-raised levies 
went into training from March to June. This was not quite enough to match the 680,000-
700.000 allied soldiers being mobilised so Napoleon went on the offensive. He first set his 
sights on the forces gathering in Belgium: Wellington’s Anglo-Dutch army of 95,000 men 
and Bliicher’s 124,000 Prussians (not including a corps of 26,000 in Luxembourg).39 
Clausewitz experienced the campaign first-hand by serving as chief-of-staff to General 
Johann von Thielmann’s III Army Corps. This force indirectly helped the victory at Waterloo 
by using the battles of Ligny and Wavre as distractions.40
Clausewitz later pondered over the reasons why Napoleon took just 130,000 against 
Wellington and Blucher and left almost two-thirds of his strength on other fronts or on 
internal guard duty. The reason was political: Napoleon’s position was so tenuous he had to 
maintain a strong impression in the eyes of the people and guard against uprisings.41 
Napoleon may have talked about raising all Frenchmen aged 20-60 years into 3,000 battalions 
of National Guards, thus giving him over 2,000,000 combatants but Clausewitz thought this 
was a fantasy impossible to put into practice 42 Even if Napoleon had destroyed the Anglo- 
Prussian forces he would still have to face the overwhelming might of Austria and Russia43
Put simply, political conditions had not been aligned for Napoleon to draw on the 
manpower, materials, fortified cities and other national assets of France. To fight a defence- 
in-depth or a true war of insurrection required in theory a completely loyal, devoted, 
undivided and enthusiastic people. The Bonapartist party was in reality opposed openly in the
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Legislative Assembly by royalists and republicans. The National Guard served to watch over 
the city-populace rather than defend them from attack. The nation was too divided and 
unprepared to meet the costs of a protracted and exhausting war so Napoleon was forced to 
adopt an aggressive battle-centric strategy more akin to Alexander of Macedonia than 
Alexander of Russia.44 Had he won the Battle of Waterloo (Belle Alliance) on 18th June the 
victoiy would have electrified the ‘self-satisfied French’ and demoralised both his external 
and internal enemies.45 The psychological and political effects of defeat however meant the 
way lay open to Paris and overthrow of the regime 46
It is interesting that Clausewitz notes the allies adjusted their line of advance to avoid 
areas not already traversed and spoilt by the retreating army so they could arrive at Paris not 
too unduly weak.47 The Prussian advance instilled fear and Gneisenau had a terrifying drum­
beat sounded out at the head of the 4th Corps deliberately for this effect48 Clausewitz explains 
how the Prussian army marched in two columns, the left wing consisting of I Corps, the right 
consisting of IV Corps, with III Corps following. The left column advanced to Avesnes,
Guise and La Fere, subjecting each garrisoned-place to bombardment with mixed degrees of 
success49 General Zieten and the guns of I Corps targeted the military defences of Avenses 
(held by 1,700 national guardsmen and 200 veterans). Unfortunately, one shell hit the fort’s 
main powder magazine and laid the town waste.50 Clausewitz’s travelogue described the 
collateral damage inside Avesnes when its garrison surrendered:
‘This place has a rather strong fortress and the city itself is not without significance. 
General Zieten had shelled it for several days, and by chance one of the shells hit the 
powder magazine. The explosion was so enormous that two-thirds of the city lay in 
ruins. I have never seen a picture of such destruction in my entire life. We stayed in 
the house that had suffered the least damage; even so the door of my room had been 
lifted out of its hinges and the main entrance to the house had been wrecked to such 
an extent that it could not be opened. The number of inhabitants killed by the 
explosion was estimated at more than 100. Entire streets were full of rubble and 
impassable; in other streets all the roofs were gone. The scene was highly depressing, 
and I will never forget the impression made on me by a young child, who was looking 
out the window of such a shattered house and rejoiced at the sight of our troops 
marching by.’51
From Dammartin at Paris on 29th June 1815 Clausewitz wrote that he found the mood of the 
people totally dull with no trace of decisive hate against Napoleon, and even less supporters 
for the Bourbons. In the best case they were open to a republican constitution, the son of 
Bonaparte, or even an Orleans.52 His campaign history explains that Napoleon’s support in 
the National Legislature and Chamber of Deputies had dissolved due to the intrigues of 
Joseph Fouche and the emperor was again forced to abdicate on 22nd June. The chambers 
named a commission of five and a diplomatic delegation was sent to the invaders appealing
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for a ceasefire to once again spare Paris from a bloody siege. On 3rd July all sides agreed on 
the cessation of hostilities, I Corps marched into Paris on the 7th and Louis XVIII returned the 
following day.53 Clausewitz’s life-long struggle was finally over and his hatred of the French 
had by now turned to a grudging admiration of their martial spirit as well as the nation’s 
beautiful art, architecture, royal palaces and countryside. Clausewitz was too exhausted for 
thoughts of revenge and just wanted to enjoy peace with his wife.54
Winning peace
The dilemma of how exactly to make the transition from war to peace, or the jus post bellum 
tradition of how to treat a defeated enemy in order to ensure a lasting peace was not entirely 
explored by Clausewitz.55 ‘Wars begin at the will of anyone, but they do not end at anyone’s 
will’ wrote Niccolo Machiavelli.56 His treatise The Prince addressed the problem of how deal 
with the inevitable grievances of a defeated people by arguing while there may be those 
willing to change masters in nearly every case there would be certain individuals and 
potential troublemakers to remove by means of exile, imprisonment or execution.57
Machiavelli advised that when one was conquering a mixed principality for the first 
time local languages, customs and institutions should be left untouched and the country 
garrisoned with a minimum of troops because it was merely an expensive way to cause 
resentment. Going to the effort of a second conquest or squashing a rebellion was generally 
seen as justification for harsher punishment.58 The choice and severity of methods varied from 
case to case according to the history of the two sides and unique political conditions such as 
whether the enemy society was an empire centralised around a single overlord like Darius III, 
a patchwork of feudal lords loosely assembled around a weak king like medieval France, or a 
popular republic; the latter being the worst situation.59
Machiavelli explained that the Romans and medieval city-states resolved their wars 
by bringing the enemy to battle or laying waste to his territory, after which they would either 
augment a defeated people and win their loyalty, or ruin them so frightfully that they could 
never be a threat again.60 The oration of Cato and the destruction of Carthage had a powerful 
resonance in European culture because it encapsulated the cleansing notion of cartharsis.61 
Over the centuries, notions of chivalry and religion as well as political reason and sense of 
balance of power encouraged disputing princes to wage wars according to just aims and 
confer mercy on the subjects taken from a rival. Eighteenth century philosophers expected 
rulers to wage war in defence, to prosecute their rights, or prevent some injury, but never to 
aggressively destroy other states.62
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Returning once again to Vattel we find the argument that all nations are entitled to 
certain rights such as independence, equality, justice, and the freedom to interact with other 
nations as they all strive to better the existence of mankind.63 One may wage war for security 
and self-defence and assist another people to uphold such values or punish offenders, 
madmen and religious fanatics.64 Vattel rejected the Roman treatment of conquered peoples 
yet he did permit reprisals against property and people so long as it fell short of death or 
corporal punishment.65 In language similar to Clausewitz’s note dated 10 July 1827, Vattel 
argues one may punish the enemy by depriving him of some his rights, taking from him some 
towns and provinces, imposing tribute.66 It is dishonourable to kill the opposing king, execute 
prisoners, or harm the ordinary people unless they take up arms.67 If ‘a fierce and savage 
people’ do not submit to the conqueror then a state of war still exists so ‘he may even, if 
necessary, keep them some time in a kind of slavery’ until their impetuous spirit has been 
curbed.68
Political reason and the passion for revenge
The Revolutionary Wars had brought forth primordial passions for destruction with the 
rhetoric of of national survival, regenerative struggle and righteous fury. Men like Saint Just 
had compared the struggle to the Punic Wars and talked of exterminating their enemies like 
Carthage. Napoleon on the other hand preferred to dominate and exploit defeated societies for 
economic advantage and glory.69 The policy of his enemies by contrast was in danger of being 
emancipated by popular passions for revenge. Stein had once confessed a desire in 1794 to 
see the capital destroyed,70 and Russian colleagues derogatively likened him to Cato.71 Years 
of humiliating oppression had nurtured intensely Francophobic feelings in Clausewitz yet he 
usually distrusted those who were ruled more by their hearts than their heads.72 Clausewitz 
disparaged for example the journalist Josef Gorres who wrote for the Rheinischer Merkur 
until the journal’s suppression in 1816:
‘During Bonaparte’s reign Gorres kept quite still, like all others who later became so 
noisy. Once the power of France was broken, however, he came out enthusiastically 
for the German cause in his Merkur,’73
In 1815 Gorres felt that while it was physically impossible to annihilate 30,000,000 people 
the allies had to take revenge against the French for the violation of persons and goods during 
their arrogant conquest of Europe.74 In Clausewitz’s estimation Gorres was an intelligent man 
with an admirable ability to rouse the feelings of others. He was dangerously unreliable in his 
political allegiances and subject to the same kind of passions which had consumed the
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revolutionary leaders.75 For all the rhetoric and propaganda of fiery civilian intellectuals and 
soldiers it was the politicians who resolved on a policy to liberate France lfom the tyranny of 
Bonaparte.76
The Treaty of Paris (30th May 1814) was quite lenient by the standards of other 
centuries; there were no mass shootings of civilians or the burning down of cities. Mettemich 
and the English Viscount Castlereagh were so committed to the Bourbon restoration that no 
war indemnity was imposed and the country was accorded the boundaries of 1792.77 When 
this peace failed the Prussian military chiefs and the British Prime Minister Lord Liverpool 
wanted to punish the French people for embracing Napoleon.78 Castlereagh, Wellington, 
Mettemich and the Tsar were more suspicious of Prussia’s intentions and persevered for a 
long-term settlement to reinstall the monarchy and restore France to the European balance of
79power.
Blucher and Gneisenau had wanted a triumphant entry into Paris, Napoleon executed 
in revenge for the murder of the Duke of Enghien and the monuments of his victories 
destroyed because they were affronts to the sorrows inflicted upon the violated nations of 
Europe. The vindictive nature of the soldiers was cause for much complaint over lodgings, 
rations and day-to-day civil-military relations. The authorities protested that the violence 
could escalate into another full-blown conflict. Wellington and Frederick William waded into 
the crisis and the embittered Prussian chiefs relented.80 Clausewitz was not a participant of the 
decision-making process and was moved around with Thielmann’s Corps through Paris to 
Fontainebleau, then Orleans and finally to Le Mans to assure public order in the north-west.81 
In a letter to his wife dated 12th July Clausewitz expressed the opinion that the best policy was 
to deprive French of their weapons without damaging their pride so the self-righteous attitude 
of the Prussians was wrong:
‘You can easily judge in how false and hostile a position this puts us toward the 
French and toward Louis XVm, the more so since the English secretly favored the 
king’s entry [into Paris], since they remain in camp, don’t levy contributions, and 
don’t loot. The worst seems to me that we fall between two stools—we spoil our 
relations with the French government and the French people simultaneously—and we 
don’t really know what we want. Our king arrived in Paris the evening before last, 
and as he revoked the order to blow up the Pont de Iena (after three small mines had 
been set off without the least effect) the drama turned to farce and the French 
displeasure with us is not much increased. Be that as it may, I find our behaviour 
lacking in that nobility that best suits the victor, and in the conflux of these peculiar 
actions and reactions it even acquires a degree of gaucheness and absurdity.’82
Clausewitz wrote that his greatest desire was for this shameful epilogue to come to an end:
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‘I dislike this position of having my foot upon someone’s neck, and the endless 
conflicts of interests and parties are something I do not understand. Historically, the 
English will play the better role in this catastrophe, because they do not seem to have 
come here with a passion for revenge and for settling old scores, but rather like a 
master who wishes to discipline with proud coldness and immaculate purity; in brief, 
with greater distinction than ourselves.’83
The English had under differing historical circumstances in the past brought fire and sword to 
France and her colonial settlements in the past.84 The burning of Washington the previous 
August showed that British commanders could be extremely vindictive towards the civilian 
property.85 Clausewitz knew what it felt like to have one’s country conquered and wrote that 
love and loyalty take time to take root in the heart of men but hatred and vengeance can be 
ignited in an instant.86 Repression only produces more hatred and enmity.87 ‘No disaster can 
make the French give in completely, not even humiliation’ wrote Clausewitz in 1815, ‘They 
regard us with a fierce, cold arrogance, with a scarcely concealed air of wickedness’.88
Clausewitz opposed disrespectful measures towards an enemy laid prostrate on moral 
as well as practical grounds. In his experience the targeting of civilians only enraged human 
passions; the burning of Smolensk and Moscow had an inflammatory effect on the Russians 
and new disgraces committed in France would only provoke another people’s war.89 From 
Etampes he wrote to Gneisenau on 24th July that military defeat and a punitive occupation had 
not sufficed to reduce the people to humility and deception.90 Carnot was already spreading 
false rumours and the military occupation risked arousing an armed rebellion. The experience 
of Spain had shown that a rising of the land (‘Aufstand des Landes’) is not an easy thing to 
disarm.91
In another letter sent from Le Mans dated 18th August Clausewitz repeated the danger 
of arousing a people’s war in the Vendee.92 He suggested Gneisenau read Alphonse 
Beauchamp’s Histoire de la guerre de la Vendee et des Chouans (Paris: 1806) and the 
Memoirs de Madame la Marquise de La Rochejaquelin (Paris: 1815).93 It will be recalled that 
Le Mans had been the place where the insurgents and their civilian followers suffered a 
massacre on 12th December 1793. Clausewitz describes how his room still bore the collateral 
damage of the battle and to this day the land is mainly royalist while are the towns more 
republican. There was now a common hatred gathering toward the new government and its 
foreign guardians:
‘ ... the requisition of cloth and shoes, the confiscation of public moneys, the nature of 
foreign occupation, which has been unknown in these parts since the Hundred Years’
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War, the disarming of the National Guard and of the countryside to the extent already 
carried out—these measures have already alienated opinion, and I believe that 
inconsiderate treatment could easily provoke people into insurrection.’94
If the people were to rebel Clausewitz does not offer a practical military solution. Any 
attempt at an unconditional disarmament of the land would encounter various difficulties such 
as the ‘disgusting’ nature of the terrain and the fact the people could simply hide their 
weapons thus reverting to non-combatant status.95 In short, it was useless to try and would 
only increase the bitterness: ‘It is unwise to push to the limit the exasperation of these people, 
who took up arms from the same cause as we did, only with more enthusiasm and greater 
daring’.96
In other letters Clausewitz warned Marie that the country was too unsafe to visit since 
there were bands of armed men openly roaming the Champagne. He lamented the diminished 
magnanimity of the allies since the Congress at Vienna, Prussia’s punitive attitude, the 
unpopular requisitioning of its armies, and the division of the country between royalists, 
revolutionaries and Bonapartists. If the nation had to be pacified by force the armies would 
occupy the whole country in a matter of weeks only to find this would cause more tensions.97 
On 21st July he wrote:
‘[We] have lots of unpleasant collisions [with the inhabitants] because we find 
conditions so confused that the idea of friend and foe is hardly distinguishable. I have 
little peace of mind about the future ... it is with horror that I think we should spend 
the whole summer in this situation.’98
It is not easy to understand why Clausewitz avoided the issue of how to deal with an 
insurrection and subscribed to the idea that it was so difficult to suppress when in other 
materials, particularly those written in the later 1820s, he suggests it cannot withstand regular 
forces. Granted, there was no clear counter-insurgency doctrine at this time. General Hoche 
had nevertheless set an good military example; less disdainful at least than the scorched-earth 
and massacres Turreau had used against the Vendee.99 The region rose again in 1815 and the 
Chouans reappeared in Brittany only to be held in check by Napoleon’s security forces. A 
division of regulars under the charge of Jean Maximilien Lamarque crushed the Vendeans at 
Lege on 20th June and peace was made five days later.100 Government troops proved sufficient 
to suppress the royalists and insurgent militia or miquelets in the department of the Gard.101
Despite these examples it was generally believed by the Germans who served in 
Spain that a united people’s war was unstoppable and involved uncontrollable horror which 
neither side could entirely control.102 In 1815 Albert Jean Michel Rocca for example
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published his account of the French atrocities he witnessed there and helped perpetuate the 
myth that a national war was impossible to subdue because the terror of arms had no effect.103 
That year there were a warning signs of an impending humanitarian catastrophe: in the Alsace 
region the Prussian and Hessian occupiers under Grand Duke of Wiirttemberg took reprisals 
against guerrilla resistance by razing villages and executing inhabitants.104
Peace prevails
It was fortunate that the difficult job restoring a lasting peace within France fell into the 
skilful hands of Wellington and the French Foreign and Prime Minister Armand-Emmanuel 
du Plessis, Duke of Richelieu.105 There were of course incidences of sporadic mob violence 
such as the massacre of Maulmont’s garrison at Nimes and state-organised repression, which 
claimed the lives of many Bonapartists including General Ramel and Marshal Brune and 
Ney.106 The White Terror gradually abated as administrators and civil servants were replaced 
and the regime concentrated on more liberal reforms and manipulative policies designed to 
stave off the revolutionaries and ensure that moderates and royalists kept winning elections to 
the Chamber of Deputies.107 Wellington was careful not to undermine the reputation of the 
Bourbon regime and attempted to reduce the imposition of the British army with strict 
disciplinary regulations for both rank and file, as well as prompt legal responses to the 
complaints of civilian communities.108
The Second Treaty of Paris (20th November 1815) was much more stringent than the 
first. France was forced to give up more territory, pay an indemnity of 700,000,000francs, 
bear the costs of 150,000-200,000 allied troops, and find daily forage for 50,000 horses. The 
total costs of such indemnities and foreign occupation were in excess of 1,500,000,OOO.109 By 
late 1816 and early 1817 the huge strain of these financial demands led to a temporary 
suspension of payments and the allies agreed to reduce the size of their occupation forces.110 
France was able to pay the war indemnity without interest and a conference of Aix-Chapelle 
transferred the remaining obligations to the banking houses Hope and Baring and Rothschild. 
The claims for damages and debts contracted in occupied countries went beyond what France 
could realistically pay so Wellington arbitrated for a fair settlement for all parties and even 
tried to tone down the hostile press in the Netherlands.111
In the long run Richilieu, Wellington and thousands of other individuals such as 
Madame de Stael worked behind the scenes, pulling strings and soothing tensions.112 So 
successful were they at creating the right political, economic, and social conditions for France 
to fulfill the treaty stipulations that the occupying forces were able to pull out two years ahead
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of schedule.113 In later years Clausewitz wondered whether the allies had been too lenient in 
their caution not to inspire revenge. The flaring up of international tension and the potential 
threat of millions of armed Frenchman in 1831 showed that even a seemingly disarmed and 
pacifist nation could revive its spirits for war.114
The future o f war
After the wars, Clausewitz and contemporaries such as Lossau, Lilienstem and Jomini had 
time to reflect on events and the implications for the future. They were all impressed by the 
sheer scale and intensity with which armies and whole societies had gone to war. The result 
manifested itself most clearly in a higher incidence and scale of battles.115 Sometime around 
1817-18 Clausewitz wrote Gneisenau an essay entitled ‘On Progression and Pause in Military 
Activity’.116 Like On War, it explains that the essence of war is like a swift, unstoppable or 
unimpeded advance: violent, bloody, and decided quickly by battle.117
The essay then tries to explain why war in reality does not always conform to logical 
necessities and why both opponents are either unwilling or unable to achieve a major decision 
to throw the other down. The reasons most obvious to Clausewitz are the gambling mentality 
(‘Spieler Philosophic’) of the human mind, the dynamic between attack and defence and the 
concept of friction in the military machine.118 He comes close to linking the answer to 
changes in armed forces, their societies and the degree of involvement by the masses. If the 
war making-power of a people is only represented by the army which marches off to battle, 
the battle and campaign will be decisive. The battles of the ancients in Asia happened so fast 
and without hesitation because the troops could only stay together for short periods of time.119
Clausewitz goes on to say that the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
saw the separation of the masses from war so it became a contest of armies and sieges. The art 
of war was largely preoccupied with tents, baggage, flour wagons, bakeries rather than bloody 
fighting.120 The Revolution and arrival of Bonaparte meant that a new structure of resistance 
had to be constructed: the Landwehr or arming of the people. The false weapons (‘die 
flashchen Waffen’) of war created in the eighteenth century were destroyed by the new 
outbreak of raw elements more accordance with the violent purpose or spirit of war.121 The 
old civilised ways were now a peculiarity of histoiy:
‘The future will also have to show what wars will really look like. In the 17th and 18th 
century wars, only the first few battles are seen as the real war and what followed 
appears more as a management of the armed peace. In the first anger of the raised 
passions and offended interests, the parties attack each other heavily -  through injury
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and loss of blood they are brought back to their senses and cool down. But they still 
remain armed against each other, expecting from the other side words of surrender 
and peace. Each believes that during that time his opponent will commit a mistake or 
that they themselves will benefit from a lucky circumstance. It is not difficult to 
realise that if these beliefs are not based on real causes, they cannot be possible for 
both sides at the same time -  these fantasies of hopes and expectations cannot find a 
place in theory.’122
The logic of war was inherently pressing towards destruction and the increasing involvement 
of the people only helped it to achieve that violent aim, and more suffering besides. Recent 
experience had revealed to Clausewitz and Fichte that war was longer about destroying 
armies and taming arrogant rulers like Napoleon but also subjugating entire peoples.123 It was 
fortunate that by 1815 Napoleon’s passion and political reason to make war was only faintly 
echoed by French people so the failing conqueror could not fall back on the support of 
people.124 After France was rehabilitated back into family of European nations its military 
strength was restored to a level that outmatched Prussia.125 Clausewitz predicted that 
European wars of the future would colossal struggles waged by millions of men and the full 
national resources of the state.126
It was little wonder that Clausewitz was skeptical about the ability of 
humanitarianism or international relations to control war. Apart from the Congress of Vienna 
and a balance of power system, which had tended to check ambitions rulers like Frederick 
Barbarossa, Frederick the Great and Napoleon in the past, there was really no supranational 
authority or reliable mechanism for building coalitions to stop smaller states like Prussia or 
Poland being swallowed up by predatoiy powers. There was no moral authority to define or 
enforce the protection of non-combatants.127 Clausewitz therefore stood by the militaristic 
belief, which was consistent with Enlightenment philosophy, that a civilised state must stay 
strong and counteract the softness and human desire for an easy life, which debases a people 
in times of peace and growing prosperity, with an invigorating war from time to time.128
After the wars the Prussian government tried to undo its militaiy reforms, disband the 
Landsturm and incorporate the Landwehr units into the regular army because it was feared 
they would become vehicles for social revolution.129 As a professional soldier, Clausewitz had 
his fair share of criticism for part-time amateur soldiers. He pointed to their lack of horses and 
equestrian experience, sloppy drill, poor discipline and unreliability in combat. He also 
recognised that there was a social distain among the noble classes about serving alongside 
peasants and a horror of revolution. The risk of the latter was marginalised by the external 
danger of the giant powers to the East and West. The Landwehr and Landsturm were essential
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safety mechanisms for raising large numbers of combatants and engaging the martial passions 
of the people to fend off foreign invasion.130
Public opinion and counter-insurgency
It is interesting that Clausewitz thought so much about popular passions being used in defence 
and gave little thought about how to defeat such elemental forces when mobilised on the 
enemy’s side.131 The 1812 Principles o f War fails to elaborate on how to gain public opinion 
other than to say it is won through great victories and the occupation of the enemy’s capital.132 
According to Beatrice Heuser Clausewitz ‘doesn’t solve this riddle of whether it is one’s own 
or the enemy’s public opinion one has to win, or perhaps even ‘world opinion’, a subject on 
which Clausewitz’s colleague Riihle von Lilienstem was much more articulate.’133 In On War 
Clausewitz prescribes little on how to change the enemy’s will or how to calm down, 
neutralise or remove the passions aroused in their people other than winning big spectacular 
battles, capturing capitals and negotiating a peace settlement from which he hopes the peace- 
loving or reasonable majority will accept.134
As we have shown, Clausewitz championed the defensive potential of guerrilla 
warfare and drafted some excellent ideas on its organisation, operational conduct and combat 
technique.135 Where he really failed was to offer a clear prescription of how to counter a 
hostile people’s war and stop enemy civilians taking up arms.136 In 1812 Clausewitz hoped 
that there would be wars of the future in which neither side would be forced take recourse to 
the last measure of a people’s uprising.137 Writing sometime in the mid-1820s he speculated 
that should Prussia ever go to war with France again, it could choose a line of advance from 
Strasbourg partly because it ‘runs through rich, level, populated areas with few warlike 
inhabitants’ and there was less danger of being exposed to ‘extraordinary means of defense’ 
by which he meant guerrilla operations.138 In some cases the problem will not materialise 
because the weaker side cannot take refuge in a Volksbewaffnung or lacks a proper militia 
system (‘Landwehrstande’).139
When insurgency does indeed become a problem On War merely hints at what might 
be done to stop it. One option is to garrison and police a hostile area in order to protect one’s 
own lines of communication and officials.140 Clausewitz almost seems to repeat the advice of 
Johann von Ewald that soldiers should be kept disciplined and well-behaved towards the 
population, help repair any damages and earn the people’s respect.141 Where there are periodic 
raids from irregular bands or partisans one’s convoys and traffic can seek refuge in fortresses, 
staging posts and stopping places.142 Another passive measure, or action without a positive
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purpose, to oppose national levies is to provide armed escorts for vulnerable convoys or 
detach units to install military outposts and guard key stations, defiles and bridges.143 This 
obviously depletes the force of attack of an invading army but such is the ‘need to occupy the 
area in the rear so as to secure their lines of communication and exploit its resources’.144 The 
French had to assign some 70,000 troops for this purpose in Spain, more than the whole 
British force committed.145
The horrifying example of the Vendee and Spain had shown Clausewitz that a 
counter-insurgent could try to demoralise the rebels by inhumane treatment and executions. 
The insurgents could in turn ‘repay atrocity with atrocity, outrage with outrage’ and lead the 
enemy ‘back into the boundaries of self-control and humanity.’146 In On War Clausewitz 
drops hints about the punitive measures of the enemy: if inhabitants are collected in villages, 
the most restless and troublesome villages could be made to endure the imposition of troops 
garrisoned on them, or have their homes looted and burned down as punishment.147 This 
particular passage was referred by Sir Charles Dilke to oppose the scorched-earth and 
concentration camps used to undermine the guerrillas during the Second Anglo-Boer War 
(1899-1902).148 Clausewitz does not advocate such methods of barbarism on either moral or 
practical grounds. The great emphasis on combat throughout On War rather encourages the 
reader to disregard interdiction and terrorisation as minor investments that can yield only 
minor dividends.149
Clausewitz’s work as a whole leads one to assume that the physical and moral 
resistance of a people’s war will collapse under concentrated blows of a professional army. 
Although counter-insurgency was more demanding in military virtues, because it required 
one’s own soldiers to be split up from the genius of commander,150 Clausewitz felt it was not 
beyond one’s power to conquer a general uprising.151 If the reader accepts that enemy 
insurgents are most useful in the framework of a national war (Nationalkriege) conducted 
principally by the regular army (das Heer), and operate best in difficult terrain by avoiding 
battle then it seems logical for their opponent to catch the insurgents in the open and subject 
them to the same demoralising slaughter deserving of the professional combatants.152 
Clausewitz writes one can ‘direct sufficient force at its core, crush it, and take many 
prisoners. When that happens, the people will lose heart and, believing that the issue has been 
decided and further efforts would be useless, drop their weapons.’153
This dissertation has already highlighted numerous cases in Switzerland, Italy and the 
Tyrol where this approach worked. It has also indicated that Clausewitz was dismissive of 
insurgents and militia as second-rate troops who cannot function in a debilitating atmosphere
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too full of danger or cope with too many defeats because they lack special military virtues.154 
The last chapter of book eight forecasts a future war in France where the allies may have to 
face militia, national levies and hurriedly-mobilized rabble (‘Landmilizen, Volksbewaffnung, 
zusammengerafftes GesindeP) in wooded country and mountainous areas and passes.155 A 
hostile local populace, supported by raiding parties or partisans (‘Streifparteien’), could 
disrupt the communications and supply of the armies. Clausewitz assumes that a corps of 
about 10,000 or 15,000 men, particularly strong in cavalry, will be able to drive off every 
partisan band (‘Parteiganger’) and serve as a link between the two offensives.156
This may strike the reader as rather blunt and simplistic in light of the Franco- 
Prussian War of 1870. Yet other cases of guerrilla warfare in Western Europe, Africa, India 
and the Caucasus seemed to confirm its weakness to decisive combats.157 Clausewitz looked 
at the problem purely from the military standpoint of major war and did not develop a ‘hearts 
and minds’ approach, which should in itself be seen merely as policy by other means. It 
seems more natural and in keeping with the logic of war that the destruction of enemy 
combatants, soldiers, insurgents, militia, armed peasants, or whatever else they are called, will 
go on indefinitely until, as Jomini put it, the storms of human passions abate and people are 
brought back to their more rational senses or politics intervenes to make them put down their 
weapons.158
The logic propounded in On War and other texts like Vattel’s Law o f Nations largely 
supports the concept of destroying anyone and everyone who takes up arms. When an 
individual (whether they are a man, a women or a child) picks up a weapon (be it a rifle or 
rock) to use with hostile intent and make themselves a combatant they immediately expose 
themselves to the logical object(s) of war, strategy, combat, defence and attack all of which 
lead to the disarmament or destruction of the enemy armed forces. By merely picking a 
weapon the individual forfeits whatever peculiar protection that has been has socially defined 
by political conditions and enters an unforgiving realm of violence where they will remain a 
target for destruction so long they remain armed. ‘The day a man picks up his pike to become 
a soldier is the day he ceases to be a Christian’ wrote the sixteenth-century Spanish soldier 
Francisco de Valdes.159 Renowned jurists and theologians like Francisco de Vitoria similarly 
argued that anyone capable of bearing arms was a potential enemy.160
If this military philosophy was not terrifying enough Clausewitz was also alarmed by 
the human passions and ideological politics fuelling the destructive wars of his lifetime 
maybe because, as Hans Rothfels put it, ‘they involved the very existence of the nations 
concerned and, as in the religious wars of the sixteenth century, they involved opposing
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principles, opposing philosophies of life.’161 In his own reflections on Clausewitz and war, T. 
E. Lawrence thought that it was ‘idiotic’ to put two incompatible philosophies or religions to 
the test of force ‘for while opinions were arguable, convictions needed shooting to be cured; 
and the struggle could end only when the supporters of one immaterial principle had no more 
means of resistance against the supporters of the other.’162 When individuals resort to war 
they have essentially decided to kill their way to a political solution and the violence is 
restrained, barely, by humanitarian sentiment and political control. Unarmed persons will be 
targeted depending on human passions, political conditions, or whether it is an effective 
means to a political end, which it rarely was in Clausewitz’s opinion.
Ultimately, Clausewitz does not address the big problem of neutralising the passions 
aroused in a people’s war and cops out with the rather weak excuse that it was all relatively 
new.163 He wrote that arming the people brought about an erosion of conventional barriers and 
questioned whether it was salutary for humanity but he conveniently avoided addressing the 
moral implications and left the question for the philosophers.164 The attacker enters hostile 
territory in the hope that the defender will become discouraged and disarmed thus allowing 
for efforts to slacken off on both sides. Clausewitz naturally cautions that this can backfire if 
the defender is fired into greater resistance.165 Heuser is quite right to assert that Clausewitz’s 
perspective was that of the would-be insurgent. How to counter enemy insurgents was not a 
subject to which he gave much attention, notwithstanding the fact that he witnessed a brutally 
successful counter-insurgency against Poland.166
The final campaign
It seems natural to finish the narrative on the final campaign against Poland and find out why 
Clausewitz supported the forces of counter-reaction. There were of course numerous other 
cases of insurgency and state-suppression in the 1820s, particularly in Spain and Portugal 
where the monarchist authorities repudiated on promises for constitutional reform with 
bloody results.167 Clausewitz read Leopold von Ranke’s Die Serbische Revolution (Hamburg,
1829) and was no doubt aware of the massacres and enslavements carried out in the Balkans 
and Greece.168 It was the disturbances in Belgium and Poland in late 1830 which dominated 
the thoughts of Clausewitz’s in the run up to his premature death because they were so closely 
connected to the threat of a resurgent France.169
Clausewitz was reinvigorated by the crisis and made chief-of-staff to Field Marshal 
Gneisenau.170 His war plans stated that if an enemy government in Paris has a strong hand of 
victories and does not hurt the interests of the people it can count on their support. It was
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essential then to cause a divisive split separating the people from their government in order to 
compel the latter to do one’s will. At the start of the war when passions are running high the 
allies should aim for Paris where the knot of all parties is located.171 Unfortunately, even the 
best armed successes could never defeat or enforce obedience from a totally united French 
nation.172 Where the people are in a state of agitation one has to consider the problem of home 
guards and national miltias.173 Clausewitz was surprisingly cautious about launching a 
penetrative invasion into France and recommended that Prussia may be better served waging 
a defensive campaign to start then teaming up with the allies for one unstoppable drive on 
Paris. Clausewitz later amended his plans for an offensive dive through Belgium in order to 
take advantage of its geostrategic importance, transportation networks, links with England 
and Holland, as well as local Orangist support.174
It is worth noting that after the wars Prince William of Orange returned to the 
Netherlands to reign over Holland and Belgium. Years of socio-economic grievances 
culminated in a major revolt when the Belgians from the middle and peasant classes took up 
arms in late August 1830. The disorganisation of the royalists and the delay they allowed for 
offers of amnesty to expire gave the rebels time to barricade Brussels and organise a 
provisional government. Dutch troops were harassed by insurgents out in the open and the 
garrisons of Antwerp, Luxembourg and Maastricht were quickly surrounded. In October the 
commander-in-chief and garrison commander at Antwerp, General Hendrik Chasse, ordered 
his men to open fire on the city causing a large loss of civilian life, which only strengthened 
anti-Dutch feeling. Diplomatic intervention by England and France helped assist the Belgians 
achieve independence much to the chagrin of Gneisenau and Clausewitz. Both men 
questioned the wisdom of the English and German public opinion for supporting the Franco- 
Belgian cause. They did concede that an intervention in Belgium and preventative war against 
France without a strong coalition and the hearts of the people was not in Prussia’s interests.175
The Dutch had requested the Tsar’s assistance from the start and as Russia mobilised 
its resources an insurrection broke out in Warsaw on 29th November. The conspirators were 
lucky to capitalise on old grievances and the revolt sent to viceroy’s forces into flight, 
abandoning valuable stores of ammunition to the insurgents in the process.175 The dictator 
nominated by the Poles, General Jozef Chlopicki, tried to profess peace and friendship 
towards the Tsar because he knew that the western powers would not intervene to save the 
extremists in the parliament who were inviting their own destruction by declaring the House 
of Ramanov forfeit. When Chlopicki resigned in mid-January a new national government was 
formed under Prince Adam George Czartoryski who was disclined to act in the dictatorial 
manner needed to master the situation. Squabbling factions within the Diet of Warsaw, now
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in permanent session, could agree on little except to reject Nicholas I and all projects for 
peace. Beyond their do-or-die rhetoric the patriots could not accept the peasant emancipation 
and other policies necessary to support a field army beyond 85,000 men. Nor did they call on 
Poles in lands possessed by Austria and Prussia for fear of provocation.177
It was to Clausewitz’s intense dissatisfaction that he was forced to observe this 
conflict with Prussian security forces stationed in the Grand Duchy of Posen.178 He had little 
sympathy with the Warsaw insurgents, their provisional government or the Polish people in 
general. There was rivalry between Prussia and the Poland that went back centuries and 
Clausewitz confessed his prejudices.179 ‘The whole existence of the Poles,’ he wrote to his 
wife in one pernicious letter, ‘is as though bound and held together by tom ropes and rags. 
Dirty German Jews, swarming like vermin in the dirt and misery, are the patricians of the 
land. A thousand times I thought if only fire would destroy this whole anthill [Anbau] so that 
this unending filth were changed by the purifying flames into clean ashes.’180 Clausewitz 
certainly admired the energy and determination of the Poles in the days of Sobieski but had 
contempt for the present day aspirations of the half-Tartar state because it had no place in the 
precarious balance of power.181 The Poles were a liability to Prussia’s security because they 
had always conspired to regain their independence by strengthening their historic ties with 
France.182
In January-February 1831 he wrote two papers basically arguing that a restored 
Poland would play to the advantage of France, which had less to fear from her neighbours 
than England, Prussia and Austrian combined did from a new revolutionary government in 
Paris. Unless these powers could exploit the disconnection between the French people and the 
radical Volkspartei in order to achieve an easy peace, they would have to go beyond a cabinet 
war and summon up the same kind energy exhibited by their people in 1813. The documents 
also indicate how much Clausewitz had backed away from the passions of the people since 
his youth. He thought the involvement of the masses and their explosively violent energies in 
the foreign affairs of the state would bring an unpredictable volatility that was neither 
effectual nor morally desirable. He had little faith in the Kantian belief that constitutional 
government or national self-determination was the best road to peace. Rather he shared 
Machiavelli’s belief that mankind was not universally driven towards ethical, intellectual 
progress but was for the most part temperamental, fickle and fad-ridden.183
According to Peter Paret the rising was for Clausewitz a conflict based less on 
reasons of state, but on foolish and irrational psychological motives, whose growing 
significance Clausewitz had repeatedly predicted in his manuscripts.184 As in Belgium
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Frederick William III and Christian von Bemstorff had no interest in intervening in Poland. 
Prussia assumed a non-combatant role and safeguarded its own provinces from insurrection 
by disabling the local Landwehr, enforcing strict censorship of the press and making threats to 
confiscate civilian property. By confiscating arms, intercepting diplomatic agents and putting 
funds under seal the Austrians and Prussians helped suffocate the Polish insurrection from 
international support and indirectly helped the Russians in their advance towards Warsaw.185
When the Polish generalissimo Jan Zygmunt Skrzynecki complained publically about 
this fact in June Clausewitz wrote an anonymous response to a local newspaper pointing out 
that neutrals were entitled to provide supplies just as Poland had in done the past. Clausewitz 
does not stress enough that the assistance Poland made to foreign powers during the Seven 
Years War was done under extreme duress. Not only was the land affected by the passage of 
troops, recruitment and levying of foodstuffs, their currency was debased when the Prussians 
mass produced their national coinage. Even after the wars Saxon and Polish women were 
secretly abducted to repopulate devastated provinces such as Pomerania. In On War 
Clausewitz at least repeats a proverb likening Poland to an inn where any rowdy crowd could 
come to partake whatever they wanted and leave whenever they pleased.186
Since the Polish insurgents were denied legal recognition by the international 
community the Prussian government was legally entitled to assist the Russians with regard to 
food, wagons and legitimate purchases. The bravery of the Poles was admirable to 
Clausewitz, their political cause was not because it would set a destabilising precedent.187 It 
was the French and demagogues like Joachim Lelewel who Clausewitz blamed above all for 
disturbing the international waters with their Jacobinism, as if disloyal revolt was the most 
sacred of rights.188 It is worth remembering that not until the 1970s were the rights of self- 
determining peoples against colonial regimes and foreign domination properly specified in 
international law. Bemstorff did insist on observing accepted legal procedures in the 
treatment of soldiers and refuges to facilitate a quick resolution of the crisis and reduce the 
movements of terrified and diseased refugees seeking asylum.189
The Russian aim in principle was to defeat the insurgents in combat and restore civil 
law and order. Field Marshal Diebitsch’s Russian army crossed frontier and issued manifestos 
calling on all loyal subjects to help this effort.190 A series of pyrrhic victories won by the 
Poles in early February were undone by a terrible defeat at Ostrol^nka on 26th May.191 The 
Russians were unable to exploit their victories due to exhaustion and threats to their lines of 
communication by civil uprisings in Lithuania and the Ukraine. Without Polish units for 
support these were snuffed out using conventional combats and threats to local nobles.192
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Under the new leadership of Marshal Paskevich the Russians made progress while the Polish 
commanders, politicians and people went in divergent directions. Half-hearted attempts to 
impose taxes, conscription and requisitions caused peasant resentment while also angering the 
extremists.193 Despite the problems of gathering intelligence during this time Clausewitz read 
the situation quite accurately and wrote on 9th June:
‘I reckon if a strong hand takes hold of the Russian sword, the free- 
willing/unimpeded overthrow of Poland will happen fairly quickly. Their armed 
forces are exhausted, the shoe is starting to press everywhere and put them under 
pressure, and the conflict of the aristocratic and democratic parties, which at the 
moment is developing further, could be the cause for the banner of nobility to be 
lowered earlier.’194
On the 23rd Clausewitz writes to Marie that trust in Skrzynecki was so weak, one expects his 
fall any day. The latest political acts and impositions for supplies have caused such divisive 
and violent opposition, even among the nobles, that many inhabitants begin to wish heartily 
for the brisk arrival of the Russians. The fall of Warsaw would help calm down the uprisings 
in the Russian rear.195 Clausewitz appreciated the problems facing their advance and grew 
impatient by the lack of single-minded purpose to go to the heart of the matter:
‘I'm very uncertain whether the Polish will get a tremendous scare and Skrzynecki 
will fall. Nonetheless they will defend themselves in Warsaw and it would take the 
energy of a Suvorov to pull off a decisive advantage. If Warsaw is to be defeated 
through hunger, then a dense and strong encirclement of both sides is required, and 
moreover, I am afraid that the Russians are not really strong enough now after so 
many postings. They have really fallen into the mistake, which we saw three months 
ago, of wanting to quash the insurrection in Lithuania and Volhynia on the spot and 
not in Warsaw.... You know, I trust him [Paskevich] because of his campaigns in 
Armenia. For the time being, General Toll has sent a few Cossack detachments over 
the River Vistula and spread great fear throughout the country; if Paskevich wanted to 
go across the Vistula, the concern for the success of the transition would at least be 
lifted this way.’196
The passions of the Polish people were not fired into greater resistance and the insurrection 
consumed itself in the sort of civil strife that Clausewitz had downplayed in his own calls for 
a people’s war in Prussia. By mid-August Warsaw fell into discord as radical mobs murdered 
General Jankowski and went on rampage for enemy spies, sympathisers and Jews.197 
Czartoryski fled and General Jan Krukowiecki stepped in as provisional president to begin 
negotiations for surrendering the capital. Soon after its evacuation on 8* September the Polish 
military leaders declared the insurrection over and the politicians fled into exile.198 The 
suburbs of Warsaw lay in ruins and the repression under Paskevich was severe in all respects: 
the ringleaders were executed, the diet was abolished, the constitution annulled, the language 
proscribed, the University of Wilno closed, the Catholic and Uniat Church were persecuted
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and thousands of families were transplanted to Russia or fled to other countries. Poland lost 
its separate status by the Organic Stature of 15th March 1832.199
Further insurrectionary disturbances such as the risings of 1846 and 1863 were 
crushed by Austria, Prussia and Russia ensuring that Poland lacked a political existence until 
the twentieth century.200 In light of these events C. B. A. Behrens later questioned the political 
position of Clausewitz. His inconsistent support of parliamentary institutions, his hardness to 
Polish demands for self-determination, and his acceptance of state authority, seemingly 
placed Clausewitz with the forces of reaction.201 Clausewitz indeed supported the hated 
policies of Oberprasident Flottwell which included confiscating the property of disloyal
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nobles in Posen, and he did call for harsher crackdowns on the pro-liberal press. If these
views against revolutionary liberalism have left a black mark on Clausewitz’s reputation in 
retrospect they were not usual for the time and were exaggerated by a concern for 
international security rather than support for cruel autocracy.204 When Clausewitz died in 
November 1831 the king lamented his passing with deep regret and an obituary in the Silesian 
Zeitimg praised the ‘high degree of humanity, justice and mercy’ of the deceased.205
Conclusion
In conclusion, Clausewitz thought it very fortunate that popular resistance did not materialise 
in France and the campaigns were resolved along conventional lines. Clausewitz called for 
lenient peace because he believed that a punitive policy risked provoking a people’s war. 
Given that Clausewitz forecast wars of the future to be costly national struggles it is 
interesting that he prescribes very little on how to defeat the enemy other than smashing their 
armed forces in combat until the government and its people have neither the political reason 
or the passion to continue fighting. The counter-insurgency campaigns in Belgium and Poland 
tended to reinforce Clausewitz’s belief that an insurgency could not stand against a regular 
army without the support of its own regular army or international support. His support for the 
suppression of Poland also seems consistent with his prejudices against the political 
aspirations of those particular people and his growing mistrust of popular passions in war.
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At the outset of undertaking this research it was unclear if Clausewitz wrote much about the 
participation and suffering of civilians or non-combatants in war. The dissertation thus set out 
to explore what exactly Clausewitz had to say on the general subject. It wanted to answer 
outstanding questions relating to whether or not Clausewitz supported deliberate attacks 
against such persons and their property. Despite the problems of using documents alternative 
to On War, it was necessary to widen the frame of reference beyond the treatise to cover 
campaign histories, militaiy memoranda, working notes and personal letters. On the basis of 
the evidence consulted the author has reached a conclusion: Clausewitz was morally and 
theoretically inclined towards conventional warfare between regular armed forces. He 
generally regarded the targeting of civilians, at least in his own times, as morally wrong, 
strategically ineffective and politically counter-productive.
To support this thesis the paper has shown how Clausewitz condemned the 
Revolution, the terror used against the Vendee and the way the French let loose their armies 
to pillage and plunder foreign lands, smacking down insurrectionary resistance with bloody 
success whenever it was caught unsupported by regular armies. To fight back Clausewitz 
preferred battle-centric warfare, not the massacre of enemy civilians. He seemed rather 
dismissive of the agricultural ravaging and atrocious sieges of the past and suggested that 
such warfare was a historical peculiarity due largely to the weaknesses of the armed forces 
and their host societies. The fact that civilians were becoming an important factor in the 
capacity to make war and did not lead him to advise harming them directly in either defence 
or attack.
Clausewitz downplayed the scorched-earth strategy used in Russia as unnecessary 
and was deeply distressed by the side-effects of collateral damage, burdensome contributions 
and general disruption to civil society. After the conquest of France, Clausewitz called for a 
lenient peace because he worried that punitive treatment would spark a people’s war. 
Clausewitz provides very little in the way of a practical solution to terminate war in that case 
except to keep smashing the enemy’s forces until the enemy policy-maker(s) and people give 
up their passion or political reason to fight. His study of insurrectionary warfare tended to 
reinforce the belief that such units stood little chance of success outside the framework of 
major military operations by the regular army and state government.
On the negative side, this dissertation has highlighted some very disturbing elements 
in Clausewitz’s thoughts about war and mankind. Although Clausewitz was imbued with the
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values of the Enlightenment he was critical of civilian publicists and military theorists striving 
for a bloodless form of war. Clausewitz instead propounded the logic of destroying the 
enemy’s combatants, which could engulf those forfeiting their non-combatant status by taking 
up arms. Clausewitz had little faith that the natural tendency towards violence could be 
limited by a temperamental sense of humanity or advancing levels of civilisation. As political 
weakness of states and the human ignorance about war and the methods of waging it 
disappeared the scale and intensity of its destruction would most likely increase.
Clausewitz makes it quite clear that a higher political aim and the increased 
involvement of the people can help war approximate its absolute conception. He especially 
distrusted impassioned political figures and revolutionary politics as key conditions likely to 
set forth a war of extermination. Clausewitz believed that political reason or rational 
intelligence stood a better chance of taming war to be merely an instrumental means to an 
end. The direct targeting of enemy civilians was not a legitimate means. He was however 
resigned to the fact that the suffering of civilian populations was inevitable, especially with 
regard to supply and collateral damage. He even accepted the possibility of enemy atrocities 
against non-combatants when resorting to people’s war and supported the suppression of 
Poland, which had terrible civil consequences.
What this all means for students of Clausewitz is that we should exercise caution and 
undertake more detailed research. Those fluent in the German language must step up to the 
challenge of translating sources other than On War. This inquiry has merely skimmed the 
surface and hopes to encourage others to delve deeper into these murky waters of war and 
civilians. Academics already seeking to understand the phenomenon more generally may 
perhaps retrieve some stimulating insights like the trinity and better appreciate why armed 
combatants are deviated from the logical job of destroying their opposite number. The study 
of Clausewitz and civilians ultimately makes one further appreciate the tenous distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants and how truly vulnerable the latter are unless 
humanitarian and political protections are asserted vigorously during all times of war.
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